hurt this genius, by leading into minute details, and too circumftantial descriptions or delineations.

THE natural appearances which are useful in productions in the arts, must always be such as are in some respect ftriking. To render memory, therefore, fubfervient to genius for the arts, it is fufficient that it be fit for retaining ideas of fuch appearances as have made a ftrong impreffion on the fenfes, as have forced attention, as have pleased taste, as have excited fome paffion or emotion, as have seemed peculiar and distinguishing. It is in a person whose perceptions are readily rendered strong and durable by these circumstances, that memory will be qualified for depofiting materials fit for being employed in the arts. But the appearances which are of importance in scientific investigations are of a different fort, generally. noways ftriking in themselves, often apparently inconfiderabl'e. The perceptions of them being thus weaker than those of the other fort, a greater natural strength of memory is necessary for retaining them. The memory muft likewise be turned for deriving strength from such circumstance as fuit the nature of these appearances. The mind must be prone to close and continued attention,

attention, that this may infix in the memory perceptions too weak for laying hold of it by 'their own power. It must be It must be prone to fuppose import ance in appearances feemingly trifling and unpromising; to look forward to their tenden cy and confequences with a high curiofity and eager pre-expectation, that, if they turn out in the manner that was looked for, the gratification of that principle may imprefs them indelibly on the mind, or, if they turn out otherwife, that principle may be again excited, which will impress them no lefs ir delibly. It is when circumstances of this ki nd have the principal influence on rendering remembrance ftrong, that memory is fit for giving affiftance in fcientifical difcoveries. In the writings of every person who hat; been remarkable for fuch discoveries, we perceive plain evidences how much power these circumstances had over his mind.

THE Connexions of things which must be represented in the arts, are not the fame with tofe.connexions which must be obferved in

he fciences. The artist is concerned chiefly vith the resemblances of things, and thefe of •he more fenfible and striking kinds; and, in i fubordination to thefe, with their obvious conitrafts, their peculiar; and difcriminating circumstances,

cumstances, and their more fignal caufes and effects: the philofopher is concerned with their causes, effects, and laws; and, as conducive to the discovery of these, with their precife qualities and adjuncts, their more hidden fimilitudes and analogies, and their more fecret differences and contrarieties. Memory is adapted to genius for the one, or genius for the other, according as it is turned most for being affected with the former fort of con nexions, or with the latter.

SECT. IV.

How the two Kinds of Genius differ in respect of the Affiftance which they derive from Judgment.

Y imagination, with all the affiftance

BY

which it can receive from the best adapted memory, neither brightness not pene→ tration is completed. But in this refpe& there is a confiderable difference between them. Some degree of brightness may arise merely from the imagination; but no degree of penetration can; the lowest degree of this cannot poffibly exist without acuteness of judgment. Accordingly, though we may with great pro priety speak of brightness of fancy, it would

be abfolutely improper to use any expreffions which implied our afcribing penetration to this faculty alone.

THAT judgment affifts genius of every kind, in fuggesting fuch ideas as fuit the purpofe, was formerly fhown. In the fciences, in producing the materials fit for the investigation of truth, this affiftance is indifpenfably neceflary. The decifions of judgment concerning objects or ideas already produced, confidered, and compared, fuggeft to the imagination other ideas affociated with these decifions, and fit for carrying forward the investigation. Judgment is employed in giving fuch decisions, at every step that is taken; and they are the only means by which we can be carried forward another ftep. In the arts too, the decifions of judgment do often fuggeft` new ideas; but the ideas abfolutely necessary may, in many cases, be fuggefted by other means. A rapid imagination often, without giving judgment time to interpofe, pours in, by its own force, a great abundance of conceptions, fo proper, that when they are afterwards reviewed, the acuteft understanding, and the niceft tafte, can fcarce find fault with them. In the arts, this rapidity of imagination, which Waits hot for the interpofition of judgment,

often

1

often produces a noble boldness and freedom of manner; in science it could produce only abfurdity and error.

IN fcience, an acute and vigorous judgment is neceffary for making any use of the conceptions which imagination has fuggefted. It is the precise business of science to deduce conclufions from certain obfervations, experiments, or ideas; but the deduction of these is altogether the work of judgment, and will be performed with greater or less advantage, in proportion to the degree of its acuteness. We sometimes meet with perfons who are remarkable for making uncommon reflections on the triteft fubjects, or drawing new conclufions from the most familiar facts: this is acknowledged to imply real ingenuity; but it shows chiefly acuteness of judgment. The commonnefs of the facts or the subjects, makes no great force of imagination requifite for bringing them into view; they had actually been in the view of hundreds: but these had not the quickness of understanding which has led to the new conclufions or reflections. Many of the facts on which Newton founds his theory of gravitation, and that of light and colours, require no great degree of imaBb 2 gination