Obrázky stránek
PDF
ePub

Northern States. "We shall never be able to defend a post! so wrote John Adams in a private letter. He was at that time President of the Board of War-would to heaven our Board of War had such a head!" we shall never be able to defend a post till we shoot a general." Disasters, the unavoidable result of weakness, were ascribed to the incapacity or cowardice of the officers. Suggestions of treachery were even whispered, and the prejudices of the New Englanders against Schuyler -for even the North, at that time, was divided and distracted by bitter sectional prejudices, of which now, fortunately, hardly a trace remains-broke out with new violence. But all this disaster and confusion did not prevent, within two or three months after, the glorious days of Bennington and Bemis Heights, and the total capture of all Burgoyne's invading army.

Not to dwell any further upon the disasters of the war of the Revolution, of which it would be easy to multiply instances, let us now cast a cursory glance at some of the occurrences of

the war of 1812.

now universally admitted, to the incapacity of the Government, and the want of spirit and enterprise on the part of the general in command. Hull was sent to Detroit with a very inadequate force, under order to invade and conquer Upper Canada. Hull's troops were eager for action, and had Amherstburg-the post of the enemy nearest to Detroit, and held by a weak garrison-been attacked immediately, it might have been taken; but, ignorant of the weakness of the enemy, though fully conscious of his own, and discouraged by his isolation from means of succor-for he was 200 miles distant from the nearest frontier settlements, and 500 from any source of effectual support, much worse off in that respect than any of our present generals-Hull wished to fortify his camp, to get his cannon mounted, to give time for the operation of a formidable proclamation which he had issued. While he was thus employed, the British General, Proctor-for Proctor we might read Johnston-arrived at Amherstburg with reinforcements, followed, first by General Brock, and then by Tecumseh, a noble Indian, any parallel for whom we should seek in vain in the ranks of our rebels. Hull thereupon gave over the invasion of Canada and retired to Detroit, where he shortly after ingloriously surrendered to the approaching British and Indians, whereby not only Detroit, but the whole peninsula of Michigan, passed into the hands of the British.

Great was the astonishment and anger of President and Cabinet-though they themselves, by the inadequacy of the forces which they had placed at Hull's disposal, were greatly to blame for it-great the astonishment and anger of the people at the mortifying termination of the first attempt to conquer Canada. But, so far from checking the ardor of the western people, it stimulated them to fresh exertions, and before long a force was placed at the disposal of Gen. Harrison, who succeeded to Hull's command, by which, in the course of the next year, Michigan was recovered, the battle of the Thames was fought, and Upper Canada temporarily occupied.

Let us note, by the way, a curious circumstance with respect to that war-a circumstance eminently instructive as to the total change which has taken place of late years in the objects, ends, and aims of leading Southern politicians. That war, as everybody knows, was preeminently a Southern measure, of which the great object, and leading end and aim, by which it was alone justified as an expedient undertaking, was the conquest and annexation of Canada. That attempt, had it been successful, would have added so much to the strength and population of the free States as effectually to have curbed all the slaveholding pretensions of the last forty years to govern the nation, and now, failing that, to sectionalize and divide it. Nor is it unreasonable to suppose that such men as Clay, Calhoun, Cheves, Lowndes, and Grundy, who urged the conquest of Canada as the means within our reach to punish the maritime aggressions of England, could have failed to foresee the inevitable consequences of that enterprise had we succeeded in it. They were patriots who sought the glory, welfare, and greatness of the united nation, not the base and selfish aggrandisement of a section and athen, as now, in an unfinished condition-and faction. Unfortunately they failed to conquer Canada, but in the impulse which the war gave to our domestic manufactures, and to the growth of our navy, they aided greatly to create the means which will now enable the nation to put down speedily with a strong hand the insolent traitors who have fallen away so rashly from the spirit and example of their noble fathers, and, deserting the altars of republican liberty at which they worshipped, have hastened to pass themselves, and are attempting to compel us and our children to pass through the fires of the Moloch of slavery.

