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THAT are the chances for an alliance between Japan and Germany” I asked Count Masataka Terauchi, Premier of Japan.

That,” he replied, "will depend entirely on how the present war may end. It is impossible to predict the changes which the conclusion of this war may bring. If the exigencies of international relationships demand it. Japan, being unable to maintain a position of total isolation, may be induced to seek an ally in Germany; but, as far as I can judge from the existing condition of affairs, I see no such danger. In other words. I believe that Japan's relations with the Entente Allies will continue unaltered after the present war.”

This remarkably frank statement by the Premier of Japan is an accurate presentation of certain new possibilities which concern the Allies, and America in particular. These new pos sibilities have been created by the collapse of Russia. That col lapse has ended the remoteness of Japan. If Russia does not get back to her feet, the Far East will be next door to Europe. If Russia does not recover, then over Russia's remains Germany and Japan are destined to meet. Will they meet as rivals or as friends?

Whether the world will see a strong Russia again will depend entirely on how the present war may end." Whether such a Russia would be autocratie or democratie "will depend entirely on how the present war may end." And whether the exigen∙ies of international relationships" will demand a Germano Russo-Japanese alliance if a strong Russia be saved, or a Germano-Japanese alliance if Russia be lost, "will depend entirely on how the present war may end." and on a few other questions with which America is greatly concerned, since they relate to her policy toward Japan.

Whether there is to be a German-Japanese alliance opposed to the French and Anglo-Saxons or not depends very largely on America. But I am anticipating.

With three or four weeks to pass between the writing and the publication of this, and with history being made at a gallop, such an article must be written with a historical perspective. Before this can be published Japan may have sent an army into Siberia. But whether Japan intervenes in Russia or not, the following interview with the Premier of Japan will have interest as interpreting the frame of mind of Japan's leaders toward a problem and during a crisis which will have a place in history, whatever the future may bring forth. The events of the winter of 1917-18 in the Far East have been of exceeding consequence. Since the first of the year Japan has been feverishly considering the new relationship which would arise between her and Germany if Russia should make peace and disintegrate. And since it became evident that the Bolsheviki were going to make peace, Japan has been on the point of undertaking armed intervention in Siberia.

Whether she does intervene or not, however, the effect gained by her restraint during the past month or two will not have been lost. The reaction in Russia toward Japanese intervention to-day or to-morrow would not be what it would have been yes terday. Japan and her allies have gained by her caution and patience; and that caution and forbearance have been largely Prime Minister Terauchi's.

That Japanese troops are not already well into Siberia as I write this is due mainly to three influences-the personality of Count Teranell, the personality of Baron Goto, Minister for Fiotte Affairs, and the opposition of the United States. Opposed to this alliment have been the forces favoring immediate interrection-Viscount Motono, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, the entire Japanese War Office, with most of the leadgers of the army and a good many of the navy, plus rance, and to some extent England. France has been for itwith the publie and the Government. The English Government, De Wever, seems not to have finally committed itself, though a

large section of British public opinion has been favoring Japanese intervention.

For the past four or five weeks the conflict between these two opposing views has been a delicate and momentous thing to watch. At first it seemed that the sentiment for intervention was irresistible, but it began to wane, and lately the non-interventionists have seemed to be gaining. But of course these are not irrevocably non-interventionists at all. Count Terauchi, Baron Goto, and, as I understand it, the American Government have not come out against Japanese intervention finally; they have merely pleaded for present caution, arguing that the time is not yet ripe, that the situation in Russia, grave as it is, is not yet grave enough to justify the risks of military intervention by Japan in the territory of an ally.

That is what I mean when I say that, whether Japan does now intervene or not, the effect of her restraint during the past four or five weeks will not have been lost. In case she does intervene Japan will find that her moral position has been greatly strengthened by the fact that she has been patient, that she has proved to the world her forbearance with Russia-in short, that she has proved her disinterestedness in advance.

To the formation of Japan's present policy toward Russia a veritable hodgepodge of elements contributed. She was entirely unprepared herself for gauging the meaning of such a spree of radicalism as Russia has been indulging in. Her statesmen had had intimate personal and political relations with Russians of the autocracy-men like Witte, Stolypin, and Sazonoff. But they knew none of the revolutionary group, and the reactionary Russian Ambassador, who has been held over in Tokyo from the days of Czardom, has not helped them to understand. Thus Japan has looked to her allies for interpretation of Russia, and has found them confused. France has looked at Russia almost entirely, it seems to me, from the standpoint of her own purely national interests. The French advocacy of Japanese intervention in Russia seems to have sprung from fear for the French investments in Russia, for surely France cannot believe that such a limited military expedition as Japan could send would appreciably relieve pressure on the western front. The warm democratic sympathy of Lafayette must be alive in France to-day, but it has been strangely inconspicuous in the attitude of France toward Russia.

