pelling the installation of automatic co legislation, however, had introduced a a special type of coupler was adopted not couple with cars of another state. tion was obviously more dangerous th intended to remedy, it became clear t practice which would follow federal re requisite degree of safety. By act of March 2, 1893 (27 Stat. L., authorized to give notice to all common merce of the standard for drawbars a commission by the American Railway of failure of this association to dete commission was itself directed to do so July 1, 1895, it was made unlawful, un otherwise, for any railroad company t commerce that was not provided with holds at the ends and sides for greater and uncoupling cars. The act made it compulsory for common carriers to equip trains with driving-wheel brakes, the train brake system, and automatic couplers. The commission was empowered to extend the period for carriers' compliance with the law's requirements "upon full hearing and for good cause." It was made obligatory for the commission to lodge with the proper district attorneys, information of any such violations of the act as might come to its knowledge. An inspector was appointed to examine railroad equipment for purposes of enforcement and for securing information upon which to elaborate a regulatory system. The prompt compliance of the American Railway Association with the provision of the law authorizing it to draw up a standard for drawbars enabled the commission to announce the standard one month after passage of the law. But the commission found it necessary to extend the time limit for compliance with the sections of the act relating to brakes and couplers so that the full effect of the law was not manifest until after August 1, 1900. In 1900 the commission called attention to the fact that the value of the safety laws could only be a matter of conjecture for at least a year, since reports of casualties to employees were reported by the carriers annually. In the following year, by act of March 3, 1901 (31 Stat. L., 1446), the commission was authorized to prescribe forms for monthly reports by the interstate carriers not only of casualties to employees while on duty but also of all collisions, derailments, and accidents to passengers. The disastrous Chicago strike of 1894 called general attention to the need of machinery for amicable settlement of disputes affecting interstate commerce between carriers and their employees. The commission recommended" that whenever strikes or lockouts were anticipated by railroad managements, by the employees, or the commission itself, authority should reside in the commission to enter upon immediate investigation to obtain testimony of all persons, to secure the aid of judicial process, to compel the giving of such testimony, and to enforce such recommendations based upon the investigation as might be constitutionally devised. Although this recommendation was not enacted 17 Annual Report, 1894, p. 68. act. One of the most important difficulties by the form of procedure prescribed in mission had rendered its decision in th the carrier, following formal complaint carrier chose to comply, the commissio to a United States court for an injunct Not only was there costly delay but ther of appeal to the Supreme Court; and it the court of final appeal that the original became binding as law. In consequence t was soon reduced to that of initiator of nant before various courts, and since no these cases, long delays resulted. The pealed cases was not less than four year Moreover, to accentuate these difficulti accept the evidence taken before the com questions of fact. The duplication of ex involved in the "de novo" proceedings of all witnesses and the production of all papers, led to a feeling on the part of shippers and railroads that the procedure before the commission was only a necessary formality prior to court adjudication, and incomplete presentations of fact were laid before the commission, upon which it was, however, compelled to render a decision. The result was that the prestige not only of the commission but also of the law itself suffered.20 Due to this delay in redress of grievances and the postponement of definitive proceedings, an effective remedy was denied in many cases to the shipper for the loss he had incurred. On this point, the United States Industrial Commission reported in 1902 as follows: Even supposing that the carriers obey the order of the Commission, that does not necessarily provide any remedy for financial or other loss entailed. The orders of the Commission become effective, in theory, only when they have been passed upon finally by the United States Supreme Court. During all the years which may elapse the loss entailed upon the plaintiff may continue, and losses hundreds of times as great may ensue for others. And, even more important than this, it may be impossible that the parties who really are aggrieved can ever obtain redress. . . . Thus, for example, the only party who can recover for the excess in freight rates paid to the carrier is the person who has actually made the payment. It goes without saying that in many instances the real burden of the unreasonable freight rate does not rest upon this party at all, but upon others who are denied action by reason of the machinery of the law. Thus, for instance, if an unreasonable rate be charged upon grain from a certain locality, it is indubitable that the effect of that excessive freight rate is to depress unduly the price of the product. The farmer, however, cannot institute proceedings before the Commission. It is only the middlemen who happen to be shippers who may do so, and the shippers may recoup themselves readily, having no incentive, therefore, to institute proceedings at all. The result is that the loss in any instance ultimately falls upon the producer of grain, without the possibility of an adequate remedy for the injustice entailed."1 The ammendment of 1889 made it a penal or criminal offence for carriers' officers, shippers, or other agents to participate in 20 Haines, Problems in railway regulation, p. 100. personal discriminations, payment of rebates, etc. Since evidence in such matters could only be obtained from persons who had directly witnessed or participated in the acts themselves, the commission found great difficulty in compelling the attendance and testimony of witnesses. In 1890 a shipper declined to answer to a question relating to his enjoyment of a preferential rate on the ground that the fifth amendment to the Constitution provided that no person should be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. The case went to the Supreme Court of the United States, which decided against the commission in 1892, holding that the Revised Statutes of the United States " did not give adequate protection to witnesses when requested to testify against themselves in criminal proceedings based upon such testimony. 22 23 Following this decision, Congress passed a law" providing "that no person shall be excused from attending and testifying .. before the Interstate Commerce Commission or in obedience to the subpoena of the commission. . . . But no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may testify, or produce evidence, . . . before said Commission." The validity of this law was contested in several cases, and it was not until 1896 that a decision" of the Supreme Court finally eliminated the obstacles confronting the commission in securing the testimony of recalcitrant witnesses. Meanwhile, the commission had been unable to obtain for six years such facts as it required in the administration of the law. The effect of the attitude of the courts in cases appealed from the commission has already been referred to. The intent of the framers of the act was that the commission's investigations and subsequent decisions upon matters of fact in cases which came before it were to be final, and that the courts would only review 22 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S., 547. 23 Section 860 of the Revised Statutes provided that witnesses should not be excused from testifying because their testimony might tend to incriminate them, but that such testimony should not be used against them in any criminal proceedings. This section had been embodied in Sec. 12 of the act of 1887. 24 Act of February 11, 1893 (27 Stat. L., 443). 25 Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S., 591. |