The first efforts of land warfare in the war of 1812 were signally unsuccessful, due, as is

We might cite other incidents of this war, including the conquest of Washington itself by the enemy, the burning of the national capitol

the coming together of Congress, the blackened ruins of the capitol still smouldering, in the patent office, the sole remaining public building, hastily and scantily fitted up for the reception of the national legislature. Worse and more alarming than all, we might picture the fierce contentions and embittered spirit of party by which the national legislature was divided when thus assembled in this hour of disaster to quarrel over the past, and with specie payments suspended, and national credit at the lowest ebb, to provide as well as they could for the future. We prefer, rather, to quote a few extracts from Madison's message sent to Congress at that meeting, and which are not with

terrible indeed if they do not shout over their successes to the very echo; and if, inspired by fresh hopes, they do not put forth renewed exertions to sustain their cause.

out a certain applicability to the present mo- | ment: "Availing himself of fortuitous advantages, our enemy is aiming with his undivided force a deadly blow at our growing prosperity, perhaps at our national existence." "He has But, as we have already said, this one battle avowed his purpose of trampling on the usages will settle nothing. The closely-populated comof civilized warfare, and given earnest of it in munities in the great States north of us are the plunder and wanton destruction of private becoming newly stimulated by the pressure of property." "He strikes with peculiar animos events, and are pouring their thousands upon ity at the progress of our navigation and our thousands toward the seat of war, so that manufactures." "From such an adversary, probably in ten days or thereabouts an overhostility in its greatest force and worst forms whelming force will be at the capital, and premay be looked for. The American people will pared anew to try the chances of the battleface it with the undaunted spirit which, in our field. How far the new general ordered to the revolutionary struggle, defeated all the unright- command may be able to gain their confidence eous projects aimed at them. His threats and and inspirit them with fresh enthusiasm, rehis barbarities will kindle in every bosom, in- mains to be seen; but it is evident enough, stead of dismay, an indignation not to be ex- from proofs afforded on all hands, that in the tinguished but by his disaster and expulsion." late contest, the Federal troops may be said to "In providing the means necessary, the na- have been without a general, in fact. One tional Legislature will not distrust the heroic newspaper correspondent tells his readers that and enlightend patriotism of its constituents. in the heat of one of the desperate conflicts, he They will cheerfully and proudly bear every met the ostensible general of the forces "three burden of every kind which the safety and miles" from the scene of the combat, in a carhonor of the nation demand. We see them riage, and that he had the honor of reporting rushing with enthusiasm to the scenes where to him how affairs were going. Another statedanger and duty call. In offering their blood, ment is made that in a whole day's conflict the they give the surest pledge that no other trib-general in command was not able to communiute will be withheld." cate with one brigade at all-of course, did not know where it was.

There is as much patriotism in the country now as in the Revolution, or in 1814. The traitors of the South are no more formidable than were the tories of the Revolution, who, at one time, aided by the British, had complete possession of the States of Georgia and the Carolinas, with an invading army in Virginia; while, in contrast to the war of 1812, the people of the North, and we may say of the Union, are united as one man.

-N. Y. Tribune.

Without assuming any of that profound knowledge of strategy, and of military matters generally, which has made the New York major-generals of the printing-offices so famous, it strikes us that such leadership as has thus been exhibited is not what soldiers would expect who are sent under the fire of masked batteries, each corps to act, in truth, as a forlorn hope; nor is it such as the country will hold the Government responsible for when a deliberate verdict has to be rendered in the solemn inquest over the slain.

So far as the late reverses by the Federal troops in Virginia may give one an idea of the actual damage done the cause of the Union, perhaps Wall street affords as good an index as Disclaiming, as we have said, all knowledge, any thing else-when it is summed up at about as a military critic, that knowledge so abun"four per cent.," as indicated in our last issue. dant now amongst that numerous class who, as The material losses, the arms and munitions of Byron says, are "the prophets of the past," we war uselessly sacrificed, are, of course, but a yet should be glad to know wherein is the great mere trifle when we take into consideration necessity of leading men, except they were the immense resources of the Government. made of wrought iron-cast-iron would not do That it will have a bad effect on the prestige-right up to the front of a net-work or chec gained previously by the prompt action of the quer-board of masked batteries, constructed Governinent, cannot be doubted. But then, months before, and awaiting the advance of the one battle gained, with whatever brilliant re-simple-hearted but brave thousands who were sults, will not cause the great powers of Europe to take sides with the Confederates; nor will it cause any fears of such a result on the part of those sustaining the Government. That it will vastly inspirit the secession States is perfectly certain. Previous to the battle, the utterances of such papers as the Charleston Courier and Mercury, and the Delta of New Orleans, prove that they entertained gloomy apprehensions in view of the mighty preparations for the campaign put forth by the Government, and, naturally more excitable than their opponents, their losses will prove to be

expected to present themselves as victims? With the whole of Virginia to outflank these batteries in, with a shorter base of operations by Fredericksburg or Yorktown to Richmond, why were the gallant thousands precipitated on this deadly trap, so carefully laid for them at Manassas? A sacred proverb says: "Vainly is the snare laid in the sight of any bird," but it was not so in this case.

