Secretary TOBIN. There are over 300 cases, where the unions have taken arbitrary action and men have been suspended, that have been tried in courts of the United States. I think that Father Toner, when he testified before your committee 2 years ago, told your committee it was common practice, and that in the event that a man was discharged from a union arbitrarily, that he has redress in the State courts of the country.

Senator TAFT. Now, do you remember Cecil De Mille, who was fired by the radio people because he would not pay a dollar assessment for political purposes? He took his he was fired from the air-he took his case to the Supreme Court, and lost because the rules of the union were so definite that he could be fired for that kind of thing; and he had no recourse.

That was testified to before us 2 years ago.

Secretary TOBIN. No, I think that in that case the Supreme Court of the United States held that when he joined that organization he knew the bylaws and rules of the organization.

It was a voted assessment of the organization and he refused to pay an assessment, and on that ground he was removed from the union. Senator TAFT. Of course, anybody who joins the union agrees to the rules, and it is the rules of the union.

Have you read the rules of the United Steel Workers? I read those with a man who has been thrown out in Youngstown only Friday.

Secretary TOBIN. Well, the courts have even held in certain cases if the rules were not reasonable they would even go beyond the rules of the union. And in the event that they felt that an employee was removed arbitrarily from the union rolls, and thereby lost his job, then even despite the fact that they had gone through the procedures that would be called for in such cases, they have restored the employees to their positions.

Senator PEPPER. Mr. Secretary, if I may, Senator, aren't those rules made, presumably

Secretary TOBIN. Senator, would that be barred under the TaftHartley law?

Senator TAFT. What?

Secretary TOBIN. The De Mille case.

Senator TAFT. In the De Mille case, yes, if he is willing to pay his dues to the union.

Secretary TOBIN. Well, in this case he refused to pay an assessment of a dollar.

Senator TAFT. That was an assessment for political purposes, I understand, and it was not dues. It was a special assessment for political purposes to conduct some sort of a campaign in California. I cannot tell you more than that.

Senator PEPPER. But he could be thrown out under the Taft-Hartley law if he so failed to pay his dues or failed to make the payment that the union required, couldn't he?

Senator TAFT. If his case was not cured by the Taft-Hartley Act, then we failed to do what we intended to do.

Secretary TOBIN. Well, gentlemen, to show you that there is ample protection for union members in the State courts of the United States I would like to submit this Wisconsin Law Review article that is thoroughly documented, and it refers to Law Review articles in the

Harvard Law Review, Yale Law Review, and several others of the country.

Senator TAFT. Your first objection, then

Senator PEPPER. Excuse me just a minute. What I started to ask was: Those rules, they are made by presumably a majority of the members of the union, are they not?

Secretary TоBIN. That is correct.

Senator PEPPER. So that it is the democratic expression, presumably, of the will of the majority of the group which associates itself together.

Secretary TоBIN. Yes.

Here is one footnote:

A good case study is provided by the bricklayers' union which was involved in early decisions holding its penalties void for lack of due process; today the bricklayers are a model of fairness in their internal procedures. See Bricklayers, Plasterers and Stonemasons Local 59 v. Bowen (185 NYS 855).

and so forth.

Senator TAFT. Mr. Tobin, do you really think that a man

Secretary TOBIN. I would just like to present this for the record in order not to hold you up. It would take too long to read it now. Senator TAFT. Do you think that a man whom the heads of a union want to fire can successfully keep his union status and job? Secretary TOBIN. Definitely today.

Senator TAFT. In the United States today?

Secretary TOBIN. Oh, definitely. Most of the unions have real democratic procedure under which hearings are held. Following the hearings the case goes before the body as a whole and the man is allowed to defend himself. In addition, he has counsel before the trial committee and usually it is done in a democratic process in the local union by a vote for expulsion, either by a majority of those present, or, as is true most of the time, by two-thirds of those present.

Senator TAFT. Don't you think the Labor Relations Board ought to be able at least to pass on the question of whether the exclusion of a man was reasonable or not?

Secretary TOBIN. Well, in going through the hearings preceding the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, I find no instance in which-I have heard references here a great deal to the testimony that was given. I did not find that there were any employers who appeared before your committee complaining.

Senator TAFT. I am not concerned about employers; that is not of interest to me.

