tion.' That the additional words were inserted for a purpose is plain; and what the purpose was is also plain. The purpose was that the fire and police department of the city should not be used to advance the interests of any political party, or the political party, or the political ambition, of any individual or set of inviduals. The fire and police departments should be maintained for their efficiency in protecting the interests of the people, and for no other purpose. . . . It is presumption of law that every public officer does his duty. This presumption is especially strong in the case of the governor, the chief executive officer of an independent state. If any court should attempt to institute an inquiry into the reasons or motives which have controlled the official action of the governor, great difficulties would be encountered. These difficulties are all the greater in cases where improper political motives are charged; and this, for the reason that the persons making such charges may themselves be actuated by improper political motives. Charges of improper motives are easily made, are often untrue, and are always hard to prove. When such charges are made in respect to an act not wrong in itself-an act expressly authorized for cause to be determined by the officer performing the act-an act which is wrong only when prompted by an improper reason or motive,— it is practically impossible to determine judicially that the act done was illegal, on the sole ground that it was prompted by an improper motive or unlawful reason; and this is especially true where the officer is required by law to state in writing the cause for his act, and his written statement shows no unlawful reason."

legally entitled to hold these offices. And the court sustained the power of the governor to remove the officers in case the removal was not for political reasons. The court pointed out that its use of the phrase "without interference on the part of the courts," in the former case, had reference to procedure only, and did not mean that the courts did not have power to pass on the rights of rival claimants to the office, where the executive order of removal is questioned by the incumbent.

Trimble v. People (Colo.) supra, was approved and followed also in People ex rel. Engley v. Martin (1894) 19 Colo. 565, 24 L.R.A. 201, 36 Pac. 543, in which it was held, further, that when the governor made an order for the removal of a member of the fire and police force, and stated the cause therefor in writing, such written statement must be held the exclusive and conclusive proof of the cause for making the order; in other, words, the courts would not question the good faith of the governor, and determine whether or not the removal was for political reasons, and for no other cause, notwithstanding the cause given therefor. The court said: "Stated in plain language, the question to be determined is: Have respondents the legal right to allege and prove in these proceedings that the real cause of the orders for their removal was other and different from the cause stated in writing by the governor; that is, have they the right to show that the orders for their removal were really made for political reasons, and for no other cause? The question is not free from difficulty. . . . The matters set forth in respondents' answers are especially forcible in view of the words of limitation inserted in the charter of 1893, forbidding the governor to remove 'for political reasons;' these words were not in the former charter; the language of the charter of 1891 was: 'The governor shall at all times have power and authority to revoke the appointment of any member of said board for good and sufficient causes to be specifically stated in such revoca

The court in People ex rel. Engley v. Martin (Colo.) supra, accordingly reached the conclusion that when the proceedings before the governor, including the written statement showing the order and cause for removal, were regular and valid on their face, the words of limitation forbidding removals "for political reasons" cannot be given practical effect except as

they might operate upon the conscience of the executive, and so restrain and control his official conduct.

In State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Johnson (1892) 30 Fla. 499, 11 So. 855, it is held that where the governor, acting on a case which is within his constitutional powers, has suspended an officer, questions such as the reasonableness of the office hours of the officer suspended, and the bona fides. of a person making the tender of payment of poll taxes, for refusing which the officer was suspended, are entirely within the exclusive jurisdiction of the governor and senate of the state, and cannot be considered by the courts. It will be observed that the court held that the power of review in such case is in the senate alone, the state Constitution providing that the governor, by and with the advice of the senate, might remove, for certain causes, any officer not liable to impeachment.

There is but one inquiry in such a case which the court can make, and that is whether or not the act for which the alleged suspension was made is, as matter of law, a ground for removal within the grant of power made to the governor; and the courts cannot inquire into the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence to prove that the officer did or did not do what he was charged with doing and was suspended for doing, if the charge is in its nature one for which the Constitution authorizes suspension. Ibid.

So, in State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Johnson (1892) 30 Fla. 433, 18 L.R.A. 410, 11 So. 845, it is held that so long as the governor's action in suspending an officer is within the limits of his constitutional power, the courts cannot interfere to arrest his action; that he is the exclusive judge, in so far as the courts are concerned, of the sufficiency of the proof of the charge. This conclusion was reached on the ground that not only had the courts been given no power of review, but also because of the power granted by the state Constitution to the senate, as above indicated. The contention was overruled that the power of suspension given to the governor could

not be exercised by him until there had been an ascertainment by the judgment of the courts, or some other tribunal possessed of judicial power, as to the existence of one or more of the causes for which suspension was authorized, in other words, that the power to make inquiry and decide upon the existence of the wrong for which suspension might be inflicted was judicial in its nature, and not within the official attributes of the governor. The court took the view that it was unnecessary to decide whether the nature of the power was strictly judicial, quasi judicial, or administrative, or what was its precise classification. It was said that the authorities are all to the effect that a grant of the power to remove either for cause or at discretion carries with it the exclusive power to hear and decide; and that, whereas the courts are entirely powerless when the power is discretionary, they are equally so where it is for cause, if the grantee of the power acts within its limits, and upon notice, if notice is required; that if the removal is for a cause designated by or falling or within the grant, the grantee or depositary of the removing power is the sole judge of the sufficiency of the evidence to justify the removal.

