Obrázky stránek
PDF
ePub

Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair. I yield my remaining 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in support of the unprinted amendment No. 20, offered by the distinguished senior Senator from North Carolina (Mr. Helms).

This amendment is essential in that it provides that U.S. defense forces in the Republic of Panama for purposes of defending the canal may conduct military operations separately from those of the Republic of Panama if it deems necessary.

Under the pending treaty, a joint defense force is established and all military training, duties and exercises are to be conducted jointly.

This amendment would merely give U.S. forces the right to act independently in defense of the canal if we deem it necessary. There may be steps which our military leaders feel are needed that the Panamanians may find objectionable.

Mr. President, little notice has been taken in the Senate that the military forces of this country, once Panama becomes sovereign-6 months after ratification—are governed by a combined board.

This Board has an equal number of military representatives from the two countries and in the event of a disagreement, would be locked in a tie vote. These representatives are charged with consulting and cooperating on "all matters pertaining to the protection and defense of the canal."

This arrangement leads one to, the understanding that all military actions taken in Panama once Panama becomes sovereign shall be taken only if agreed to by this Combined Board.

Mr. President, the Senate must not forget that if this treaty is approved, Panama will become sovereign in all parts of the old zone in 6 months. Once sovereign, Panama becomes the judge of all issues not explicity spelled out in the treaties.

If we are to avoid trouble and disputes, defend the canal as we deem proper, and create the relations the treaties attempt to achieve, this amendment should be approved by the Senate.

I thank the distinguished Senator.

The PRESIDING Officer. Who yields time?

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, as the able Senator from Maryland explained, we oppose the amendment as being utterly unnecessary. There is nothing in paragraph 3 of article IV of the treaty which prevents the United States of America from conducting such separate military planning exercises or operations as the United States deems necessary. Both Panama and the United States could conduct such operations separately, or they could, if they chose, conduct those operations jointly, depending upon which better achieves the objective of adequately defending the canal.

The amendment is superfluous and utterly unnecessary. Any Senator with any question in his mind can ascertain that fact simply by reading the provisions of the treaty. On that basis, we oppose the amendment. I move to lay the amendment on the table and ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time has not expired yet.
Mr. CHURCH. I yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from North Carolina yield back his time?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, Mr. President, I yield back my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time is yielded back.

Mr. CHURCH. I move to lay the amendment on the table. I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to lay the amendment on the table. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. CRANSTON. I announce that the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. Anderson), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Hollings), the Senator from Maine (Mr. Muskie), and the Senator from Michigan (Mr. Riegle) are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. Anderson) and the Senator from Michigan (Mr. Riegle) would each vote "yea."

Mr. STEVENS. I announce that the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. Bartlett), and the Senator from Maryland (Mr. Mathias) are necessarily absent.

The result was announced-yeas 66, nays 28, as follows:

[blocks in formation]
[blocks in formation]

So the motion to lay Mr. Helm's amendment No. 20 on the table was agreed to.

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the motion to table was agreed to.

Mr. CHURCH. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

UP AMENDMENT NO. 21

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I send to the desk an unprinted amendment and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from North Carolina (Mr. Helms) proposes an unprinted amendment numbered 21.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

At the end of article IV, add the following:

"6. Any nuclear armament of the United States of America which is mobile or tactical in nature, or which is installed on a military aircraft or vessel of war of the United States of America, and which armament is transported through the former Canal Zone, shall not be considered as emplaced in the territory of the Republic of Panama in violation of the obligations of the United States of America under Article 2 of the Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America or of the obligations of the Republic of Panama under such Treaty.".

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, so that we might consider a time agreement on this amendment, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be a time limitation on this amendment of 40 minutes, equally divided, with Mr. Church in charge of the time in opposition to the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Who yields time?

Mr. HELMS. I yield myself 10 minutes.

Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, a number of our distinguished colleagues have made an analogy between treaties and contracts.

That is a reasonable analogy. A treaty is like a contract; and like a contract, you have to read the fine print.

In paragraph of article IV, the treaty says that the use of areas and installations and the legal status of the armed forces of the United States of America in the Republic of Panama shall be governed by the agreement in implementation of article IV. So if you want to find out what our rights really are, you have to turn to the implementation agreement. Unfortunately, there has been little debate about the implementation agreements because they are not before the Senate.

However, if you look in article VI of the implementation agreement-not to be confused with article IV of the treaty itself—there is an astonishing paragraph. Paragraph 6 says:

Since the Republic of Panama is a signatory to the Latin American Denuclearization Treaty..., the United States shall emplace no type of nuclear armament on Panamanian territory.

