Industrial Organization

Přední strana obálky
Oliver E. Williamson
Edward Elgar, 1996 - Počet stran: 500
Oliver Williamson is one of the most important industrial economists of our time. He has made a major contribution to economic scholarship and remains at the forefront of research into transaction costs and the theory of the firm.

In this volume he has provided a very careful selection of what he considers to be the most important articles and papers in industrial organization. Featuring 23 articles, dating from 1937 to 1987, this collection includes papers by Kenneth J. Arrow, Ronald H. Coase, Franco Modigliani, Michael Rothschild, Herbert A. Simon, George J. Stigler and Joseph Stiglitz.

The first part presents classic articles which supplied the foundations upon which the field of industrial economics was built. The second and third parts present papers on the new economics of organization and a revitalized theory of strategic behaviour and competition. Professor Williamson submits that a new science of organisation is taking shape to which industrial economics has been both a principle contributor and beneficiary.

Now available in paperback, this important volume will be indispensable to all teachers, researchers and students concerned with modern industrial economics and the theory of the firm.

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Další vydání - Zobrazit všechny

Industrial Organization
Oliver E. Williamson
Zobrazení fragmentů - 1990

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O autorovi (1996)

Edited by the late Oliver E. Williamson, formerly Professor, Graduate School and Edgar F. Kaiser Professor Emeritus of Business, Economics, and Law, University of California, Berkeley, US and 2009 Winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics for Studies of Economic Governance

Bibliografické údaje

NázevIndustrial Organization
Elgar critical writings reader
Elgar reference collection
International library of critical writings in economics
RedaktorOliver E. Williamson
Vydánídotisk, přepracované vydání
VydavatelEdward Elgar, 1996
Zdroj originálu:Michiganská univerzita
Digitalizováno23. srpen 2010
ISBN1858984882, 9781858984889
DélkaPočet stran: 500
  
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