our neighbors by visiting them more frequently. There are no longer any serious handicaps in the way of visiting a number of the states of South America. By becoming intimately acquainted with the problems of Peru, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil, we can do more toward aiding in the formation of an intelligent foreign policy than might appear at first sight. It is ignorance that breeds insults.

Finally, let us stop using the words "Monroe Doctrine." It would be well if a formal resolution of Congress could be passed, but since Congress has never formally approved of the Monroe Doctrine in so many words, it is probable that it would be sufficient if our great parties in their next platforms should avoid the repetition of those phrases supporting the doctrine which have been customary for so many years.

For the immediate future, let us adopt a policy of PanAmerican Defense. Let us invite to the round table of discussion all the American republics who can show clean records and economic stability. If we believe that any American republic, by reason of civil war or internal discord, is endangering the peace of its neighbors, if we believe that cause for interference in its affairs is arising, let the matter be considered at the round table. Let it meet in some one of the American capitals, not merely to discuss, as Pan-American conferences have done, innocuous policies regarding Pan-American railway projects and international postal regulations, but the actual business in hand. In other words, let these Pan-American conferences not represent a formal exchange of pleasantry every so often, but let them be called for the definite object of settling definite and difficult problems. If there is to be any intervention, let it come as the result of a family gathering, and not as the decision of the American Department of State. Let us remember that it is "as the disinterested advocate of peace and good-will that we shall have most influence in the Western Hemisphere."

If Argentina, Brazil and Chile decline to meet us on these terms, then let us go to The Hague and call a council of all civilized nations, and ask for an expression of interna

tional opinion, and the appointment of international police. Here is an opportunity for a truly enlightened international policy.

Meanwhile let us not forget that the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine involves an attitude of constant suspicion both at home and abroad, which raises barriers against the progress of international good-will and diminishes our influence both in Europe and America.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

By Honorable George F. Tucker

Many views have been entertained as to the meaning of the Monroe doctrine, and as to its claim to a place in the code of international law. The conservatives regard it as a declaration of little value and efficacy; to the devotees of bold and forceful politics it has become a kind of fetish; even a President of the United States asserted nearly twenty years ago that it "has its place in the code of international law as certainly and as securely as if it were specifically mentioned;" and yet, as to its genesis, aim, and validity there can be no room for cavil or controversy. Enunciated over ninety years ago, when Spain was bent on resubjugating her Spanish-American dependencies, which had long before asserted their independence, and when it was apprehended that she was assured of the support of other European powers, the Doctrine has never been sanctioned or adopted by the Congress of the United States, and its place in the code of international law has been strenuously and even bitterly questioned by most of the leading nations of Europe.

And what is this Doctrine? It may briefly be defined as a warning to the governments of the Old World not to establish colonies on, or to extend their political systems to these continents, and to refrain from interference in the affairs of the Spanish-American republics. Conceding that the Doctrine has no place in the realm of international jurisprudence and that it is hardly more than a fiat, we are confronted by the fact that its assertion by this government has more than once received the attention of European powers, and it has been, in a certain sense, recognized by them in the happy adjustment of the contentions which have occasioned its avowal. There are four conspicuous illustrations.

International misunderstandings over a projected waterway at the Isthmus of Panama long preceded the ratification

of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty in 1850. This compact, which was intended to settle a perplexing question only augmented the difficulty, and the discussions and writings to which it gave rise would fill volumes. In the course of time differences were harmonized or contentions withdrawn, and the Hay-Pauncefote treaty has lodged ample power in the American government to construct the Canal; and the bickerings and quarrels of many years are forgotten. During the long period of unrest and disturbance in Cuba, Americans apprehended that Great Britain or some other European power contemplated the acquisition of that island, and Great Britain and France entertained a somewhat similar view as to the intentions of the United States. The two nations urged this country to enter into a tripartite stipulation to the effect that no one of them should obtain possession of the island or exercise any dominion over it. After the rejection of the proposal by this country in 1852, there seemed to be little hope of a settlement of the question, yet now we find Cuba enjoying independence under our own guardianship, and her present condition and her future welfare are matters of indifference to the powers of Europe. On the intervention of the French in Mexico about fifty years ago, the Monroe Doctrine was again invoked. The situation was for a time serious, but at last the invaders withdrew; and ever since no power has assumed to interfere in the affairs of this so· called republic, except the United States itself, now endeavoring through an able, upright and conscientious President to aid the Mexicans in the establishment of a stable government. And, lastly, there is the case of Venezuela, in 1895. The question related to the determination of a boundary line between that country and British Guiana. The feeling engendered between the two nations, parties to the controversy, was intense, if not bitter. However, the question at last reached a definite adjustment, and the incident is now history. These occasions of the so-called application or assertion of the Monroe Doctrine are cited to show that in every instance reason and sense have triumphed, and war has been happily averted.

We are now at the threshold of the future and are asked to

exercise prevision-to suggest how far the Monroe Doctrine ought to apply to prospective incursions of European nations into the territory of Central and South American republics, or to possible interference in their affairs. These questions are difficult to answer, and every case must be treated and settled according to the circumstances creating it, and the disposition and temper of the disputants. It is believed by many that there is little ground for apprehension that foreign powers will endeavor to establish on these shores settlements hostile to democratic institutions or disturb the autonomy of the Spanish-American republics, but if problems relating to land or government or even trade, or the enforcement of pecuniary obligations do come up for solution, there are the most cogent reasons for the exercise of the spirit of accomodation, for the application of liberal construction and interpretation, and for the abnegation not only of the apprehensions similar to those so prevalent at the time of the inception of the Doctrine, but also of jingo sentiments and policies.

The speaker is not inclined to present ideas and formulate rules of his own. It is his purpose rather to ask questions based on governmental conditions, international relations, commercial methods and practices, and the utilization of physical forces for the carriage of merchandise, so radically different from those which obtained or were employed ninety, seventy, or even fifty years ago. We should not forget that at the time of President Monroe's declaration this country had a population of only a few millions, and that her interests were inconsiderable in comparison with those of today, that the Spanish-American countries were emerging from colonial conditions that made the transition to independence and democracy difficult and problematical; that trade between civilized countries was not extensive and was largely limited to merchandise peculiar to an age when wants were few and luxuries little known; that transportation was not yet effected by the agencies which man has since called from latency; that knowledge the world over was the possession of the few, and that such a thing as the education of the masses was hardly contemplated; that racial affinities