from Fort Walla Walla, on the Columbia river, to Fort Benton, on the Missouri, have been completed. The length of the road is 624 miles. The officer in charge of the work recommends that the sum of $70,000 be appropriated by Congress for the further improvement of the route.

It appears, from the report of the acting paymaster general, that during the fiscal year ending the thirtieth of June, 1862, the sum of $5,550,039 54 was paid to the regular troops; that $91, 116, 610 61 were paid to volunteers; and that $38,597,819 07 have been paid since the thirtieth of June, 1862. The report states that nearly all the regiments were paid to the 30th of June, many to the 31st of August; that some delay in payment has been occasioned by want of funds, but it is believed that all will soon be paid.

By the death of Colonel Larned a vacancy was occasioned in the office of chief of this bureau, which, under the existing law, can only be filled by regular promotion from the corps. In my opinion, the good of the service requires a wider range of selection for this most important office. The vacancy has not yet been filled, in order that. by a change of the law, the volunteer and regular services may be open to selection of such person as you may deem most competent for the duty.

The surgeon general's report affords information in respect to the sanitary condition of the army. It also shows an expenditure of the whole appropriations of that department, amounting to two millions four hundred and forty-five thousand eight hundred and ninety-four dollars and eighty-nine cents, ($2,445,894 89.) The number of general hospitals is one hundred and fifty-one; the number of patients in them fifty-eight thousand one hundred and seventy-five. The whole number under medical treatment is stated to be not short of ninety thousand.

The surgeon general represents that, during the past year, there have been no epidemics in the army of any severity; that the diseases which affect men in camps have been kept at a low minimum; that scurvy has been almost entirely prevented; and that there have been but few victims of yellow fever.

This bureau required enlargement and reorganization in many par ticulars, and some improvements have been made. Others are suggested which merit careful consideration.

The operations of the surgical department have been aided by humane and benevolent associations. The horrors of battle have been assuaged by ministers of mercy; and it is worthy to be recorded of the medical profession that their services have been voluntarily and gratuitously offered on every occasion. Relief associations in every State have done much to comfort and assist the sick and wounded in camps and hospitals, and their vigilant superintendence has perhaps operated to check the negligence, abuse, and fraud that too often prevail, even in such institutions. Religious congregations and societies have also tendered to the government their church buildings for hospitals, while their pastors have ministered to the patients. These matters are proper to be brought to your notice, because, while war stimulates every evil passion, the virtues developed in this great

struggle to maintain our national existence should not pass unnoticed.

The report of Major Myer, of the signal corps, deserves your attention. The services of this corps to armies in the field, and for many military and naval purposes, is highly estimated. At present it is without distinct organization, and is made up of officers detailed from other branches of service. A separate organization is recommended. The acknowledgment of this department is due to Colonel Stager, Major Eckert, and their assistants of the telegraph corps. In diligence, fidelity, and important aid, they have been unsurpassed by any branch of the service.

With this presentation of the past operations and present condition of the War Department, the duty required of me by the act of Congress to make an annual report is, in a great measure, fulfilled. It is seen that a force has been placed, by the people of the United States, at the command of the government, to maintain its authority, more mighty in all the elements of warlike power than was ever before arrayed under one banner. How shall that force be employed? To smite the enemy on every hand, to attack his armies and strongholds, to occupy his ports, clear the great rivers of the west from his obstructions, and pause not until he is subdued, is our plain duty. Above all, it is our duty to disdain no legitimate aid that may save the lives of our gallant soldiers, diminish their labors, provide for their wants, and lessen the burdens of our people. No aphorism is more universally received than that "the sole object of a just war is to make the enemy feel the evils of his injustice, and, by his sufferings, amend his ways; he must therefore be attacked in the most accessible quarter." The power of the rebels rests upon their peculiar system of labor, which keeps laborers on their plantations to support owners who are devoting their time and strength to destroy our armies and destroy our government. Whenever that system is in hostility to the government, it is, in my opinion, the duty of those conducting the war to strike down the system, and turn against the rebels the productive power that upholds the insurrection. Rightly organized in the recovered territory, the laborers of the rebel States will not only aid in holding fortified positions, but their labor will, in India, free the white soldier from the most unwholesome exposure of the south. They will cultivate the corn and forage, which will feed our cavalry and artillery horses, and save the country a portion of the enormous burden now attending their purchase and transport from the north. This cultivation would have been of greater advantage to us on the southeastern coast than even that of the great staple of the sea islands. Probably the people who remained upon these islands, within protection of our armies, could, under wise control, have supplied all the forage needed this year by the forces in the department of the south. The full ration for a horse weighs twentysix pounds; that of a soldier three pounds. An army well organized and equipped for active operations, with a due proportion of cavalry, artillery, and baggage trains, will have not less than one horse or mule to every four soldiers; so that the weight of food for the ani

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mals is more than double that of the rations of the men. How important an aid, how great an economy, in a long contest, therefore, would there be in raising, by this cheap labor, the greater part of the forage alone for the southern department?-thus, for a great portion of our wants, transferring the base of supplies, now at New York, to Hilton Head or New Orleans.

The department has found it difficult to transfer this labor from one part of the seat of war to another. Local and family ties seem to be very strong with these people, and, with all their faith in the power and good will of our military commanders, it was found difficult to get volunteer laborers to leave Port Royal for other depots.

A population of four millions, true to the interests of the Union, with slight assistance from the army, will, under proper regulation and government, be of the greatest assistance in holding the territory once recovered. The principal staples of the south are the product exclusively of their labor. If protected upon the lands they have heretofore cultivated, with some organization, and with support from small detachments of loyal troops, they would not only produce much of what is needed to feed our armies and their trains, but they would forever cut off from the rebellion the resources of a country thus occupied.