England from the beginning has had a rather limited understanding of the Russian Revolution, yet England has seen Russia more clearly than France has. England has been too much inclined to accept the interpretation of Russia furnished by the British Tories and Imperialists. Lately, however, British Labor and the British Liberals have forced a saner view to the front. And England seems to have been a good deal influenced by President Wilson's judgment of events in Russia, which has been much more accurate than that of any other statesman, and remarkably accurate, considering the obstacle of distance and other difficult circumstances.

Then to the formation of Japan's policy toward Russia a number of conflicting internal currents are contributing. Japanese polities are the most difficult politics in the world to understand. I certainly do not pretend to understand them. But the present facts are that both the two major parties which contend for supremacy in the lower house of the Japanese Diet are opposed to intervention. Apparently their motive is a fear that intervention will increase the prestige of the present Ministry and lend it a new lease of life, whereas both the Seiyukai and Kenseikai parties are counting on an approaching dissolution of the Terauchi Ministry as a benefit to them. Similarly, elements in the bureaucracy opposed to Terauchi fear intervention. The Genro, or Eider Statesmen, are also urging the Government to go slow, but their advice is more likely to be based on a sincere judgment of what is best for the country. Moreover, Terauchi himself is inclined to avoid intervention,

through an opinion which is the exact opposite of that held by the political parties. He fears that intervention will lead to some national calamity, and thus weaken, instead of strengthen, his position. The Japanese public has been excited by false or exaggerated reports of events in Russia, including the alleged massacres of Japanese by Germans and Bolsheviki; but, on the whole, the Japanese public has been about equally divided. There is no real public opinion in Japan.

The most marked clash on this issue has been that between Premier Terauchi and Home Minister Goto on one side, and the Foreign Minister and War Office on the other. The army has been tugging at its leash like a starved bulldog scenting meat. And Viscount Motono has been almost equally eager for seizing what seems to him a golden opportunity for Japan.

The long and short of it is that there are two Governments in Japan-one composed of the Premier and the Home Minister, the other composed of the Foreign Minister and the War Office. On the issue of Russian intervention the first has had the backing of the United States, and the second has been supported by France, while England and Italy have been hesitating, though apparently slightly in favor of intervention. The influence of Viscount Ishii, the new Ambassador to America, has strengthened the stand of the Premier and Home Minister. It is now quite apparent which of Japan's two Governments is the stronger, and there have lately been rumors that Viscount Motono is contemplating resignation.

Such are some of the stronger cross-currents through which Japan has had to steer her way during the past two or three months. To complicate matters, the question has been, not simply whether to intervene in Russia or not, but how to intervene if intervention is agreed upon. A good deal of the British sentiment for intervention has apparently been based on the assumption that British or American troops would co-operate in the expedition with the soldiers of Japan. American and French opinion has been more inclined to prefer having Japan go it alone, so far as active military operations are concerned, but with the Allies helping financially. After talking with many prominent Japanese, including several members of the Government, I have come to the conclusion that with the Japanese it is a question of intervening in Siberia alone or not intervening at all. Their pride is injured by the suggestion that Allied troops be sent to co-operate with them, and justifiably so, it seems to

me.

The first question I put to the Premier when I saw him at his official residence recently related to this point. At that moment intervention was hanging in the balance, soon after Trotsky had signed the preliminary agreement of peace at Brest-Litovsk. "Does Japan intend to intervene in Siberia?" I asked. "And, if so, would she prefer to act alone or in co-operation with her allies?"

