objects were not otherwife related; these relations would affociate them, though the things had not been fucceffive; both being combined in order, it must have great power to produce affociation. In a regular proceffion, perfons not only follow one another, but are disposed according to their rank and dignity: in confequence of this, either the view, or a defcription of a small part of a proceffion, is enough to enable the imagination to pass along all the other parts, and to take in a conception of the whole. Succeffive events are generally connected as caufes and effects: when they are, they will readily occur to every person in the order in which they happened, and influenced one another; every narration may fuggeft examples of this. But when fucceffive objects happen not to be thus connected, they are flightly affociated by mere fucceffion. In a chronological table, events are connected by fucceffion alone; in a regular hiftory, by order; in this laft cafe, there is a much greater union of the parts, than in the former. The other relations which, in order, are joined · with fucceffion, have fo confiderable force, that an historian often gives the most perfect order to his narration, by bringing together events in it, which have a natural connexion, though though they did not happen in immediate fucceffion, and is, without reflection or design, led to adopt this order. In THERE is likewife what may be called an order of nature. This has often a great analogy to order in place and in time. It is no wonder that it fhould, fince we conceive all things as connected both with place and with time. Order in both feems to be, in fome inftances, established by nature; our thoughts move easily in tracing descent, or in following the course of time, but with difficulty in tracing ascent, or in going backward in time. But ftill the fpecies of order now under confidera tion, is different from the other two. many cafes, there is a natural order in things themselves: hence one manner of confidering them, is according to, order, and another contrary to it; our thoughts muft proceed in that natural order, elfe their progrefs is obftructed. In conceiving a man, our thoughts pass rea dily from the head downwards; it is in many respects the principal part of the body, and by it that nourishment is conveyed, which fuftains the whole. In conceiving a tree we proceed upwards from the root to the ftem and the branches: it is from the first that these latter parts derive their nourishment, and by it they are fupported; there is also a fucceffion in their first production, they grow up gradually from the root: both these causes have an influence on the courfe of our thoughts. In conceiving a house, the mind, in like manner, naturally afcends from the bottom to the top, and for the fame reasons ; the inferiour parts fupport the fuperiour; the building proceeds from the foundation upwards: befides, if we would go into the house, we muft afcend from the ground towards the roof; the mind takes the fame course. THERE are perhaps fome cafes in which cuftom alone fixes a certain order; but after custom has fixt it, it operates as ftrongly on the mind, as if it had been established by nature. Writing from right to left, or from left to right, is determined merely by custom ; but in confequence of that cuftom, an European finds difficulty in tracing the combination of letters in the former direction, and an Oriental finds equal difficulty in tracing that combination in the latter direction. THUS every one of the affociating principles affumes many different forms; and every diftin& form which any of them can affume, may be confidered as a separate relation, and neceffarily produces a correfpondent peculia rity in the exertion of genius, which is di-: rected by it. The feveral modifications of these principles must contribute both to increase the force, and to diverfify the form of genius, in the very fame ways, as it has been already shown that the variety of their.combinations does. SECT. VII. Of the Predominance of the affociating Principles. HE obfervations which we have hitherto TH made, show that there must be great differences and diffimilitudes in the effects of genius; for they lead us to perceive that it may proceed from one conception to another in an infinite variety of ways. But in order to explain, in what manner the multitude of the affociating qualities lays a foundation for permanent diversities of genius, fome farther obfervations will be neceffary. ALL the affociating principles have fome degree of force in every man. There is perhaps no perfon on whom any one of them has no influence at all. But in almost every man, some one of them is predominant: on every subject, a man is apt to follow one relation rather P 4 rather than any other, and to conceive chiefly fuch ideas as are, by that relation, connected with the present perception. Whence this proceeds, is perhaps inexplicable; it must, in a great measure, be refolved into original differences in the conftitution of the mind: but the thing itself is evident in the most fimple and common inftances. If different perfons fet themselves to recollect a company, one naturally recollects it by running over the places occupied by those who compofed it; another enumerates them according to their feveral profeffions, conditions, ages, or fexes; another according to their respective families and connexions: in the first perfon, vicinity or order; in the fecond, refemblance; in the third, the relation of caufe and effect, is the predominant principle of affociation. WHEN any object is conceived by a perfon, all its qualities are in fome measure present to his view but in confequence of original differences in the turn of men's imaginations, one man's attention is fixt chiefly on one of thefe qualities, and another man's attention on a different quality. This is, in many cafes, the immediate cause of the predomipance of one affociating principle. The different qualities of an object not only lay a founda |