This is interesting for several reasons. First of all, it is interesting for sloppy drafting. There is no such thing as "the Latin American Denuclearization Treaty." The correct title is the "Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America." Perhaps the wrong title is given so that anyone who is trying to find out what that treaty is will not be able to find it and give up. However, I did find it; and I also found out that the word "emplace," as used in paragraph 6, does not appear anywhere in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. That treaty speaks of "the receipt, storage, installation, deployment, and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons." But it does not use the word "emplace," and we have no way of telling what the word "emplace" means under the treaty. So the corollary is that we do not know what "emplace" means in paragraph either.

Second, paragraph 6 is interesting in that it goes directly counter to the thrust and intent of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. For that treaty only prohibits Panama from having nuclear weapons in Panamanian territory; it does not prohibit the United States from having nuclear weapons in Panamanian territory. In fact, the intent of that treaty, as explained to the Senate by the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee was to allow nonnuclear states to give permission to nuclear states for the transit and shipment of nuclear weapons through nonnuclear territory.

The treaty was signed by Panama and other Latin American countries on April 1, 1968. Only Latin American countries, all of which were nonnuclear, were permitted to sign. Nuclear states, however, were permitted to sign the protocols.

The United States is an adherent to Protocol II. It was transmitted to the Senate by President Nixon on August 13, 1970. He said at that time:

I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to Additional Protocol II and give its advice and consent to ratification, subject to the statement which accompanies the report of the Secretary of State. That statement, which is similar to the one made by the United States at the time of our signature, expresses our understanding concerning territories and territorial status, transit and trans

port privileges, non-use of nuclear weapons, and the definition of "nuclear weapons."

The President's reference to "our understanding concerning territories" is very important in the present case, because "territory" as used in that treaty includes "territorial seas," and Panama claims everything within 200 miles of her shores as her "territorial seas." Thus even if we had nuclear submarines within 200 miles of Panama, Panama could charge us with violations, holding canal operations as hostage.

The letter of Secretary of State Rogers said:

The negotiating history of the Treaty makes it clear that these prohibitions do not affect transit and transport privileges of non-Contracting Parties. This fact is reflected in the statement which accompanied United States signature of Protocol II, and which, it is proposed, should accompany our ratification thereof. In that statement, the United States takes note of the Preparatory Commission's interpretation of the Treaty, as set forth in the Final Act, that, governed by the principles and rules of international law, each of the Contracting Parties retains exclusive power and legal competence, unaffected by the terms of the Treaty, to grant or deny nonContracting parties transit and transport privileges.

The Foreign Relations Committee voted 13 to 0 to order the protocol reported with additional understandings developed by the committee. In his report, the then chairman of that committee, Mr. Fulbright, said:

In the course of the Committee's hearings executive branch witnesses proposed another modification of the statement to present a more explicit formulation of the U.S. understanding of the basis for territorial claims. The principal provisions of the revised statement, which is incorporated in the form of a declaration in the resolution of advice and consent, are as follows:

(1) U.S. ratification cannot be construed as an acceptance by the United States of the unilaterally asserted boundary claims of the parties to the treaty (e.g., territorial seas).

(2) U.S. military transit and transport privileges will not be affected by ratification.

(3) The pledge not to use nuclear weapons against a contracting party would not prohibit a U.S. nuclear response in the event of an armed attack by a party with the assistance of a nuclear-weapon state.

Mr. President, it is perfectly clear from these documents that there is nothing in the so-called Denuclearization Treaty that would prevent Panama from giving permission to the United States to transport nuclear weapons in Panamanian territory or territorial seas. Yet, paragraph 6 uses the word "since":

Since the Republic of Panama is a signatory to the Latin American Denuclearization Treaty, the United States shall emplace no type of nulcear armament on Panamanian territory.

Plainly, there is no causal relation whatsoever to Panama's being a signatory. Panama is free to allow or to disallow the right of transit or transport to the United States. The Denuclearization Treaty is no restraint on Panama at all. I think Panama should take positive steps to grant us such permission.

Now what does the word "emplace" mean? Is it the same as "deploy"? Does it mean a permanent installation, or does it mean any temporary placement?

Of course, it is true that the Neutrality Treaty entitles vessels of war and auxiliary vessels to transit the canal irrespective of armament. But does the general principle override the specific exception

« PředchozíPokračovat »