Again: There is an incident in the life of the great Napoleon, that life so fruitful of suggestions, that would seem to have a bearing upon the matter in question. It is long since

we saw the account alluded to, but we do re- | bers of Congress, sitting in grand council, and member that in his first essay with the army yet commanders of regiments in the field-if it of Egypt he was invited by the Turks to walk does not likewise silence in some way the newsup to a deliberately constructed range of bat-paper school, who cause impatience, and conteries and be slaughtered; but that-in a cow- sequent insubordination in the camp, as well as ardly sort of manner, perhaps-he chose to go untimely precipitancy at head-quarters, it will around the spot where they were planted with prolong a struggle awful to contemplate in the so much care, and the result was, that he slew far future. Some steps, it is true, have been some thousands of the Turks, and broke their taken toward reforms in high places, in view power completely for all time. Valor is a very of the lesson of the other day; but there must good thing, doubtless, but we greatly prefer the be a clean sweep of the blundering and incom"Rich Mountain" sort-the McClellan and petent civilians, in the new levies especially, if Rosecranz school of tacticians-to that which the country at large is to expect success in the is in vogue lower down on the Potomac, es- reconstruction of the Government. pecially where the purpose of those on the line -Baltimore American, July 26. of the advance is to disorganize and conquer— not slay-with the remembrance that those who are opposed to them are people of the same country.

That a more overwhelming disaster has not been the consequence of all this management this helter-skelter rush to "Richmond "-is rather remarkable than otherwise. Nearly two hundred miles to advance through hostile territory is an exceedingly long distance, comparatively, as those have found, doubtless, who have penetrated about one-eighth as far, to retrace their footsteps under these untoward results. And suppose-here comes a lesson from history again-suppose, we say, that Beauregard and his advisers had adopted the tactics of the Parthians toward the Roman consul, Crassussuppose they had coaxed along toward Richmond the brave but inadequate force lately defeated, and then turned upon and suddenly and completely destroyed them, what then would have been the condition of the questions at issue to-day? They might have done it. "Onward to Richmond!" has been the senseless battle-cry which has stunned the ears of the nation for weeks past, and the authorities at Washington may consider themselves fortunate that the case for them is no worse.

WASHINGTON, July 26, 1861.-The public mind, painfully but reasonably excited, is entitled to be informed of what so deeply and vitally concerns the general welfare. When the rebellion broke out into open war upon Fort Sumter, the people rose with a unanimity unexampled in the world's history, offering themselves and their possessions to the Government, asking only in return that a war thus wantonly and wickedly provoked, should be vigorously prosecuted.

Passing over an interval of three months, we come to the disastrous battle of Manassas. Who is responsible for this great national disaster? Officials cannot answer-individuals may speak-their answers passing for what they are worth, according to the estimate which the public put upon the judgment and means of information.

Lieutenant-General Scott, in the discharge of his duty as commander-in-chief of the army, conceived and perfected a plan or programme, by means of which he confidently, as the results of a summer and fall campaign, anticipated the overthrow of the Confederate army, and thus virtually to end the rebellion.

This plan, primarily, contemplated camps of instruction, where raw levies might, during the months of June, July, and August, be subject to discipline and inured to service, sending the regiments as they became fit for duty, into the field, making room, as they departed, for green organizations.

It is not our special business either to censure or defend those attempting, with varied success, to preserve those free institutions, that unequalled fabric of free government so nearly suffered to go to ruin mainly by default of the head of the late Administration. We cannot defend the palpable blunders of our present rulers, but when we behold them reeling under the heavy burdens cast upon them by the faults of others, we would be as charitable as possible toward their shortcomings. Not their partisans, we yet hope they may, with as little suffering to the nation as possible, restore the country to its wonted condition of prosperity; but to do this, that terrible evil-political brawling-must not be recognized as a qualification for military position, or for the places of military counsellors. If there is one rock which more than any other endangers the safety of the Government in this frightful crisis it is this. But this plan did not accord with the popular And if the Government does not remorselessly, idea. Prominent individuals, whose counsels and at once, throw overboard the whole phalanx and clamors precipitated the outbreak, demandof these insane brawlers-some of them mem-ed precipitate action. These demands were

With this disposable force (after the safety of the Capital was assured) Gen. Scott commenced operations at Fortress Monroe, near Harper's Ferry, and in Western Virginia, the latter point being most favorable, profiting, as no other section did, by the cooperation and sympathies of loyal inhabitants. With Washington for his base of operations, the western wings of his army were to feel and fight their way southward; until at the appointed time, having reached their designated positions, all his columns were to move simultaneously, Richmond falling as Mexico fell, before an irresistible

army.