It was held in Gray v. McLendon (1910) 134 Ga. 224, 67 S. E. 859, that the court was powerless to review the action of the governor in suspending, or that of the general assembly in removing, a railroad commissioner; that the governor and assembly in taking such action had unlimited discretion, and need not make any investigation or inquiry, or assign specific reasons for such suspension or removal, and might act for any reason satisfactory to them; that, no provision being made by statute for the courts to review their action, the courts could not enter into the inquiry whether the reason for suspension or removal was sufficient, or whether the charges preferred were purely of a political nature. These conclusions were reached under a statute providing that such commissioner "may" be suspended from office by order of the

governor, who should report the facts of such suspension and the reason therefor to the next general assembly; that, if a majority of the latter declared that the commissioner should be removed from office, his term should expire; and that in case any commissioner became disqualified in any way he should at once remove the disqualification or resign, and that on failure to do so he "must" be suspended from office by the governor. The court pointed out the distinction between the permissive suspension which the governor was authorized to make for any reason satisfactory to him and the required removal which he was under obligation to effect in case the commissioner became disqualified to hold office; and it was held that the fact that the statute required the governor to report to the assembly the reasons for suspension after the same was made did not make it proper for the court to read into the statute the proposition that the governor could only suspend for reasons which the court deemed proper grounds for suspension.

It is held, also, in Harrington v. Smith (1923) 114 Kan. 262, 127 Pac. 270, that under a statute authorizing the governor to remove a public officer for official misconduct, an order of removal made upon evidence, the officer having had notice of the investigation and an opportunity to be heard, is not subject to review by the courts, but is conclusive if made in good faith, and can only be set aside for fraud or its equivalent. In this instance a commissioner of elections was removed on a charge of misconduct for wilfully refusing to appoint members of the election boards and to notify them of their appointment at least ten days before the election; and the officer contended that, assuming that the law required the giving of such notice, the omission afforded no basis for removal because it did not imply turpitude, and could be readily accounted for by the difficulty of reconciling and interpreting the various statutes and by the hurry and confusion necessarily attending the preparation for an election. But the court

said that there was no occasion to review the evidence, since it was quite immaterial as to what conclusions the court would arrive at from its consideration; that, however erroneous the governor's decision might be, it was final and conclusive, if made in good faith.

And where the statute provided that the executive council should elect a board of railroad commissioners who should hold office for three years, and that the council might at any time remove the commissioners or any of them and elect others to fill the vacancy, the court in State ex rel. Little v. Mitchell (1893) 50 Kan. 289, 20 L.R.A. 306, 33 Pac. 104, held that the statute should be construed as meaning that the commissioners should hold office for the term of three years unless sooner removed; and that the council had the power, at its discretion, to remove the commissioners at any time; and that when the council, in its discretion, determined to remove a commissioner, the courts should not prevent or interfere, even though the action was influenced by political considerations.

Attention is called, also, to Lindley v. Davis (1925) 117 Kan. 558, 231 Pac. 1026, where the order removing the chancellor of a state university was made by a state board of administration, the removal being, it was alleged, brought about by malice, oppression, and caprice on the part of the board and of the governor, which allegations were admitted by demurrer. But the court applied the rule that the action of removing such an officer, who held during the pleasure of the board, could not be reviewed by the courts, unless upon ground of actual corruption, or what would be tantamount thereto.

In State ex rel. Barrett v. Hedrick (1922) 294 Mo. 21, 241 N. W. 402, it was held that the governor had jurisdiction (see III. infra) to act as he did in the removal of a warehouse commissioner, and that the court had no power to review his action,-at least if there was evidence which was not before the court on review. And it was held that the prejudice charged

against the governor would not warrant the court in holding that he was without jurisdiction, since the legislature has conferred on the governor the power of removal in such cases for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or misconduct in office, and had made no provision for removal by other methods in case it was shown that the governor was prejudiced. It was said: "No 'change of venue' was allowed. The lawmaking power intrusted the matter of removal to the governor, without regard to any question concerning his state of mind or attitude toward an official coming within the act. Doubtless that body thought public sentiment a sufficient deterrent. Whatever it thought, and whether its course was wise or otherwise, the act enables the governor to proceed in any case within it. A particular state of mind which might be his in a particular case was not thought by the legislature to be reason for refusing to invest him with the power to remove, and this court cannot amend the statute. . . . Since provision for removal was deemed necessary, and since the power to remove must be lodged somewhere, the legislature chose the governor and reposed the power in him without any qualification or restriction in so far as concerns the feelings he might entertain toward any officer with respect to whom he might undertake to exert his power to remove. It follows that it is wholly needless to go into a discussion of the question whether the record shows the governor had improperly formed an opinion adverse to relator in advance of the hearing he tendered him."

