precaution in case the vessel should be seized, as it would furnish some evidence of the intention to incorporate the goods in the general stock of the neutral market.

The payment of duties in the neutral port when the goods arrived there in transitu may appear prima facie a very expensive process, even if this fact alone would be considered as rendering the property free from condemnation. The state of a belligerent market may be very attractive, but if the trader had to undergo not only a certain amount of risk, but also the heavy expenses of a real importation into a neutral country for immediate re-exportation, it is possible, indeed probable, that he might be tempted to direct his energies to a more profitable channel. But fortunately for the American trader, this difficulty could be obviated, for he was allowed to pay the importation duties in a "colorable" manner. According to an Act of the United States of March, 1799, on the arrival of a cargo destined for exportation the trader was permitted to land the goods without being compelled to pay the duties; the only thing which he had to do was to give a bond whereby he agreed to pay the corresponding duties in the event of the goods not being re-exported. On their re-exportation the custom house authorities effected the usual clearances just as in the case of originally exported goods, and no mention was made of the bond that had been given. Such provision could not but help the trader to furnish himself with a very valuable item for the "proof" of his bona fides in case his cargo should be seized. It was evident that there could not be any difficulty in certifying that "the duties had been paid according to law." We need not wonder that at the time the United States were accused of framing this Act with the principal, if not the only object, of shielding American vessels that were engaged in this illegal trade.

The trader had a much easier task when he came to consider the question of the insurance on the cargo. At first it seems to have been the practice to effect an insurance of the entire intended voyage, with the option of touching in an American port; but finally they came to adopt the much safer plan of insuring the two parts of the voyage as two dif ferent transactions-in the first part the neutral port appeared to be the final destination, and in the other it was the original starting place of the vessel. It would seem hardly relevant for our purpose to continue

the detailed account of the minute precautions adopted by the traders in order to show what they did not have, namely, an intention to incorporate the goods in the general stock of the country. Suffice it to say that in time the English courts came to consider the circumstances of the cargo and the payment of the duties as insufficient evidence of a bona fide importation into a neutral port.8

It was not until the beginning of the nineteenth century that Sir William Scott and Sir W. Grant dealt with the practice, condemning it in the most unequivocal language, the former in The Maria, and the latter in The William; 10 and thus the theory was firmly established that in such cases the two voyages were in reality parts of one and the same transaction in which a forbidden cargo was taken to a forbidden destination.

III

The mere recital of the facts that brought the theory into existence would seem in itself a sufficient justification for its application in connection with the carriage of colonial trade to the mother country. It may perhaps be objected that the rule was a hindrance to neutral commerce and that consequently great hardships were placed upon traders; but the state of international law at the time with which we are dealing was such that it cannot be said that injustice was in any way inflicted on them by the belligerent who caused the enforcement of the doctrine, and therefore, as long as those circumstances continued, any condemnations under it cannot but be pronounced to have been perfectly legal. But whatever may be the opinion with regard to the application of the theory to colonial trade, it cannot be doubted that the principle embodied in the doctrine is sound in itself. It is hardly necessary to point out that the circumstances which called for the enunciation of the famous doctrine are not likely to arise again, for nearly all the members of the international family have long abandoned the practice of monopolizing their colonial trade, and, according to the Declaration of Paris of 1856,

8 See the case of The Enoch and The Rowena, July 23, 1805, cited by Sir William Scott in The Maria, Roscoe, Reports of Prize Cases, Vol. 1, p. 497.

Roscoe, op. cit., p. 497.

10 Roscoe, op. cit., p. 505.

neutral vessels have the right to carry enemy property with the exception of contraband of war.