Count Terauchi does not speak English, and Mr. Yusuke Tsurumi, the son-in-law of Baron Goto, had kindly volunteered to act as interpreter. Mr. Tsurumi not only speaks excellent English but writes it. He was the editor in charge of producing the authoritative "Official Guide to Eastern Asia," published by the Imperial Government Railways of Japan. Mr. Tsurumi understands the American point of view; he is an ardent friend of America and an admirer of President Wilson, whose election he urged in America during the last Presidential campaign. Through Mr. Tsurumi Count Terauchi replied:

"I have not as yet formed a definite opinion about this problem. Nor would it be of any practical use if I had made up my mind, because intervention cannot at once be put into practice. The opinions of the Allied nations must first be heard. Besides, we can hardly form an unerring estimate of the real situation in Russia. Though a treaty of peace has been signed between Germany and Russia, what concrete result may it bring? Will the Russian people continue to submit to the guidance of the Bolshevik Government? Even if the Bolshevik Government succeeds in getting rid of Russia's obligations toward her allies, how do we know that the Russian people's will is represented by that Government's conduct? Japan once waged war with Russia, but to-day there is between the two countries absolutely no ill feeling. At the outset of the present war, when Russia proposed to send her Siberian troops to the western

front, our Government gladly consented to safeguard the peace of the Far East so as to enable Russia to deliver her utmost power on the western front, with no apprehension about the East. Thus the Japanese Government has good will for Russia and entertains deep sympathy for her in the deplorable compli cations which have arisen in Russia's internal administration since last year. So we by no means desire to make an enemy of Russia, even if Russia's condition should get from bad to worse. Though the Bolshevik Government should shake hands with Germany, yet there would be many Russians whose views are sound and reasonable and who regard us as their friend and ally, so that we should be loth to despatch troops thoughtlessly. and thereby make an enemy of the Russian people. What we fear deeply is the possible advent of the German influence in the East, and we will have to be prepared against possible emergencies, for Germany may push her influence too far eastward. But if Japan be obliged to take military action in Siberia, such action will be taken simply because of the necessity of maintaining the peace of the Orient, and will never mean aggression or territorial ambition on the part of Japan.

"As regards your second question, namely, as to whether Japan wants to act singly or in concert with other allies, I would say that Japan would want a co-operative action. If any of our allies should desire to participate in Japan's military expedition, Japan would be only too pleased to welcome such participation and assistance, but we fear that such participation would be impossible now. Great Britain and France are concen trating all their power on the western fronts, so that they will have no surplus strength to spare for an expedition to the Far East. As to the United States, she is also doing her best in lending her man power to France and in otherwise working for victory. and we fear it will not be very easy for her to send very many troops to Siberia.”

"Then in what manner would you have the United States help you?" I asked.

"In case Japan is to make a co-operative move into Siberia," said the Premier, "she will desire every possible assistance you can render. The material and financial help which the United States can afford us is precisely what Japan will need."

Count Terauchi surprised me by the considerable amount of animation he put into his discourse. His usual expression is a cold inscrutability which a professional gambler might envy. He seldom betrays emotion in his face, and behind that mask he makes his plans and maps his courses, unmoved by praise or hostile criticism. Yet, despite his stony exterior, he is deeply emotional, and weeps easily. He is very sincere and loyal and patriotic and kind. His bad points are said to be narrow-mindedness and a lack of ideals. He is a frank materialist. And he is reputed to be very much afraid of Socialism. Co-operation between such a man and a man like Trotsky is hard to conceive. So I asked him: "Supposing that Japan intervenes in Siberia and that the Bolshevik Government, if still in power. should show a willingness to accept Japanese co-operation in restoring order, would Japan help the Bolsheviki to re-establish a strong state?"

He did not answer directly, but said:

"As I have already said, Japan bears every good will toward Russia, and in this war has been supplying her with arms and munitions to help her win victory. We had hoped with all our heart for Russian victory. But, unfortunately, in March of last year Russia was plunged into the vortex of revolution, and from it resulted the unexpected Kerensky Cabinet, which has since been replaced by the Lenine Ministry, which we see now signing peace with Germany. For all that, we still believe that a great many Russians are influenced by a rational faith in the recuperation of their country and in the principles of humanity, and therefore our sympathy for Russia remains unchanged. It is our belief that Russia will regain her national footing, which she seems to have lost for the time being. And when she does, it is necessary, in the interest of Japan, and Japan's allies too. that Russia should be protected to the best of our ability. For Japan, in particular, it is very desirable that Russia should lie between Japan and Germany; so we will not stint our aid to her, but will give her all possible help. We feel sincerely sorry for Russia-sorry that so great and powerful a nation as she

should have come to such as Diementatie protiallen: z 1.0wegtetice of revision

We suppose the war should end with Germany in posses son of the Human Falte peorizes. "I wked and with 4 açan WEST CARA Shema as a remis dé Japanese trad What Cont Termath would Japan think để the eccscant L é a new and scale Lama sitosted on the sermory lying mainly between Mowow and Lirik »

-Liis Japan's most hope" reçued the Premise that Rusia should be rebom into a string, wikeered wase. We recere that the exons of Rueda as an independens nama * costitute an efecte hamer as die eerwinets CÉ Gemas fence toward the East and tende e a gras factor toward percuting the pace of the Oriens and of the whole world. That is why we snagit deine that Bussa should continue ber madreal life forever, even tongi de v te beesce in terriky a sale (CH.

The Premier wooded a torce and abgeorgis in sea I rengtied the boy be has six line as one who fai worked for me and who had been dœtarged. Es gane at me was full of dignited won & iw my: - Ah pou we how the zois have regarded pour injustice to me. I have exchanged a piebeian for a Prime Minister.

As Count Teravchi sipped tea and mcked be asked how I thought the Alles voci regari son a bože koetan mate between Germany and Japan. He semed mat home this. As the tea warned him be nodded his bead ani miei Then, with his high count-iones zamor eps anted exeterans, and high taid bead, be looked like a ine cui Merdan me arch, some chieftain of ancient China His Lopezien is his most noticeable physical characteristic and is aver matei by hostile cartoont ali kot be the head of Funnen be of the Seven Gods of Good Lak welped in Japan whose "dome" is a yard high. This al im and his mackSke countenance give Tesati an appearance of dignity ani shrewdness which is indicative of his reál étareter. I hate wi kom seen such a high bai mess in be that of Framewo Vila Mr. Mason made two visits to Mexico for The Ortok ± 1914 ini 1916, and personally interviewed both Villa and Carranza. -THE EDITORS.

Teranchi's friends call him the Kitchener of Japan." He is Like the lase "K. of K." in that be actos par dana by with high siministrative genius: he is like Kitchener in his warcity of face and in his reposed arike for woe Also like Kimbener. Teranski began at the bottom of the labierani has been a War Minister and a great ecòcial simtitrane. Teraneni's work as Governor-General of Korea is compared to that of Kitchener in Africa abi liia

Teranti is a stickler for discipline. A this time that we had tween taking poor Mr. Istrmi had been standing, and be rated subting thebu the interview, with lasted an poor and a quarter. Eekul me afterwards that he had expected süber di nox do in Everet, as Com: Temaki erstes ATRTKE TO CRIçine the highest trail a man. Mr. Isummi's sung may be rewarded

Extin-Tokyo entertia trung kawa Some Anerians are posed of the opinion that there is a positCity of Japan's ening an albatre with Germany after the woff the sons sea of me present war koonud fante surt pomislity. What is

Sepest retirar de bow the preser war may end." je im pomitee to pendet for etat zes Fira de encetam a để the war may ng if the ripenes Jć the in semata.ca man colpe demand adapan ting maide mama poritie of such mata may be stand to wek 11 231 Germany: *rin as far as i at juiz form the existing Kodika sé afar. I we to see danged. In other words. I Dere than Japan & ratios with the Ensere Devi rcting maktened after the prswnt war. Las vinne I was asked by a gran Auevas poteman whether time was a dezer for the future of Amenasda panem fremvistię, wien İdil kylm so expiain the simase. If the United Staus sandli také sar'ı a meg a voci endanger the indeprodeare of China, Japo i enocid not of exore be a ily; tes in a dar that the UniteSOLDA TI deter do wying d te koi Therefore there ino fear of the American Japanese fremd-tip being in any way timated I was born in the year busing the arrival of Commodore Perry in Japan: the memes ve event was 5000! flowed by the Harris Treaty, with opened Japan to the intereonarse of the wool Hai Coanda Perry the fired guns on Japan there migha keg have reated beings of entity in the tomas of the Japanese; butfire beginning to end be adhered to the prizeiples of retire and humanity in is mine as to the opening of Japan. There were were fartigioed men in Japan who saw real airainage is fourning his alive, and the result was as formmate as acid be destrui The ine the very beginting of Japan's intercre with American she was car benefactor. sit our ebent. Yar tave pasi see ton bet there is no rease to suspent any ecange in the evetality of the neighborly rades. It is the that Japan has a line military strength, bet that she shoobi woi ber army acres the Paize and land in Anerva is quite impresitur; and I possume it would be dfelt for the United States wo do the same against Japan. I believe there is no have to acompase war between the two excttries. What posible harm can there be to have Japan de verging this side of the Partite and the United States growing on the other side' The possitéity of Jazan and America teaking of into war has never for a mocecentered my mind. Asi if you ask what is the best way to maintain in perpetuity this corilai American Japanese frockship I would say, let as go on in the same manner as we have been doing during the past sixty years.

-I wild like to ask a questing bearing on Japan's future, your Eveliency." I said thing up the thread of overation The Anglo-Saxon peoples are today feling a song liberal idealism. Pertaps there are a god many Ango Saxons now who feel that their race has ainsiy peabct all the territory it needs for the development of its memes partarly on the Pace, where the Anglo-Sax.cs have of the Pacific coast of North America. Hawa the Pros Australia, New Zealand, and foothools in China. On the other bar-i, intelligent Amerans and Britons are beginning to raise that a country wish is growing as rapólyas Japan ani winch has proved its fight to be ranked as a cirioned tas & ocgli not to be denied the privilege of normal expansive Japan's pegelation is outgrowing her territory. Where will the mod in cist? A JapaDese magazine writer has menty speed that Japan might make an arman, your with France by winė Japan would take over part or all of French Indo-China Other Japanese have menticed the possibility of extending Japan's territory northwani Now, America desines the preservat a of the territorial integrity of China bor intent Amerans would not be

-1000 20 ssica of termicry acerbere else if it eccl be armand by. It has been sued that the war might end with tremmany bowling the Faite provinces of Russia. France regaining A Lion, and froe making an 17 th Japan by which Japan wai get French Birn (hester he cra to the present crisis in Siberia To Wand which the worki knows Jaraz is disinterested, Oil Japan prefer as a okey to absorb some of her tieve of ani à me a northern region

as Siberia or a colony in the south, such as French IndoChina ?"

"Japan is increasing in her population at the rate of about half a million a year," replied the Premier, " and it is indeed a problem that we should well consider; but it is not likely that we shall be pressed for the lack of land to live in during ten or fifteen years to come. For there is still much room in Chosen and also in Hokkaido which can be used for our colonization. Manchuria, though it is not part of Japan's territory, can relieve much of our surplus population. The Japanese people do not take kindly to the idea of emigration, because they have long been used to the mild climate at home, and dislike both the torrid and arctic regions. Neither freezing Siberia nor the scorching south is very tempting to the Japanese. As to any questions depending on the disposal of Alsace-Lorraine, they must await the decision of military power."

Here Count Terauchi brought the interview to an end, remarking that he was overdue at the Diet. He shook hands with his left hand, for his right has been of little use since his right arm was wounded in the Saigon Rebellion forty years ago. At the beginning of our conversation the Premier had remarked that he was not speaking for publication. When asked to relent, he said that he would get Mr. Tsurumi to write out his recollection of what had been said and submit it to him in Japanese. Then, if it met with his approval, it would be given to me and translated. This was done. Mr. Tsurumi's remembrance of the conversation proved almost dictographic. He wrote it out in question and answer form like a catechism and submitted it to the Premier. After reading it Count Terauchi submitted it for the consideration of the Foreign Minister and of the Minister for Home Affairs. When they had approved it,

First, unless the German menace to the Far East through Russia grows considerably stronger than it is at this writing, Japan will not intervene in Siberia except with the warm approval and with the assurance of the economic support of all her allies. The advice of caution given by the Japanese Ambassador to Petrograd, who has just come out of Russia, strengthens the party which is for extreme prudence in the question of intervention.

Second, if Japan does intervene, she would prefer to have no foreign troops co-operating, except, perhaps, small detachments of Chinese, although she would consent to Allied co-operation if the Allies insist. But she would want, and would need, generous assistance in the form of munitions and money from Great Britain and America.

Third, if Japan does intervene, she will have no intention of going beyond a limited objective, probably Irkutsk, which she would approach over both the Siberian and Amur Railways. Japan, in short, has no desire to meet the organized armed forces of Germany, for which she has a most wholesome respect. Despite the possible wording of her explanations, her intervention would be undertaken almost solely to stop the spread of anarchy and German intrigue toward the Far East; that is, it would be purely a measure of national self-defense for Japan. Thus it would probably have very little effect toward relieving the pressure of German arms on the west front.