As

The rebel armies move with ease through portions of the border States, living upon the country in which our commanders find no supplies. The people bring forth their hoards, and offer them to the rebels for sale or gift. Protect the laboring population, who are the majority in the greater part of the south, in the possession of the land and its products, and this great advantage will, for whatever portion of the country we occupy, be transferred to us. soon as the coast is thoroughly occupied, and the people organized, trade will revive. Cotton, rice, sugar, and other products will be exchanged by the producer for what he needs. Their wants will be supplied direct from the northern factories, and the cultivation of the great staples will enable them to pay for what they use. A perfectly free trade may thus again grow up between the north and the south, and with greater or less rapidity it will spread over the whole country as our forces succeed in meeting and dispersing the rebel armies.

The greater part of the whole country which formerly produced the sea-island cotton is now thoroughly restored to the Union. The laborers are there-the soil and climate. It needs only assurance of protection to revive the cultivation of the staple, as well as to produce vast quanties of corn and forage for our troops. Since this war must be conducted by marches, and battles, and sieges, why neglect the best means to make them successful, and their results permanent? It is worthy of notice that thus far the portions of territory which, once recovered, we have most firmly held, are precisely those in which the greatest proportion of colored men are found. By their assistance our armies will be able permanently to operate in and occupy the country; and in labor for the army, in raising its and their own supplies, full occupation can be given them, and with this

there will be neither occasion nor temptation to them to emigrate to a northern and less congenial climate. Judging by experience, no colored man will leave his home in the south if protected in that home. All possibility of competition from negro labor in the north is avoided in giving colored men protection and employment upon the soil which they have thus far cultivated; and the right to which has been vacated by the original proprietors deeply involved in the crimes of treason and rebellion. No great territory has been perinanently reduced without depriving the leaders of its people of their lands and property. It is these that give power and influence. Few men have the commanding genius and talent to exercise dangerous influence over their fellow-men without the adventitious aid of money and of property. By striking down this system of compulsory labor, which enables the leaders of the rebellion to control the resources of the people, the rebellion would die of itself.

Under no circumstances has any disposition to servile insurrection been exhibited by the colored population in any southern State, while a strong loyalty to the federal government has been displayed on every occasion, and against every discouragement. By the means suggested the rebellion may be disarmed and subdued swiftly and effectually, and the lives of our own people saved from slaughter on the battle field. By the occupation of all their ports on the Mississippi and the sea-coast a market will be opened in every rebel State for the industry of our people to supply the wants of the army, and also of a loyal population, in exchange for the valuable products of their labor. Another point of attack is by armed settlements upon the vacant government lands in Florida and Texas. Thousands in the northern and western States are impatiently waiting the signal of military movement to plant their homes in the best territory of this. continent, and bring it back to the Union as loyal States. So far from the southern States being invincible, no enemy was ever so vulnerable if the means at hand are employed against them. If your proposition for compensated emancipation, and a voluntary return to loyalty, be blindly rejected, still the proper application of the means at command of the government cannot fail to accomplish the suppression of the rebellion and a restoration of those peaceful relations which were designed to be established forever on this continent by the Union of the States.

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.*

The PRESIDENT.

REPORT OF THE GENERAL-IN-CHIEF.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, November 25, 1862.

SIR: In compliance with your orders, I have the honor to submit the following report of military operations since the 23d of July last, when, in compliance with the President's order of July 11, I assumed command of the army as general-in-chief.

The first thing to which my attention was called, on my arrival here, was the condition of the army at Harrison's Landing, on the James river. I immediately visited General McClellan's headquarters for consultation. I left Washington on the 24th, and returned on the 27th. The main object of this consultation was to ascertain if there was a possibility of an advance upon Richmond from Harrison's Landing, and, if not, to form some plan of uniting the armies of General McClellan and General Pope on some other line. Not being familiar with the position and numbers of the troops in Virginia and on the coast, I took the President's estimate of the largest number of re-enforcements that could then be sent to the army of the Potomac.

On the day of my arrival at Harrison's Landing General McClellan was of opinion that he would require at least fifty thousand additional troops. I informed him that this number could not possibly be sent, that I was not authorized to promise him over twenty thousand, and that I could not well see how even that number could be safely withdrawn from other places. He took the night for considering the matter, and informed me the next morning that he would make the attempt upon Richmond with the additional twenty thousand. But immediately on my return to Washington, he telegraphed that he would require thirty-five thousand-a force which it was impossible to send without leaving Washington and Baltimore almost defenceless. The only alternative now left was to withdraw the army of the Potomac to some position where it could unite with that of General Pope, and cover Washington at the same time that it operated against the enemy.

After full consultation with my officers, I determined to attempt this junction on the Rappahannock by bringing General McClellan's forces to Acquia creek. Accordingly, on the 30th July, I telegraphed to him to send away his sick as quickly as possible, preparatory to a movement of his troops. This was preliminary to the withdrawal of his entire army, which was ordered by telegraph on the 3d of August. In order that the transfer to Acquia creek might be made as rapidly as possible, I authorized General McClellan to assume control of all the vessels on the James river and Chesapeake bay, of which there was then a vast fleet. The Quartermaster General was also requested to send to that point all the transports that could be procured.

On the 5th I received a protest from General McClellan, dated the 4th, against the removal of the army from Harrison's Landing, a copy of which is annexed, marked Exhibit No. 1, with my reply on the 6th, marked Exhibit No. 2.

On the 1st of August I ordered General Burnside to immediately embark his troops at Newport News, transfer them to Acquia creek, and take position opposite Fredericksburg. This officer moved with great promptness, and reached