adapted to different purposes. Another.confequence is, that the memories of different perfons are suited to different subjects. Some are especially ready in remembering reasonings, and fuch phenomena and proceffes in nature as are the proper subjects of reasoning; the connexions of things as caufes and effects, make the ftrongeft impreffion on their memory. Some retain most firmly the form and structure of natural bodies, or descriptions of them; their memory is chiefly affected by the co-existence of the parts. Others retain beft, trains of events, or relations of them in history; vicinity, order, and that fpecies of caufation by which events depend on one another, are the connexions which suit their memory. Others are remarkable for easily remembering poetry; the relations of ideas which prevail in it, lay fastest hold on their memory: many of these relations are originally bestowed upon the parts folely by ima gination; but after they are bestowed, and the work is read, they become obferved connexions of the parts of that work, and are proper objects of memory. Thofe things which are peculiarly fuitable to a perfon's memory, are generally those to which his understanding and his tafte are moft adapted. This fuggefts a reason

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reason why they are peculiarly suitable to his memory: they are the subjects to which he can attend most cafily and most closely, into which he can enter moft deeply, and from which he receives the greatest pleasure; they cannot therefore fail to make a strong and lafting impreffion on him. Their making such an impreffion on him, will neceffarily have an influence on the turn of his genius. Every man will introduce into his works chiefly those fubjects which he remembers beft, if they can at all fuit his purpose. Both the illustrations and the episodes of one poet, relate almost conftantly to natural things; those of another are generally taken from hiftory, or confift of narration; a third abounds on every occafion with moral fentiments, or runs out into philofophical speculations. The peculiar congruity of different connexions to different memories, contributes to produce variety of genius, in the fame manner, though not in fo great a degree, as the predominance of one affociating principle; for exertions of memory enter into every work of genius, though only in fubordination to the exertions of imagination.

SECT.

SECT. X.

Of the Varieties of Judgment, and their Influence on Genius.

F we recollect, how conftantly judgment

ways it affifts and regulates it, in all the exertions of genius, we cannot doubt that the diverfities of which judgment is fufceptible, will contribute greatly to the variety of genius obfervable among men. To investigate the several powers of judgment, and to ascertain the foundation of our feveral convictions and reasonings, is a principal subject in all treatises concerning human understanding;✔ but it is our business to confider judgment only so far as its varieties affect the operations of genius.

WHEN in the analysis of genius we distinguish judgment from fenfe, memory, and imagination, we use the term in its most extenfive fignification. Taken in this extent, it is of two kinds, judgment of truth, and judgment of beauty. To the former, the name is most commonly appropriated: the latter is called tafte.

TRUTH regards either real existence, or the relations of general ideas: judgment is exercised about both; and about each it is exercifed in different ways, fometimes intuitively, at other times by reasoning, fometimes producing certainty, and at other times only probability. It includes all the intellectual faculties by which we diftinguish truth from falfehood, embrace and affent to the one, and disbelieve and reject the other (a). Men dif fer either in the degree in which they poffefs the fame species of judgment, or in the species of judgment which they are most prone to exercife, and exercife in greatest perfection.

THE faculties by which we perceive fuch truths as regard the relations of general ideas, are commonly known.

SELF-EVIDENT truths are perceived by intuition, which exerts itself in an infallible conviction that certain relations belong to the ideas compared, and cannot but belong to

(a) The author was led, many years ago, by the office which he then held, to enquire with fome care, into the feveral modifications of judgment, the kinds of evidence correspondent to them, and the nature and degree of conviction produced by them. New light has been thrown on several branches of this fubject, by Dr. Reid's ingenious Inquiry: and the whole of it has been illustrated with great perfpicuity and elegance, in Dr. Beattie's Efay on Truth, Part 1. The prefent defign admits the confideration of this fubject, only in ope very confined point of view, as connected with the vari stics of genius,

them;

them; and this conviction arifes on the mere comparison of the ideas themselves, without any reasoning. In all the proper subjects of intuition, we perceive the relation to be implied in the very nature of the ideas, so that it must appear the same to every being, capable of comparing them.

SUCH relations of ideas as are not self-evident, can be perceived only by reason. None but the necessary relations of ideas can be deduced by reason, merely by comparison of the ideas themselves; at least these are the only relations which can be in this way deduced with fuch certainty as to make it worth while to attempt deducing them. The reasoning by which such relations are deduced, is called demonstration. In order to our perceiving the force of a demonftration, we must perceive the truth of all the steps of which it consists. But it is not properly by an exertion of reafon, that we perceive the truth of each separate ftep. Often the conviction is intuitive; as when in the course of a demonftration we affume the equality of two fides of a triangle, which are radii of the fame circle. Even fuch propofitions as have been formerly demonftrated, when they are applied in a fubfequeat demonstration, cannot in that case he

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