Secretary TOBIN. I mean employees. I have heard so much talk about all the witnesses who appeared before the committee; there was not, so far as I have been able to find, a single witness who was a union member protesting against conditions in his union or who had been removed, who had protested.

Senator TAFT. There are a hundred letters in the back of those hearings, from different men who were allowed to file statements, if you will just take a look at the hearings.

Secretary TOBIN. Well, did anyone check those cases through to find out whether they were disgruntled people?

Senator TAFT. Of course they are disgruntled people. What do you think made them write those letters? [Laughter.]

Secretary TOBIN. Well, wait a while. If they appeared before the committee, the committee would have had an opportunity to

cross-examine them. I do not think that evidence is worthy of consideration by any committee.

Senator TAFT. Mr. Tobin, in this hearing about two-thirds of all the testimony is going to be written testimony submitted by statements because the committee is not going to permit them to appear. We also had to limit the hearings very much.

Those people were poor people who had no money to come to Washington in most instances, so I do not think you could discredit their testimony. Maybe you will probably find a few who are not very strong.

Secretary TOBIN. Well, in the hearings there was not one single worker who appeared.

Senator TAFT. Well, I question that, but that we can discuss later when we examine it more at length. Your second objection is the so-called use of the injunction, and you say, "The evils of the labor injunction were recognized by the Congress in the Norris-LaGuardia Act."

Was it not very primarily brought about by the use of the obtaining of injunctions by private employers? Wasn't that the main purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act? Wasn't it even doubtful whether it. applied to the Government at all?

Secretary TOBIN. I think it clearly denied the agencies of government the right to procure injunctions in private cases.

Senator TAFT. You think it clearly did deny the use of it?

Secretary TOBIN. Excepting in extreme cases, and there are a set of circumstances under which you can get an injunction, but not being a lawyer, I would like to have a lawyer explain to you the six steps that you have to go through in order to obtain an injunction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act.

Senator TAFT. I understand that the possibility of a private person getting an injunction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act exists. The restrictions on obtaining it are such that it becomes impossible, but isn't there doubt that it was put in as against Government injunction at all? Isn't that a doubtful question?

Secretary TOBIN. I would like to refer you to my able counsel to my right.

Senator TAFT. Well, would your counsel be willing to state now that there was anything in the act that was aimed at the Government injunctions?

Mr. WILLIAM S. TYSON. I think it is clear that the Lewis case held that where there has been seizure and the employees are employees of the Government, an injunction can be gotten. Otherwise the courts have not, so far as I know, come out clearly and said either that an injunction could or could not be obtained in the event they were not Government employees.

Senator TAFT. Mr. Secretary, as far as the Taft-Hartley Act is concerned, it does not authorize any private injunction by any private employer, does it? It only authorizes injunctions by Government agencies.

Secretary TOBIN. Yes, but it is equivalent to it because it makes it possible for the employer to bring a charge of an unfair labor practice, and it is mandatory upon the general counsel to proceed to get that injunction, so although there is the intervening step

Senator TAFT. What do you mean "mandatory"?

Secretary TOBIN. It is mandatory in secondary-boycott cases. Senator TAFT. Only if he finds the case justifies one, that there is irreparable damage, a prima facie case of irreparable damage against a secondary boycott or a jurisdictional strike.

The CHAIRMAN. May I break in here while you are on the subject of injunctions? This is a letter from the Attorney General which has just come in, and I turn to page 5, next to the last paragraph, and it deals with this very question, and I think this is the proper place for it to appear in the record:

However

says Mr. Clark—

with regard to the question of the power of the Government under title III, I might point out that the inherent power of the President to deal with emergencies that affect the health, safety, and welfare of the entire Nation is exceedingly great. See Opinion of Attorney General Murphy of October 4, 1939 (39 Op. Atty. Gen. 344, 347); United States v. United Mine Workers of America (330 U. S. 258 (1947)).

Title II of the bill addresses itself affirmatively to solving the underlying labor dispute and not merely to the sterile maintenance of the status quo through the medium of the courts. Since these sections of the bill primarily consist of a procedure for resolving the substantive matters in dispute, it may be expected that, in most instances, differences will be settled quickly, and that no recourse to the courts will be necessary. Should, however, the parties not obey the mandate of section 302 (c) of the bill, and should this result in a national crisis, it is my belief that, in appropriate circumstances, the United States would have access to the courts to protect the national health, safety, and welfare. I say this because it is my belief that access to its own courts is always available to the United States, in the absence of a specific statutory bar depriving the Government of the right to seek the aid of the Federal courts in such critical situations. Particularly is this true where, as in the proposed legislation, a statutory obligation is placed upon the parties requiring them to continue or resume operations during a specific period. This bill, as I read it, does not purport to circumscribe the rights of the United States in this respect.

That may not be wholly in keeping with your discussion, but I deemed it germane and, therefore, I have put it in there.

Senator TAFT. It is very germane, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask Mr. Tobin, did he think when he drew this bill, did you think you were giving injunctive power in emergency strikes or didn't you?

Secretary TOBIN. I am not a lawyer, Senator, so

Senator TAFT. But you participated in drafting the bill. What did you intend your lawyers to draw when they drew the bill? Did you intend the lawyers to draw an injunction bill or not an injunction bill? Secretary TOBIN. Senator, I will present Mr. William Tyson, Solicitor of the Department of Labor.

Senator TAFT. Well, Mr. Tobin, I wanted to know what you meant. You were one of the four people directed to draw a bill, and I want to know not what the law says now, but I want to know whether you intended to draw an injunction bill in emergency disputes or whether you intended to draw a bill which rested entirely upon moral suasion. That is what I would like to know.

Secretary TOBIN. I will answer that question. I am not an attorney, and did not see the Attorney General's letter until we heard it just this minute.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pepper would like to say something.

Senator TAFT. With due respect, Mr. Secretary, I do not intend to be rude, but you did not answer my question. What did you intend this bill to do? It is a vital question. It has been one of the vital questions in public discussion. Did you intend to provide a bill that provided for injunction in emergency disputes or one which did not provide for injunctions in emergency disputes?

Secretary TOBIN. We did not draft a bill that contained a provision providing for injunctions in emergency disputes.

Senator TAFT. This is the first thing that we have heard, that am injunction can be sought in an emergency under this bill.

Secretary TOBIN. That is a legal question. I am not an attorney and I do not know what the answer would be.

Senator PEPPER. Mr. Chairman, I merely wanted to make the observation that the bill speaks for itself with respect to its language. It did not provide for any injunction. I do not see how anybody could surmise that it was intended to carry a provision for an injunction, and if this is authority outside of the bill for the President of the United States under the general law to seek redress, then, of course, that is entirely outside of the scope of this proposed legislation.

Senator TAFT. I notice, however, that the Attorney General bases part of his opinion that injunctions can be sought on the terms of the bill which says that the President can issue a proclamation, and that thereupon the parties shall continue the status quo.

Senator PEPPER. That is a conclusion of law.

Senator TAFT. That is based on that part of the bill.

Senator PEPPER. He is surmising that that would be a predicate. upon which the President of the United States in case of an emergency could make a showing for an injunction in the courts of the country. That is not in the language of the bill; that is a conclusion of law.

Senator TAFT. Then, I take it, Mr. Secretary, under that provision, as a practical matter, the Attorney General holds that the NorrisLaGuardia Act does not bind the Government of the United States in any case involving the national emergency; at least is that correct? Secretary TOBIN. I am not in a position to answer that.

Senator TAFT. I wonder if your lawyer would answer it. With respect to section 401 of the bill, title IV, you provide expressly that the Norris-LaGuardia Act shall be restored to full application, except as to section 10 of the National Labor Relations Act. That is the section which deals with injunctions after the National Labor Relations Board has heard the case, acted, and then gone to court and got its enforcement. That clearly knocks out the partial injunction in secondary boycotts and jurisdictional strikes, don't you think?

Mr. TYSON. At the time the Senator was reading the opinion I did not get to hear it, and I have not seen it, as the Secretary said, but it is my understanding that the intent of this particular bill is to confer no right to injunctive relief other than existed prior to the bill.

As I understand it, the Attorney General, in his opinion, is dealing with an entirely different question, the inherent powers of the President under the Constitution and he merely cited language in the letter in giving his opinion as to what would happen under these inherent powers of the President. That was the way I understood it. Senator TAFT. Of course, I may say now I entirely disagree with the Attorney General. He is entirely wrong. His opinion is based