ceffary, for their introduction, and perhaps have never formerly been conjoined with it; it feems to contribute to their introduction only by preventing an uneasiness which would indifpofe the mind for exerting its faculties.

SECT. III.

Of the Influence of the Paffions on Affociation.

T

HE other principle in human nature,

which has an influence on the affociation of ideas, which either promotes the introduction of fuch as are linked together by fome of the affociating qualities, or introduces ideas unconnected with each other, merely by means of their relation to itself, is a prefent paffion.

A PASSION in ftrict propriety means only fuch an emotion as is produced by fome one particular cause, and directed to fome one determinate object. There are feveral emotions, as remorse, self-approbation, and the like, which may perhaps be reckoned fenfations rather than paffions: but our present defign does not render it neceffary to attend to that distinction. A paffion is fomething different from an habitual temper or turn of mind: the L 2

latter

latter may in fome inftances have derived its origin from the frequent returns or the long continuance of a particular paffion; but once formed, it fubfifts without the operation of any particular caufe, and without being fixt on any precise object, and produces a permanent propensity to any fentiments or paffions which are congruous to it. But a paffion and an habitual temper have fo many things in common, that we may without any inconvenience include both in the cause of affociation which we are now examining: it will be fufficient to diftinguish them in particular inftances, when fuch fhall happen to occur, in which their influence on the introduction of ideas is different, or in which they run counter to one another.

In general, that the train of ideas fuggefted to the mind, has a very great dependence on the paffions, is obvious. Mention fome actions of a person whom we love; our love will fuggeft fuch circumftances as tend to make us approve these actions. Mention the very fame. actions to another who entertains refentment. againft the perfon who did them; and his imagination will immediately clothe them with fuch circumstances as destroy their merit, or render them blameable. Let us barely

think of any perfon: if we love him, we readily recollect and dwell upon the fair and worthy parts of his character; if we hate him, his wrong or fufpicious actions croud into our thoughts. The joyful heart runs eafily into a gay and pleafant train of think ing, but does not naturally recollect any thing that is gloomy, and instantly rejects it if it be fuggefted by peculiar caufes. The obferva tion holds of every emotion, paffion, and difpofition.

IT will be proper, however, to attempt a fuller explication of the manner in which the paffions influence the affociation of ideas. To understand this, is of great importance in a theory of the varieties of genius; for to give a just representation of the paffions, is one of the greatest efforts of genius; and it can be accomplished only by following those paths into which the paffions naturally direct the thoughts. But the influence of the paffions on the fucceffion of our ideas, though thus important, relates only to one fpecies of genius, genius for the arts. It would therefore be improper to enter on a full difcuffion of it at prefent, when we are tracing out the gene ral fources of the varieties of genius. In the obfervations which we are now to make on

this fubject, some examples will be necessary both for illuftrating and for confirming our principles. It may perhaps be thought most proper to draw thefe from our own experience in real life. But to be able to select examples from real life, and to fet them in a ftriking light, would require no small degree of one of the highest and rarest kinds of poetical genius. It will therefore be both the safest and the best way, to take our examples from fuch representations of the paffions in poetry, as are confessedly natural, and will approve themselves natural to the tafte of the reader. Such examples have as great authority as instances which a perfon himself obferves in or dinary life. Shakespear alone will almoft fupply us with as many as are necessary.

IN taking a general view of the influence of the paffions on affociation, it will be neceffary, first, to point out the manner in which they affect the nature of the ideas felected and introduced.

THERE are some ideas intimately connected with a paffion, as the object of the paffion, its cause, what is fit for fupporting it, or what gratifies it. Every paffion has a strong tendency to fuggeft fuch ideas, to force them into our view, to make us prone to conceive

them.

them. We naturally continue fixt in attention to fuch ideas, or recur often to the contemplation of them. A paffion leads us to them, folely by its own force, without any affiftance from a present perception connected with them. When a person is under the influence of any paffion, the difficulty is not to recollect the objects closely connected with it, but to prevent their haunting him continually. An angry man, for example, can scarce avoid thinking of the perfon who has offended him, and of the injury which he has done him, recollecting every thing he can dishonourable to that perfon, remembering with pleasure the misfortunes which have happened to him, even imagining diftreffes into which he may fall, and in a word dwelling on the conception of every thing immediately relating to his anger. Angelo's defcription of his own. difpofition when he was under the power of love, is perfectly natural;

When I would pray and think, I think and pray
To feveral fubjects: heav'n hath my empty words,
Whilft my intention hearing not my tongue,
Anchors on Ifabel: heav'n's in my mouth,
As if I did but only chew its name,
And in my heart the strong and swelling evil
Of my conception.(a)

(a) Meafure for Meafure, at 2. fcene 10.