44 WARREN, C. J., dissenting. be subject to deportation and thereby deprived of the right to assert any rights. This government was not established with power to decree this fate. The people who created this government endowed it with broad powers. They created a sovereign state with power to function as a sovereignty. But the citizens themselves are sovereign, and their citizenship is not subject to the general powers of their government. Whatever may be the scope of its powers to regulate the conduct and affairs of all persons within its jurisdiction, a government of the people cannot take away their citizenship simply because one branch of that government can be said to have a conceivably rational basis for wanting to do so. The basic constitutional provision crystallizing the right of citizenship is the first sentence of section one of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is there provided that "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698. Even if Congress can divest United States citizenship, it does not necessarily follow that an American-born expatriate can be deported. He would be covered by the statutory definition of "alien," 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (a) (3), but he would not necessarily have come "from a foreign port or place" and hence may not have effected the "entry," 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (a) (13), specified in the deportation provisions, 8 U. S. C. § 1251. More fundamentally, since the deporting power has been held to be derived from the power to exclude, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, supra, it may well be that this power does not extend to persons born in this country. As to them, deportation would perhaps find its justification only as a punishment, indistinguishable from banishment. See dissenting opinions in United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 264; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, supra, at 744. Since this action for a declaratory judgment does not involve the validity of the deportation order against petitioner, it is unnecessary, as the Government points out, to resolve the question of whether this petitioner may be deported. WARREN, C. J., dissenting. 356 U.S. United States and of the State wherein they reside." United States citizenship is thus the constitutional birthright of every person born in this country. This Court has declared that Congress is without power to alter this effect of birth in the United States, United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 703. The Constitution also provides that citizenship can be bestowed under a "uniform Rule of Naturalization,' " but there is no corresponding provision authorizing divestment. Of course, naturalization unlawfully procured can be set aside." But apart from this circumstance, the status of the naturalized citizen is secure. As this Court stated in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 827: "[The naturalized citizen] becomes a member of the society, possessing all the rights of a native citizen, and standing, in the view of the constitution, on the footing of a native. The constitution does not authorize Congress to enlarge or abridge those rights. The simple power of the national Legislature, is to prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization, and the exercise of this power exhausts it, so far as respects the individual." (Emphasis added.) Under oa form of government, as established by the Constitution, the citizenship cf the lawfully naturalized and the native-born cannot be taken from them. There is no question that citizenship may be voluntarily relinquished. The right of voluntary expatriation was recognized by Congress in 1868. Congress declared that "the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, l. 4. 8 See, e. g., Knauer v. United States, 328 U. S. 654; Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U. S. 665; Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118. 9 Act of July 27, 1868, 15 Stat. 223. 44 WARREN, C. J., dissenting. right of all people . "10 Although the primary purpose of this declaration was the protection of our naturalized citizens from the claims of their countries of origin, the language was properly regarded as establishing the reciprocal right of American citizens to abjure their allegiance." In the early days of this Nation the right of expatriation had been a matter of controversy. The common-law doctrine of perpetual allegiance was evident in the opinions of this Court.12 And, although impressment of naturalized American seamen of British birth was a cause of the War of 1812, the executive officials of this Government were not unwavering in their support of the right of expatriation.13 Prior to 1868 all efforts to obtain congressional enactments concerning expatriation failed. The doctrine of perpetual allegiance, however, was so ill-suited to the growing nation whose doors were open to immigrants from abroad that it could not last. Nine years before Congress acted Attorney General. Black stated the American position in a notable opinion: 14 15 "Here, in the United States, the thought of giving it [the right of expatriation] up cannot be entertained for a moment. Upon that principle this country was populated. We owe to it our existence as a nation. 10 Ibid. 11 See Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U. S. 491, 498 and n. 11; Foreign Relations, 1873, H. R. Exec. Doc. No. 1, 43d Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1, Vol. II, 1186-1187, 1204, 1210, 1213, 1216, 1222 (views of President Grant's Cabinet members); 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 295; Tsiang, The Question of Expatriation in America Prior to 1907, 97-98, 108109. 12 See Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242; Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbour, 3 Pet. 99. 133 Moore, Digest of International Law, §§ 434-437; Tsiang, 45-55, 71-86, 110-112. 14 Tsiang, 55-61. 159 Op. Atty. Gen. 356, 359. WARREN, C. J., dissenting. 356 U.S. Ever since our independence we have upheld and maintained it by every form of words and acts. We have constantly promised full and complete protection to all persons who should come here and seek it by renouncing their natural allegiance and transferring their fealty to us. We stand pledged to it in the face of the whole world." 16 It has long been recognized that citizenship may not only be voluntarily renounced through exercise of the right of expatriation but also by other actions in derɔgation of undivided allegiance to this country. While the essential qualities of the citizen-state relationship under our Constitution preclude the exercise of governmental power to divest United States citizenship, the establishment of that relationship did not impair the principle that conduct of a citizen showing a voluntary transfer of allegiance is an abandonment of citizenship. Nearly all sovereignties recognize that acquisition of foreign nationality ordinarily shows a renunciation of citizenship." Nor is this the only act by which the citizen may show a voluntary abandonment of his citizenship. Any action by which he manifests allegiance to a foreign state may be so inconsistent with the retention of citizenship as to result in loss of that status.18 In recognizing the consequence of such action, the Government is not taking away United States citizenship to implement its general regulatory powers, for, as previously indicated, in my judgment citizenship is immune from divestment under these 10 See, e. g., Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U. S. 491; Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299; Bauer v. Clark, 161 F. 2d 397, cert. denied, 332 U. S. 839. Cf. Acheson v. Maenza, 92 U. S. App. D. C. 85, 202 F.2d 453. 17 See Laws Concerning Nationality, U. N. Doc. No. ST/LEG/ SER.B/4 (1954). 18 See, generally, Laws Concerning Nationality, op. cit. supra, note 17. 44 WARREN, C. J., dissenting. powers. Rather, the Government is simply giving formal recognition to the inevitable consequence of the citizen's own voluntary surrender of his citizenship. Twice before, this Court has recognized that certain voluntary conduct results in an impairment of the status of citizenship. In Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U. S. 491, an American citizen had renounced her citizenship and acquired that of a foreign state. This Court affirmed her loss of citizenship, recognizing that "From the beginning, one of the most obvious and cffective forms of expatriation has been that of naturalization under the laws of another nation." 338 U. S., at 498. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299, involved an American woman who had married a British national. That decision sustained an Act of Congress which provided that her citizenship was suspended for the duration of her marriage. Since it is sometimes asserted that this case is authority for the broad proposition that Congress can take away United States citizenship, it is necessary to examine precisely what the case involved. The statute which the Court there sustained did not divest Mrs. Mackenzie of her citizenship." It provided that "any American woman who marries a foreigner shall take the nationality of her husband." 20 "At the termina 19 Act of March 2, 1907, 34 Stat. 1228-1229. The full text is as follows: "SEC. 3. That any American woman who marries a foreigner shall take the nationality of her husband. At the termination of the marital relation she may resume her American citizenship, if abroad, by registering as an American citizen within one year with a consul of the United States, or by returning to reside in the United States, or, if residing in the United States at the termination of the marital relation, by continuing to reside therein." 20 This clause merely expressed the well-understood principle that a wife's nationality "merged" with that of her husband's. Cockburn, Nationality, 24; 3 Moore, Digest of International Law, 450-451, 453; 3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law, 246-247. This was a |