be taken by the United States in assuming the initiative in this movement. A few broad outlines should suffice. First, it is essential that we commit ourselves unreservedly to the principle of the imperative need of the union of the states of Central America. Second, our government should inform the governments of these Republics that it considers the union as the only adequate remedy for the ills they have so long endured, and that it is prepared to assist in every way it properly can to attain this object. Third, it should invite and induce each of the five governments to send commissioners possessing plenary powers, to a conference to be held on neutral ground, to discuss the formation of the union and to draw up the bases for the ultimate accomplishment of that end, whether at once or by progressive steps requiring, possibly, several years of preparation and re-adjustment. Such a discussion would most probably open the door to many delicate and trying questions, whose solution would require the utmost patience and the most skillful diplomacy. A consistent adherence, however, to the central principle of the need of the union, should produce tangible and effective results. There is ample room for discussion as to the precise measures required to bring about the union. But there should be no room for discussion as to its complete desirability. In the project presented to the Washington Conference in 1907 by the delegation from Honduras, is to be found a tentative program for the formation of the union, which might serve as a point de depart for another conference called for this purpose (Foreign Relations, 1907, p. 670).

It would be unwise to attempt to minimize the difficulties in the way of this project, nor is it possible in the limits of this article to point out the numerous and weighty factors which must be taken into consideration in this connection: for example, the relations of Mexico to Central America. Allusion should be made, however, to the attitude of Costa Rica. For more than thirty years, while the other states of Central America have been racked by internal dissensions and petty wars, Costa Rica has been entirely free from revolutions and has been able to avoid becoming embroiled

in the factional troubles and intrigues of its neighbours. This may be due to conditions peculiar to itself. It is, nevertheless, a fact which is of no little encouragement for the rest of Central America. The economic development of Costa Rica has naturally been very great, and its people have been able to enjoy marked prosperity. It is not difficult, therefore, to understand why they have been unwilling, heretofore, to be drawn prematurely into any close political connection with the other states of Central America. It is possible that Costa Rica may still be indisposed to amalgamate her interests with those of her neighbours, even though the union should be brought about through the initiative and the protection of the United States. Such an attitude would be particularly lamentable inasmuch as Costa Rica would be in a position to lend the most substantial elements to the union. This should not deter the other States, however, from going ahead with the project, because the reluctant sister would be at liberty to come in whenever she might so desire, remembering that in the constitution of 1847 it was affirmed "that Costa Rica forms a part of the Central American nation and will coöperate toward its reorganization in conjunction with the other states."

Secretary Blaine fully appreciated the vital importance of the union of the Central American States as the surest remedy for their persistent maladies. His instructions of November 28, 1881, to the American minister in Mexico, in reference to aggressive attitude of that country towards Guatemala, are of especial interest as a clear enunciation of American policy.

But in reference to the union of the Central American republics, under one federal government, the United States is ready to avow that no subject appeals more strongly to its sympathy, nor more decidedly to its judgment. Nor is this a new policy. For many years this Government has urged upon the Central American States the importance of such a union to the creation of a well ordered and constitutionally governed republic and our ministers have been instructed to impress this upon the individual governments to which they have been accredited and the Central American statesmen with whom they have been associated. And we have always cherished the belief that in this effort we had the sincere sympathy

and cordial coöperation of the Mexican government. Under the conviction that the future of the people of Central America was absolutely dependent upon the establishment of a federal government which would give strength abroad and maintain peace at home, our chief motive in the recent commotion in Mexico was to prevent the diminution, either political or territorial of any of these states, in order that, trusting to the joint aid and friendship of Mexico and the United States, they might be encouraged to persist in their effort to establish a government which would, both for their advantage and ours, represent their combined wealth, intelligence and character (Foreign Relations, 1881, p. 816).

In his general instructions to the American diplomatic representatives in Central America, dated May 7, 1881, Mr. Blaine also said:

You cannot impress too strongly upon the government to which you are accredited or upon the public men with whom you associate the importance which the government of the United States attaches to such a confederation of the states of Central America as will respond to the wants and wishes of their people. Our popular maxim, that "in union there is strength," finds its counterpart in the equally manifest truth that, "in division there is weakness." So long as the Central American States remain divided they will fail to acquire the strength and prestige to which they are entitled. The statesmen of Central America may feel certain that, with a common representative government, wielding the power and consulting the interests of the several States, their connection with the railway system of the continent will be eagerly sought and they will both give and receive advantages which always follow the establishment of commercial relations and political sympathy. All internal improvements, including the great project of the interoceanic canal would receive great stimulus and aid from a firm union of the Central American states and the strong government that should grow from that union (Foreign Relations, 1881, p. 102).

It is fruitless to speculate as to what Blaine might have done to forward the union, had he remained longer in power at that time. His statesmanlike vision in grasping a great idea and his boldness in carrying it into effect were demonstrated in the realization of the Pan American Union. Since his day the United States has waited patiently in the hope that the republics of Central America would be able to work out their own salvation. It would now seem certain that they cannot do so unaided. The futility of peace conferences and sentimental agreements has been proved beyond

question. The obligation of the United States towards these countries is generally recognized. Acting the ignominious part of a policeman, we are intermeddling in their domestic affairs and cannot foresee whither such a policy may lead. A courageous, radical remedy is urgently demanded. The administration at Washington, which by a measure of the highest, constructive statesmanship, is prepared to aid the people of Central America achieve their noblest ideal, will build for itself a lasting monument in the hearts of all Spanish-Americans. The United States will be freed from all aspersions of pursuing unworthy aims as well as from the perils of irksome interventions. It will be able to demonstrate irrefutably that the Monroe Doctrine does not serve to perpetuate bad government, but that its benificent effect is to enable the people of this western hemisphere to emerge from chaotic political conditions, and unhindered to achieve their highest aspirations and destinies.

THE DOMINICAN CONVENTION AND ITS

LESSONS

By Jacob H. Hollander, Ph.D., Professor of Political Economy, Johns Hopkins University, Formerly Special Commissioner Plenipotentiary to Santo Domingo, and Financial Adviser of the Dominican Republic.1

The occasion for American intervention in Dominican affairs in 1905 was the imminence of serious complications between the United States and foreign powers, growing out of the active measures taken by such governments to enforce the rights of their creditor-citizens as secured by formal contracts or by international protocols with the Dominican Republic.

For thirty-five years before (1869-1904), Dominican history had been a miserable succession of revolution and anarchy, interrupted by ruthless and blood-stained dictatorships. Of this mis-government the financial counterpart was the accumulation of some $40,000,000 of public indebtedness, much of it semi-fraudulent in character but possessing sinister importance by reason of commitments which the Dominican Republic had been driven into making with creditor governments.

If the United States had been willing to contemplate the full operation of these instruments, much of the reason for intervention as an international necessity would have disappeared. On the other hand, if the seizure of Dominican

1 Much of the historical and descriptive matter contained in the following paragraphs has already been published by the author in one form or another: "A Report on the Debt of San Domingo," 1905; “The Readjustment of San Domingo's Finances" in Quarterly Journal of Economics, May, 1907; “The Financial Difficulties of San Domingo," in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, July, 1907; "The Reorganization of Dominican Finances," in Proceedings of Lake Mohonk Conference, October, 1912; "The Regeneration of San Domingo," in The Independent, August 28, 1913.