[ocr errors]

more and more clamorous. Exciting appeals to popular feeling were soon followed by open aspersions and denunciations of Gen. Scott. And finally, with a presumption and insolence unheard of, a leading journal, assuming command of the army, issued and reiterated the order, "On to Richmond."

While widely spread newspapers were thus weakening the Administration by assaults upon its Commanding-General, his embarrassments were aggravated by the persistent hostility and every-day aspersions of the Postmaster General, whose brother, a prominent member of Congress, assailed him from the stump.

Meanwhile Congress assembled. Senators and representatives, with more zeal than knowledge, caught up and reiterated the cry, "On to Richmond." The impatient Congressmen were leading and influential. They waited upon the President to complain of the inactivity of the army, and upon General Scott, urging him "On to Richmond." Army bills, prepared with deliberation by Senator Wilson, (in accordance with the views of the Government,) were emasculated by the House Military Committee, of which Mr. Blair is Chairman. The President and his Cabinet had reason to apprehend-if not the censures of Congress-the failure of measures essential to the prosecution of the war, unless the Tribune order of "On to Richmond" was obeyed.

It is not true, however, as has been averred, that General Scott was constrained to hazard this battle by the President. Between the President and, with one exception, the Cabinet and General Scott, there have been a mutual regard and confidence.

I will not now stop to consider details or criticize acts. The major blunder includes all the minor ones. There should have been no general engagement until we were in the field with an army strong enough to overwhelm and crush out rebellion. There are other points at which we could be advantageously and successfully occupied.

But even if it were excusable to assault an army equal in numbers to our own, in its chosen position behind its intrenchments, the purpose should have been abandoned when the army of Manassas was reinforced by that from Winchester. Then, surely, the conflict was too unequal. With all the conditions and circumstances so changed, General McDowell should have taken the responsibility of disobeying his orders. The reason would have justified him in the judgment of the Government and people.

But the order of "On to Richmond" was obeyed, and where does it leave us? Where we were three months ago, with a harder conflict on our hands, and a dismal, if not doubtful future. The "On to Richmond" dictators have added another year to the war, an hundred millions of dollars to its cost, and opened graves for fifteen or twenty thousand more soldiers.

And now the sensation journals began to disparage the strength and courage of the rebel army. "The rebels will not fight!" "The Cowards will run!" &c., &c., appeared in flaming capitals over flash paragraphs. The wholo And what have we gained? Alas, too little popular mind was swayed by these frenzied ap- for such a fearful expenditure of time, treasure, peals. A movement upon Manassas was uni- blood, and reputation. We have learned, what versally and blindly demanded. Passions and few doubted, that our army is all that is expectanimosities, kindred to those which once del-ed of it; that our men fought with the courage uged France in blood, were being excited. The tyranny of the press, the denunciations of a Cabinet minister, and the impetuosity of a dozen members of Congress excited the masses, "moved" Gen. Scott "from his proprieties." For once in his life his purposes were thwarted -for once "his mind becaine the mind of other men."

The result has shown that it was a fatal weakness. And yet who knows what would have been the effect of an adherence to his plan? The New York Tribune was educating millions to distrust the wisdom of the Administration and the fidelity of the commanding generals. Every day emboldened its audacity every rail and wire disseminated its treason -and every hour augmented the popular discontent. Congress, though its session opened auspiciously, began to falter. The Blairs, one in the Cabinet and the other in Congress, were organizing the "On to Richmond" faction. To have resisted these demands would have overthrown the Administration, and might have destroyed the Government. "Madness ruled the hour," and a battle at Manassas, right or wrong, became, not a military but a political "necessity." VOL. II.-Doc. 32

of veterans; that we may always, and under all circumstances, rely on them. We have learned, what was also too well known, that the army was in many instances indifferently officered. We have learned, too, the importance and necessity of discipline. Effective troops, however excellent the material, cannot be found in workshops, the cornfields, or the cities. They must have military training, without which every "On to Richmond" movement will prove a failure.

Though we have encountered a great and disastrous check-though we are pained and humiliated-we possess the means and the energy to retrieve all, if these means henceforth are wisely employed. I may in a future letter indicate how, in my judgment, these means should be employed. -Albany Erening Journal.

SOUTHERN PRESS ON THE BATTLE.

It would be a very difficult task to review the various accounts current in this city and along the railroad to Manassas, of the great battle which was fought on the 21st inst., in the vicinity of Manassas Junction and Centreville,

and to reduce them to an orderly and consistent shape. Indeed, the rationale of few of the world's memorable battles has been fully comprehended or stated, except after years of calm reflection and diligent investigation by the historian, the statesman, and the strategist. It was sixteen years before the Romans acquired a wholesome knowledge of the strategy of Hannibal. The same period was scarcely adequate to instruct the Generals of Austria, Russia, England, and Prussia in regard to the secret of Napoleon's success. It need not be surprising then if the Confederate victory of the 21st shall long remain a dark, dreadful mystery to our encinies, and if numbers of our own people shall for some time entertain most fantastic and illogical notions concerning it. To one, however, who has been closely observing military operations on the Potomac for two months past, there is no reason why such a result, though so full of glory and so profoundly gratifying, should appear either surprising or mysterious.

I will not here recapitulate details which have been given you by telegraphic correspondents. I possess no facts of importance touching the actual battle beyond those which have been communicated to you through the telegraph. But information from that source is confined almost exclusively to a brief statement of results, leaving the reader to get at causes and consequences as best he may. The preliminaries of the present battle as well as its probable consequences are of the utmost interest, and to them I shall mainly address myself.

Two weeks ago it was evident that both Johnston and Patterson were influenced, in their manœuvres, by considerations connected with the line of Manassas. Johnston desired to occupy Patterson in the Shenandoah valley, and Patterson desired to occupy Johnston in the same region. Each aimed to force the other into a position from which it would be impossible to extricate himself and participate in operations between Washington and Manassas Junction. In this game Patterson was out-generalled. Johnston excelled his antagonist alike in boldness and caution, in vigilance and activity. Keeping his communication with the Manassas line intact, he could not be deceived by Patterson's feint demonstrations, but just so soon as the latter had fallen back toward the Potomac, he set out at once, from Winchester, to join Gen. Beauregard's column near Manassas Junction, marching 18 miles to Strasburg, and proceeding thence, about 50 miles, by railroad. He arrived not an hour too soon, with 20 regiments. His men had one night to rest before waking to meet the bloodiest fury of the battle on the left of Stone Bridge.

I will not say that Gen. Johnston's presence was absolutely necessary to turn the scale in our favor. I firmly believe that General Beauregard's force was considerable enough, its disposition skilful enough, its defences strong enough, its men and officers determined enough,

to administer a signal repulse to the entire mass of the largest army which General Scott was able to send against him from Washington. But it would have been by a victory bought at a terrible sacrifice of what the South should most assiduously economize, the precious lives of her noble defenders. As it was, one of the most brilliant victories of the age was achieved with a loss of life almost incredible, when the weight of the enemy's column and the length of the battle are considered. The enemy seemed to stake the issue of the day on turning our flank on the left. It was then that Johnston, after having baffled Patterson, as Blucher baffled Grouchy, did more than was done by Blucher at Waterloo. The centre led by Davis, the right commanded by Beauregard, did the rest. The enemy was exhausted, appalled, tumultuously routed by the inflexible resistance, the deadly fire, the terrible charges with which their attack was met. And yet but a small portion of our forces at and near Manassas Junction were actually engaged. Perhaps there were at no time as many as twenty thousand of them under fire or in sight of the enemy, while it is possible that double that number of the enemy's total army of about seventy thousand were brought into action.

It is rumored, and believed by many persons, that General Patterson and General Scott were on the field of battle. But neither, in my opin ion, was present. It would certainly have been very strange in General Patterson to come upon the field without any portion of his command, and there is no reason for believing that any portion of his command was engaged in the battle or near at hand. As for General Scott, though the movement against General Beauregard may have been made according to his order, I doubt whether that order was given in accordance with his deliberate views of policy. Precipitated into the measure, as I believe, by the clamor of the politicians at Washington, and by the blood-thirsty rage of the Black Republican Press, he was quite willing to remain at a distance, and leave the immediate responsibility of failure, if the measure should fail, with his subordinate officers, while ready to appropriate the credit of success to himself if the measure should succeed.

It is not easy to believe that General Scott, if left to pursue his own plans, would stake the issue of a campaign on a battle fought under the circumstances of that of the 21st. Two months ago he committed a mistake in halting at Alexandria, after crossing the Potomac, instead of pushing forward briskly toward Richmond. But that mistake sprang from excess of prudence, and it is not reasonable to deduce from such a mistake another arising from the opposite fault of rashness. For rash it certainly was to attack General Beauregard on ground which he himself had selected and elaborately fortified. Political considerations must have prevailed over military considerations when General Scott consented to the attack, without

« PředchozíPokračovat »