It was held, also, in State ex rel. Churchill v. Hay (1895) 45 Neb. 321, 63 N. W. 821, that the contention urged against the order of removal was not a valid one, to the effect that the governor was incapable, on account of bias and prejudice, of giving the officer an impartial hearing. Although observing that there was in the record no apparent foundation for the charge, the court said, also, that the motives of the chief executive officer of the state in the discharge of

his duty as such were not the subject of inquiry in such a proceeding as the one before the court. And the court held that power conferred on the governor to remove certain public officers for cause is an administrative, and not a judicial, function, and that orders made in the exercise of that power are not reviewable by the courts; that the limit of judicial interference in such cases is to protect public officers, removable for cause only, in their right to a hearing upon specific charges, or, in other words, to require the officer or body claiming the right to removal to keep within his or its jurisdiction. See III. infra. The question arose in quo warranto proceedings to determine the rights of the superintendent of the hospital for the insane, insane, the governor having found, as a basis for removal, that attendants employed by the superintendent and under his control had wantonly and unnecessarily abused and maltreated patients, that medical treatment had not been modern, and that harmful drugs had been administered to patients; also that the expenses had been greater than necessary. The court intimated that the latter charge as to extravagance would not sustain the order of removal, as it did not appear that the superintendent was directly responsible therefor; but held that the former findings, relating to matters within the jurisdiction of the governor, directly involving the management of the hospital, were sufficient in law to sustain the order based thereon. It thus appears that the court reviewed the legality of the officer's removal sufficient to determine that the governor had jurisdiction, and that the removal was for a cause for which he was authorized to remove the officer. And, regarding the statutory provision for removal by the governor for malfeasance in office, "or other good and sufficient cause," the court said that the governor was not by the statute invested with arbitrary powers; that the language "other good and sufficient cause" should be held to mean causes of like nature, affecting

the competency or fitness of the officer for the position.

And in Atty. Gen. ex rel. Taylor v. Brown (1853) 1 Wis. 513, it was held that the courts cannot inquire into the motives of the governor in removing an officer, under a statute authorizing him to do so when he believes that the best interests of the state demand such removal. The question arose in quo warranto proceedings; and the court, in the opinion, pointed out that the policy of the state Constitution and laws had assigned to the different departments of the state government distinct and independent duties, in the performance of which it was intended that they should be entirely independent of each other, so that whatever power or duty was expressly given to or imposed on the executive department was altogether free from the interference of other branches of the government,-especially where, as in this instance, the subject was committed to the discretion of the chief executive. The court observed, further, that it would be unbecoming and unwarranted on its part to inquire into the motives of the governor; that it was no part of its duty to impugn the governor in such a case, but that, on the contrary, it was bound to hold him justified in whatever conclusion he might have formed; and that whatever influenced the executive in the removal of the officer had no claim to the court's attention, but was wholly foreign to the question before it.

So, under a statute providing that the officer should continue in office for a certain term unless sooner removed by the governor for incompetency, or other specified causes, it was held in Keenan v. Perry (1859) 24 Tex. 253, that the governor's action in removing the officer must be deemed conclusive as to the existence of cause for removal, in so far as the right to the office was concerned; that whether it was correct or not, there was no authority to revise it, and the governor's decision was not reversible by the court. It was held, accordingly, that it was no objection to the governor's action that, in removing the officer,

he did not assign the cause or causes for removal. The court said that the law did not require the governor to assign the causes, and that, as no court or tribunal was clothed with authority by the law to revise the action of the governor, and his decision was not elsewhere examinable, it was not perceived what useful purpose would be subserved by assigning the particular cause or causes upon which he acted; that the authority to require such assignment would imply a power of revision, which was not given by the law. And the court observed that if a cause existed in the governor's mind, though it had no existence in point of fact, it was admitted that the same was conclusive in so far as concerned judicial inquiry; also that the liability to abuse of such power could not afford the legal test by which to judge of its existence.

It was held in Re Guden (1902) 171 N. Y. 529, 64 N. E. 451, that power conferred by a constitutional provision that the governor might remove a public officer, after giving to the officer a copy of the charges against him and an opportunity of being heard in his defense, was executive and not judicial, and was intended to be vested exclusively in the governor; that, when these two requirements were complied with, the courts could not inquire into the merits of the removal. It was said that an examination of the record disclosed that the requirements of the Constitution were fully complied with; that, therefore, the courts did not examine into the merits, since both the power to decide whether the officers should be removed from office and the responsibility for a right decision rested solely on the governor.

But in People v. Ahearn (1909) 131 App. Div. 30, 115 N. Y. Supp. 664, affirmed, without discussion of this point, in (1909) 196 N. Y. 221, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1153, 89 N. E. 930, the court said (following Re Guden (N. Y.) supra) that, although the removal by the governor was an executive act and therefore not reviewable by the courts, yet it was not one to be performed arbitrarily or otherwise than