As it has not been our intention in this connection to enter into a speculation of the application of the doctrine during the nineteenth century, nothing will be said of the working of the theory with regard to contraband of war or of its later extension to blockade. Our purpose has been merely to lay down the principle underlying the doctrine and to make an attempt to recall the occasion that brought it into life. We have thus unavoidably perceived that it is impossible to deal with this part of the history of international law in the eighteenth century without entering into the economic state of affairs then prevailing. The interpretation of the laws of war on sea was, as we have already observed, based mainly on the usages of earlier times, which found their source in the municipal regulations of the maritime nations; and these ex parte ordinances were in their time primarily devoted to the solution of problems of an economic character. Hence it is that in a state of war neutral commerce was profoundly affected, and as a natural consequence of this fact there was a fierce struggle-purely economic-between the belligerents on the one hand and the neutrals on the other. In the history of the Doctrine of Continuous Voyages in the eighteenth century we are able to notice ample illustration of this neutro-belligerent conflict, as well as the plausible ingenuity adopted by the neutrals during the struggle and the subtle measures resorted to by the belligerent in order to counteract the tendencies of their enemies. The prevailing idea in this conflict was that the neutral should give way.

HARMODIO ARIAS.

SOME QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE

EUROPEAN WAR 1

VII

WAR ZONES AND SUBMARINE WARFARE

On February 4, 1915, the German Admiralty published the following decree:

The waters around Great Britain, including the whole of the English Channel, are declared hereby to be included within the zone of war, and after the 18th inst. all enemy merchant vessels encountered in these waters will be destroyed, even if it may not be possible always to save their crews and passengers.

Within this war zone neutral vessels are exposed to danger, since, in view of the misuse of the neutral flags ordered by the Government of Great Britain on the 31st ult. and of the hazards of naval warfare, neutral vessels cannot always be prevented from suffering from the attacks intended for enemy ships.

The route of navigation around the north of the Shetland Islands, in the eastern part of the North Sea, and in a strip thirty miles wide along the Dutch Coast are not open to the danger zone.

Early in March it was announced that the zone had been extended to include the waters surrounding the Shetland Islands. This decree was intended by the German Government as a counter-measure against Great Britain, mainly on account of the decision of the British Government to treat as absolute contraband all cargoes of foodstuffs destined to Germany, which decision had been adopted by Great Britain in consequence of the German decree of January 31st placing the grain and flour supply of the empire under government control.

The war zone expedient, however, did not originate with the German Government. On the 4th of November, 1914, the British Government had issued an order declaring the North Sea to be a war zone, and warning neutral ships of the danger to which they would be exposed in trav1 Continued from the January and April numbers of this JOURNAL.

ersing the waters embraced therein. The following is the text of the British order:

Owing to the discovery of mines in the North Sea, the whole of that sea must be considered a military area. Within this area merchant shipping of all kinds, traders of all countries, fishing craft, and all other vessels will be exposed to the gravest dangers from mines which it has been necessary to lay and from war-ships searching vigilantly by night and day for suspicious craft.

All merchant and fishing vessels of every description are hereby warned of the dangers they encounter by entering this area except in strict accordance with Admiralty decisions. Every effort will be made to convey this warning to neutral countries and to vessels on the sea, but from the 5th of November onwards the Admiralty announce that all ships passing a line drawn from the northern point of the Hebrides through the Faroe Islands to Iceland do so at their own peril.

Ships of all countries wishing to trade to and from Norway, the Baltic, Denmark, and Holland are advised to come, if inwards bound, by the English Channel and Straits of Dover. There they will be given sailing directions which will pass them safely, so far as Great Britain is concerned, up the east coast of England to Farne Island, whence safe route will, if possible, be given to Lindesnaes Lightship. From this point they should turn north or south, according to their destination, keeping as near the coast as possible. The converse applies to vessels outward bound.

By strict adherence to these routes the commerce of all countries will be able to reach its destination in safety, so far as Great Britain is concerned, but any straying, even for a few miles, from the course thus indicated may be followed by serious consequences.

The British war zone embraced substantially the whole of the North Sea; that of Germany embraced the whole of the English Channel and the territorial and open seas "around Great Britain." The effect of the British order was to render entrance to the North Sea between Iceland and the Hebrides dangerous, but it left open access from the south through the English Channel and Straits of Dover route, subject to directions which would be furnished to sailors by the Admiralty. The German proclamation left open the entrance to the North Sea except a strip along the English coast. A strip of marginal sea thirty miles wide along the coast of Holland was also left open. The two proclamations were therefore in a sense complementary. Both constituted a severe encroachment upon the rights of neutrals to navigate the high seas, but that of Great Britain was the less objectionable of the two.