degree, though it be employed in an inferiour province. Wherever it is poffeffed, a perfon's thoughts are wholly moulded by the prefent defign; he lofes fight of himself, and is perfectly transformed into the character which he wants to affume. Thus as a fitnefs for being strongly impreffed by a defign, bestows regularity on genius, fo a capacity of being equally impreffed by diffimilar designs, gives a great variety and compass to the genius of a particular perfon.

We have now endeavoured to difcover the fources of the varieties of genius, so far as they lie in the peculiarities of the imagination. If none of the affociating principles be strong, there can be no genius. If one be remarkably vigorous in comparison with the reft, genius will be fixt to one fort of subjects fuited to that principle. If all of them be very vigorous, the perception of a particular defign will have force enough to give any one of them a temporary prevalence; and by this means genius will have great compass, its exertions will be fufceptible of great variety. In proportion to the degree of variety of which genius is thus fufceptible, it will approach the nearer to univerfality.

BUT

BUT though the varieties which belong to imagination, evidently produce many diverfities of genius, we shall never be able to account for all its diversities by attending only to the imagination; for imagination alone is not sufficient for compleating any work of ge nius. In all its perfect exertions, it derives aid from other faculties, the varieties of which must contribute fomewhat to the feveral forms which it affumes. The faculties from which imagination receives affistance, are sense, memory, and judgment. An enquiry into the varieties of which the first of these is capable, would give us little light: the varieties incident to the two laft, it will be of importance to examine, The varieties of memory bear the nearest analogy to those of imagination, and for that reafon it will be natural firft to explain them.

SECT. IX,

Of the Varieties of Memory, and their Influence on Genius.

EMORY is employed either in retaining fingle perceptions, or in preferving the order and connexion of different perceptions. It is fufceptible of confiderable varieties in respect of both these exertions.

I

EVERY perception retained by memory, decays by length of time. As diftant objects look fainter and fmaller to the eye, and as diftant founds ftrike the ear more feebly, than such as are near; so the remembrance of things past grows weaker in proportion to the time which has elapfed fince they were present; and at last every trace of them is obliterated. But fome perceptions decay much more slowly than others. While one perception is forgotten as foon as it is received, the remembrance of another is firm and permanent for many years. The general principles on which the permanence of remembrance depends, are very simple.

It may be established as a principle, that those perceptions are most firmly and permanently remembered, which were ftrongest at first. A strong perception, like a deep shade of colouring, seems to decay more slowly than one that is faint and delicate; and though it fhould decay as faft, it would be longer before it were effaced. The particular cases. reducible to this general principle, are very numerous; and they are all experiments ferving to confirm it. They are chiefly the following.

THE

THE perceptions of fenfe are always stronger than any ideas which we can form; and accordingly what we have perceived by our fenfes, is better remembered than what we have only heard or read of. The perceptions of some of the fenfes, are ftronger and more striking than those of other senses; and in confequence of that they fix themselves more durably in the memory. Of all our perceptions, pleasure and pain are those which affect us most deeply; and the objects which produce them, lay fastest hold of the memory: we often hear men give it as a reason for their never being able to forget one thing, that it affected them much; and give it as a reason for their having no remembrance of another`. thing, that it did not at all intereft them. (a)

SOME degree of attention is necessary for our perceiving objects at all; founds often strike the ear without being heard, things are often full in our view without being feen; the whole attention of the foul is otherwise engaged. By bestowing attention, the mind as it were embraces the objects exhibited to it,

(a) Siquas res in vita videmus parvas, ufitatas, quotidianas, eas meminiffe non folemus: propterea quod nulla nifi nova, aut admirabili re commovetur animus. At fi quid videmus aut audimus egregie turpe, aut honeftum, inufitatum, magnum, incredibile, ridiculum, id diu meminiffe confuevimus. Ad Heren. lib. iii.

R 3

and

and lays itself open to a strong impreffion from them, which makes them both affect it much while they are prefent, and keep firm poffeffion of the memory afterwards. The length of time for which attention is bestowed, as well as the clofenefs of the attention, reuders our perception of an object the stronger; and it renders the remembrance of it proportionably the more lafting (b). In like manner, by returning often to the contemplation of an object, we learn to conceive it vigorously, and the remembrance of it becomes clear and permanent: a perception which has feldom affected the fenfes, is quickly obliterated from the memory; light and colours are totally forgotten by those who have early loft their fight but fuch perceptions as are repeated every day, never quit their hold of the memory; by the attention beftowed upon them as often as they recur, they are preserved in their original frength, without finding time even to begin to decay.

Ir is obferved, that every thing is well remembered, which is impreffed on the mind

(6) Nec dubium eft, quin plurimum in hac parte valeat mentis inten.io, et velut acies luminum a prospectu rerum quas intuetur, non averfa. Unde accidit, ut que per plures dies fcribimus edifcendi caufa, cogitatione ipfa contineat, QUINT. Inf. Orat. Ab, xi, cap. 2,

when