66

Fourth, Japan is much exercised over the definition of her future relations with Russia and Germany. Her present relations with Russia are handicapped by great lack of understanding on the part of Japan. The interviews just now being given out by the Japanese Ambassador to Russia on his return home are almost the first public utterances made by a Japanese public man indicating any understanding of the fact that the radicalism and liberalism of Russia are genuine, widespread, and ineradicable, and that they are not merely the effusions of a few professional agitators." Japan's misunderstanding of Russia has been aided by the fact that Reuter, the British news service, has fed the Japanese public with cabled excerpts of the Russian views of the Tory newspapers of England like the London "Times" and the London "Observer," and has notice ably not given the Japanese a fair glimpse of the opinion on this issue held by British labor and British liberalism, the elements which are really running the war in England. More than once the doubtless well-intended work of the Reuter service has actually tended to hinder the winning of the war for democracy.

America, on the other hand, has helped to give Japan a better understanding of Russia than Japan was apparently able to get for herself. Unquestionably, the United States, for all the misconceptions nursed by its tories, has understood radical Russia better than any other ally of Russia. Moreover, America's views are having great weight with Japan. There is an unmistakable and highly interesting drift in Japanese official opinion to-day. This is an inclination toward the view that the value of the Anglo-Japanese alliance has been nearly exhausted by Japan, and that a more valuable ally for the Island Empire will be Germany or America. In other words, for her own peculiar purposes Japan is inclining to consider both Germany and America greater Powers than Great Britain. The Japanese seem to feel that England will be so exhausted by the war and so engrossed with making good the economic drain on her own resources that she will have little support to lend Japan's programme in the Far East. There is also an opinion that the British Empire will break into a flexible group of nations after the war.

On the other hand, Japan is impressed by the growing military and economic power of the United States, although she does make a proper discount for the usual American boasting.

As for Germany, Japan is feeling that the war will probably leave the Germans in a position of great strength, and that this strength will seek development either through central

In return for Japan's evasideration of the American view abret Bossia the United States mast scrupulously recognize the special position and interests of Japan in the Far East, and must actively aid the proper and orderly development of Japan. Amenia has a great opportunity to guard real democracy in Russia and to envarage it in Japan, to help Japan and Russia enterstand each other, and to help them both check the menace of Prussia. To accomplish the ends the United States must be in performance as well as in after-dinner promises a true friend of both Jaran and Russia Trat is the unmistakable way to end the Kaiser's dream of Berlin-Petrograd-Tokyo."

- What do I think of tithing she repeated, as she brought me into the neat, warm kichen. Why, if I didn't tithe I'd be packed as clean as a bird. I've got to tithe to keep goin'.” But what does your husband say about it?"

My bastand is a drinkin' man, as I guess you've heard. He says I shan't touch a ent of his money, so I take a tenth of what is left after I've pabi for food and rent; sometimes it's only five cents, sometimes it's ten, but whatever it is it don't being to me.

When I returned to the earth. I found a meeting of a group of ministers from near-by pari-ben gathered to learn the technique of petting tithing before their congregations. There were sixteen, most of them your fellows with bouf wars and honest faces. They came from farming cemuines and had the hard task of persuading the New York farmer that a tenth of his produce did not being to him. I was amused at the naïve way they ran tosiness and räcke together, and at first I was geziony shoked at the familiar way in which they addressed the Ivity. Their buy speech seemed blasphemous until 1 grasped the fact that no disrespect was inten-led and that they bet pat into practical expressse the philosophy of pantheism.

-A man koks up iio Jens face and says, Lord, I surrender; all to thee I owe." And the Lord says, 'If you mean bustness, what are you going to give?)

* The Lord's no fool. We get our business sense from him, sing with every other good thing"

- Why wait the Lord take care of the tither? He knows be gets his money that way to carry on his work. If he owns a venth of a business, bell see that i det sofa.”

When they knelt for prayer. I foi I liked their “Amens" and Yes Loris and-Hakusehiming across the speak e's rasoio. It all had a lively sense of intercession and em toomal vabdity.

Lave, some of them toời of their experiences, especially of the rewanis reserved for those who cling to their stewardship. *Falster foi a ntber in the poochoose," one said, and arche. I'm a parven on six bobined a year; and I found I had so tithe te gå ont of it”

the wood of a man i Sarvae who titbed regularly when the Math was celt pe dicas a meth; be prospered until it grew wa kind bus. Thrived to beg to relinquish, so he game by the prave. Disaster fürved Etil he was brought so perenny sodality. He began thing again, and now he day and spinnaky,

À VELI TE To bear the sier of Ms. Gordan,” said one 2 has a Laste joişda way about DHC, VINI MA) so das in the reina think she ruled the vb: s master. She told it to THE BEST TATA after prayer-med

lavanisasi “ris mek you'll have to