52.

4. THE LEADERSHIP AMENDMENT TO THE SECOND TREATY

Despite the assurances which the President gave to Torrijos, dissatisfaction continued to increase in Panama, according to numerous news reports. Then, on March 28, the Panamanian ambassador to the United Nations sent a letter from Torrijos to the heads of state of all UN members. In a letter to the UN Secretary General, the Ambassador, Jorge E. Illueca, explained why the letter had been sent:

"General Torrijos's letter and the documents enclosed make reference to the vote which took place on 16 March 1978 at the United States Senate on the Resolution of Ratification of the Treaty concerning the Permanent Neutrality of the Panama Canal. In this resolution, approval to the ratification was granted subject to a number of amendments, conditions, reservations and understandings, inserting among them a pre-condition to American acceptance of the Neutrality Treaty, known as the "DeConcini Amendment.'

"According to its proponent, the "DeConcini Amendment is intended to give to the United States of America the unilateral and perpetual right to "take military action on Panamanian soil without the consent of the Panamanian Government," pretending that said amendment must be construed to permit the United States to intervene in Panama in the event of labour unrest strikes, a slowdown, or under any other pretext labeled as interference with Canal operations....

"Not only does the amendment make no reference to the regime of neutrality, but, as stated by Senator Edward Kennedy, who opposed the DeConcini Amendment, 'Panama had waited 75 years since its independence to end American occupation of its heartland. I must wait another 22 years before it achieves full control over its national territory." Now Panama is asked, in Kennedy's words, "to accept an amendment which has the ring of military interventionism--not just during this century, but for all time."

The Panamanian action shocked supporters of the Treaty, with its pointed adoption of the views of the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. Kennedy. The amendment had not faced serious opposition; in fact, Senator Kennedy's views were

53.

not even presented on the Floor, but were printed in the Record under the "bullet" rule. Yet the Panamanian statement came close to repudiating the Senate action.

By the time of the Senate's Easter recess, Panamanian criticism had escalated to mini-crisis proportions. The pro-Panama media in this country took up the cry, and began to deliver savage attacks upon the motives of the distinguished Senator from Arizona.

Meanwhile, informal negotiations resumed with the Panamanian regime in an attempt to find a formula that would mollify Panama nian objections. Former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin

American Affairs William Rogers made a special trip to Panama

to discuss possible solutions.

In Washington, the team seeking

a solution was led by the distinguished Majority Leader, Mr. Byrd. The problem, of course, was that the Panamanians were demanding more than could be resolved by logic. The United State's negotiators had hoped to squeeze through by a carefully constructed semantic ambiguity, which would not concretely resolve the issue of unilateral defense. Apparently they hoped that the text would be vague enough so that the dictator could assert to the Panamanian people that they were receiving full sovereignty, but that actually would leave to the United States a toe-hold to violate that sovereignty if circumstances should develop where military force was absolutely necessary. The strategy was to get over the ratification hurdle by enveloping the contradiction in semantic double-talk..

When the Senator from Arizona quite properly

called their hand by demanding that the contradiction be resolved,

54.

the deception was unmasked.

Senator DeConcini was puzzled that the storm of controversy arose over his action, and he had good reason. On April 18,

he told the Senate:

"What puzzles me, Mr. President, is that suddenly the public debate has focused on whether it is appropriate for the United States to retain the right to keep the canal open regardless of the reasons that may lead to its closure. Frankly, I believed that there was no disagreement in principle on this point. I believed that it was accepted by the Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate leadership. It has come as quite a shock to me that this is apparently not the case.

"Let me be more specific, Mr. President. On February 3, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ordered its report on the Panama Canal treaties to be printed and distributed to Members of the Senate to aid them in their consideration of the treaties. Since only Senator Griffin dissented from the report and appended minority views, I must assume--as I believe all of us assumed--that the rest of the Foreign Relations Committee agreed with the report.

"As it turns out, Mr. President, a number of Senators who are fairly senior members of that committee have publicly raised serious questions about the principle behind the DeConcini amendment. The reason why this is perplexing, Mr. President, is that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report on the treaties endorsed that principle....The Foreign Relations Committee...asserts broader rights than were asserted in the DeConcini amendment. In other words, the Foreign Relations Committee report goes beyond the rights asserted by my simple clarification."

Of course, the distinguished Senator was exactly right. I have already pointed out the sweeping and absolutist claims made by the Foreign Relations Committee for the leadership amendment, claims that pointedly asserted the supremacy of United States unilateral defense rights over Panamanian internal affairs and territorial integrity.

55.

Senator DeConcini went on:

"I know there is nothing in my reservation that goes beyond the words of the Foreign Relations Committee, and I believe those words reflect the intent of the Congress. My only quarrel today as well as in the past has been what I perceive as ambiguity in the drafting of the leadership amendment. The Foreign Relations Committee report believes that the leadership amendment accomplishes the stated objectives; I do not. However, I assert no new right, but neither will I accept any changes in those words that derogate from the rights we have clearly established in our action on the Neutrality Treaty."

The

The Senator's final words set the tone for the debate on the "solution" to the problem of Panamanian discontent. issue was whether the new leadership amendment derogated or changed the original DeConcini reservation or not. In proposing the new amendment, the distinguished Majority Leader, however, carefully avoided coming down on this point; he merely made the record that the amendment had been cleared with the Panamanian

dictator:

"The final text of the amendment represents a consensus which developed out of those discussions with the many Senators on both sides of the aisle.

"On this Sunday, the past Sunday, together with the distinguished floor managers of the treaties, Mr. Sarbanes and Mr. Church, met with the Panamanian Ambassador, Mr. Gabriel Lewis, in the company of Warren Christopher, the Deputy Under Secretary of State, and showed to the Panamanian Ambassador the proposed text of the amendment.

"Following our discussion, Ambassador Lewis relayed the contents of the proposed amendment to his government. Later in the day, Mr. Sarbanes and Mr. Church, and I were informed through the State Department that the Panamanian Government considered the amendment to be a 'dignified solution to a difficult problem, '"

Nevertheless, proponents of the new leadership amendment, were very careful to maintain that it did not diminish or limit

56.

the DeConcini reservation, as the following exchange between Senator Javits and Senator Laxalt makes clear:

"Mr. LAXALT. Is the Senator saying to all of us then that the effect of this reservation is to diminish the effect of the DeConcini reservation?

"Mr. JAVITS. Not at all. On the contrary, it is to lay down the ground rules by which it should be used, and which are the only ground rules that are practicable for a nation like our own.

"What concerned me about the original DeConcini reservation is that it was susceptible to abuse, and this, the ground rules here laid down, it seems to me, removes that danger.

"Mr. LAXALT. To the extent then this is a limiting factor, a moderating factor, certainly at least to that extent then it has to diminish the thrust of the DeConcini amendment or do I misunderstand the observations of the Senator from New York?

"Mr. JAVITS. I think the Senator does misunderstand my observations. It diminishes nothing. It increases our stature, but it diminishes absolutely nothing about what the purpose of the agreement between Carter and Torrijos, which was incorporated in the previous treaty, was intended to attain, and that is, under any circumstances, even if it means stepping upon the territory of Panama, under any circumstances, even if it means guerrillas or organized troops who are operating out of Panama, we have the obligation to keep that canal open, neutral, accessible and secure."

Thus, the distinguished Senator from New York makes clear

his understanding that the United States has the power to send troops to Panama, even if it means fighting guerrillas or organized troops, and that the new leadership amendment does not abridge that

right in any way.

Similarly, an exchange between the distinguished floor

manager, Mr. Church, and the distinguished Senator from Utah, Mr. Hatch, nailed down the fact that the new leadership amendment did not in any way undo the DeConcini reservation: