over 1,600 stand of arms, and a considerable quantity of stores. Our loss was 108 killed, 611 wounded, and 17 missing. The retreating foe was pursued only a few miles. On the 30th of September General Grant ascertained that Generals Price and Van Dorn were concentrating their forces at Ripley, with the probable intention of attacking Corinth. The enemy crossed the Hatchie river and took possession of the railroad north of Corinth, thus cutting off all direct communication with Jackson and Bolivar. He then advanced towards Corinth, and some skirmishing took place on the 2d of November. Major General Rosecrans commanded our forces at Corinth, which consisted of the divisions of Brigadier Generals Hamilton, McKean, Davis, and Stanley. The first three were placed in line of battle near the old rebel intrenchments, and the last held in reserve in the town. The skirmishing was renewed on the morning of the 3d, and by ten or eleven o'clock the engagement became pretty general, and continued till dark. It was fiercely renewed on the morning of the 4th, and fought with varied success till near noon, when the rebels were defeated and driven from the field, leaving their dead and many of their wounded. The enemy's forces were commanded by Generals Van Dorn, Price, Lovell, Villepigue, and Rust, and their number estimated at about 38,000, or nearly double those of General Rosecrans. Their loss in killed was 1,423, which would give, by the usual proportion, 5,692 wounded. We took 2,265 prisoners, among whom were 127 officers. We also captured 14 stand of colors, 2 pieces of artillery, 3,300 stand of arms, and ammunition, accoutrements, &c. Our loss was 315 killed, 1,812 wounded, and 232 prisoners and missing. This great disparity of numbers in killed and wounded resulted in part from the fact that a portion of our men fought behind the intrenched batteries. Major General Grant had ordered a brigade of four regiments, under Brigadier General McPherson, from Jackson to Corinth. Finding the railroad interrupted at Bethel, the latter turned to the left, and reached Corinth on the 4th by the Farmington road, thus marching nearly around the enemy, and forming a timely junction with General Rosecrans. Other forces from Jackson and Bolivar, under Brigadier General Hurlbut, were directed on Corinth, by way of Middleton and Pocahontas, to cut off the enemy's retreat in that direction. They encountered the enemy on the Hatchie river on the morning of the 5th, and, as Brigadier General Hurlbut was making dispositions for an attack, Major General Ord arrived upon the field and assumed command, but, being wounded about 11 a.m., he again relinquished it to General Hurlbut. The battle continued till about A 31 p. m., when the enemy retreated south, crossing the Hatchie at Crum's Mills, about six miles further up the river. Our loss was 50 killed, 493 wounded, and 17 missing. General Hurlbut did not attempt any pursuit, and General Rosecrans did not leave Corinth till the morning of the 5th. The enemy, therefore, effected his escape, but was followed for a distance of about sixty miles, without being overtaken. General Grant afterwards moved his forces south as far as Holly Springs, and drove the enemy across the Tallahatchie. This operation was attended with several brisk skirmishes, in all of which our troops were victorious. These operations have restored peace in Western Tennessee. The official reports of the operations of General Grant's army are submitted herewith, marked Exhibit No. 7. The unfortunate withdrawal to Missouri, by General Curtis, of a large part of the army in Arkansas, prevented the execution of the military operations which had been ordered in the latter State. In Missouri, the forces under Brigadier General Schofield not only broke up and destroyed numerous guerilla bands, but defeated the rebel army in several engagements near the southwest corner of that State, and drove it across the Boston mountains, in Arkansas. I cannot give the details of these engagements, as no official reports have been received. 27 The Indian tribes in the northwest, and more particularly in Minnesota, These savages incited, it is said, by rebel emissaries, committed numerous murders and other outrages on the frontiers during the latter part of the summer. were vigorously attacked by a volunteer force under Brigadier General Sibley, In the department of the Gulf the withdrawal of our flotilla from Vicksburg enabled the enemy to concentrate a considerable force on Baton Rouge, which was then held by Brigadier General Williams. The attack was made on the 5th of August, with greatly superior forces, under the rebel General Breckinridge. General Williams gained a most signal victory, but fell in the fight. Our loss was 90 killed and 250 wounded. We buried 300 of the enemy's dead left upon the field. On the 16th of August the garrison of Baton Rouge was On the 24th of October General Butler sent a withdrawn to New Orleans. force under Brigadier General Weitzel to operate on the west bank of the Mississippi, in the La Fourche district. He engaged a considerable body of the enemy on the 25th, about nine miles from Donaldsonville, and defeated them, with the loss of their commander, a large number killed and wounded, and 268 prisoners. Our loss was 18 killed and 68 wounded. This victory opened the whole of that part of the country. General Butler's reports of the military operations in his department are submitted herewith, marked Exhibit No. 8. In the department of the south the only military operations which have been undertaken were the reconnoissances of the Pocotaligo and Coosawatchie rivers. These expeditions, under Brigadier General Brannan and Colonel Barton, encountered a considerable force of the enemy on the 22d of October, and engagements ensued in which we lost 32 killed and 180 wounded. The official reports of these engagements are submitted herewith, marked Exhibit No. 9. In the department of North Carolina our force has also been too small to attempt any important offensive operations. On the 6th of September a party of the enemy surprised the garrison of Washington, but were soon driven out. Our loss was 8 killed and 36 wounded, and that of the enemy 33 killed and about 100 wounded. Several successful reconnoissances have been made into the interior. The official reports of the affair at Washington are marked Exhibit No. 10. It is seen, from this brief summary of military operations during the last three or four months, that while our soldiers have generally fought with bravery, and gained many important battles, these victories have not produced the usual results. In many instances the defeated foe was not followed from the battlefield, and, even where a pursuit was attempted, it almost invariably failed to effect the capture or destruction of any part of the retreating army. This is a matter which requires serious and careful consideration. A victorious army is supposed to be in condition to pursue its defeated foe with advantage, and, during such pursuit, to do him serious if not fatal injury. This result has usually been attained in other countries. Is there any reason why it should not be expected in this? It is easily understood that in a country like that between Yorktown and Richmond, or the thickly wooded swamps of Mississippi and Louisiana, a retreating force, by felling trees across the roads and destroying bridges over deep and marshy streams, can effectually prevent any rapid pursuit. The one in a few minutes blocks up or destroys roads which the other cannot clear or repair for hours or even days. The pursuer has very little hope of overtaking his flying foe. But this reasoning is not applicable to Maryland, and the greater part of Virginia, Kentucky, and Middle Tennessee. It must be admitted that, in these theatres of war, the rebel armies have exhibited much more mobility and activity than our own. Not only do they outmarch us, both in advance and retreat, but on two memorable occasions their cavalry have made, with impunity, the entire circuit of the army of the Potomac. If it be true that the success of an army depends upon its "arms and its legs," ours has shown itself deficient in the latter of these essential requisites. This defect has been attributed to our enormous baggage and supply trains, and to a want of training in making marches. There is no doubt that the baggage trains of our armies have been excessively large. Every possible effort has been made within the last few weeks to reduce them; but this is no easy task. Once accustomed to a certain amount of transportation, an army is unwilling to do without the luxuries which it supplies in the field. By the recent increase of the army ration, which was previously larger than in any other country, a considerable amount of transportation is employed in moving provisions and supplies which are not necessary for the subsistence of the soldiers. An examination of the returns of the Quartermaster General, a few days since, developed the fact that the army of the Potomac, including the troops around Washington, (most of which are without field trains,) had fifty-four thousand animals, and that nine thousand of these were employed in transporting ambulances and hospital stores. In addition to all this, the roads, streets and wharves are incumbered with private vehicles, used for the transportation of sutlers' stores. No matter how large the main body of an army may be, it can never move rapidly with such a mass of impediments: and yet speculative projects are almost daily urged on the War Department to increase the immobility of our armies in the field. Again, our troops, especially those in the east, have been very little accustomed to marching, at least to that kind of marching usually required by active operations in the field. Absenteeism is one of the most serious evils in all our armies. Hundreds of officers and thousands of men are almost continually away from their commands. Many of these are really stragglers and deserters. In regard to officers, the evil is being abated by summary dismissals, and, if the law could be stringently enforced against the men, it would soon put an end to desertions. But straggling on the march and in battle can be prevented only by severe and summary punishment inflicted on the spot. In this and many other important particulars our military laws require revision and amendment. They were mostly enacted for a small army and for times of peace, and are unsuited to the government of the army we now have, and the war in which we are now engaged. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. H. W. HALLECK, EXHIBITS. No. 1. [Copy in cipher.] BERKELEY, VA., August 4, 1862. Your telegram of last evening is received. I must confess that it has caused me the greatest pain I ever experienced, for I am convinced that the order to withdraw this army to Acquia creek will prove disastrous in the extreme to our cause. I fear it will be a fatal blow. Several days are necessary to complete the preparations for so important a movement as this, and while they are in progress I beg that careful consideration may be given to my statement. This army is now in excellent discipline and condition. We hold a debouche on both banks of the James river, so that we are free to act in any direction, and, with the assistance of the gunboats, I consider our communications as now secure. We are twenty-five miles from Richmond, and are not likely to meet the enemy in force sufficient to fight a battle until we have reached fifteen to eighteen miles, which brings us practically within ten miles of Richmond. Our longest line of land transportation would be, from this point, twenty-five miles, but, with the aid of the gunboats, we can supply the army by water during its advance, certainly to within twelve miles of Richmond. At Acquia creek we would be seventy-five miles from Richmond, with land transportation all the way. From here to Fort Monroe is a march of about seventy miles; for I regard it as impracticable to withdraw this army and its material except by land. The result of the movement would thus be to march one hundred and forty miles to reach a point now only twenty-five miles distant, and to deprive ourselves entirely of the powerful aids of the gunboats and water transportation. Add to this the certain demoralization of this army which would ensue, the terrible depressing effect upon the people of the north, and the strong probability that it would influence foreign powers to recognize our adversaries; and these appear to me sufficient reasons to make it my imperative duty to urge, in the strongest terms afforded by our language, that this order may be rescinded, and that, far from recalling this army, it be promptly re-enforced to enable it to resume the offensive. It may be said that there are no re-enforcements available. I point to General Burnside's force; to that of General Pope, not necessary to maintain a strict defence in front of Washington and Harper's Ferry; to those portions of the army of the west not required for a strict defence there. Here, directly in front of this army, is the heart of the rebellion. It is here that all our resources should be collected to strike the blow which will determine the fate of the nation. All points of secondary importance elsewhere should be abandoned, and every available man brought here. A decided victory here, and the military strength of the rebellion is crushed. It matters not what partial reverses we may meet with elsewhere; here is the true defence of Washington. It is here, on the banks of the James river, that the fate of the Union should be decided. Clear in my convictions of right, strong in the consciousness that I have ever been, and still am, actuated solely by love of my country, knowing that no ambitious or selfish motives have influenced me from the commencement of this war, I do now, what I never did in my life before: I entreat that this order may be rescinded. If my counsel does not prevail, I will, with a sad heart, obey your orders to the utmost of my powers, devoting to the movement, one of the utmost difficulty, whatever skill I may possess, whatever the result may be; and may God grant that I am mistaken in my forebodings. I shall at least have the internal satisfaction that I have written and spoken frankly, and have sought to do the best in my power to arrest disaster from my country. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, Major General. Major General HALLECK, Commander-in-Chief. HEADQUARTERS ARMY, Washington, D. C., November 23, 1862. Official copy. No. 2. WASHINGTON, August 6, 1862. GENERAL: Your telegram of yesterday was received this morning, and I immediately telegraphed a brief reply, promising to write you more fully by mail. You, general, certainly could not have been more pained at receiving my order than I was at the necessity of issuing it. I was advised by high officers, in whose judgment I had great confidence, to make the order immediately on my arrival here; but I determined not to do so until I could learn your wishes from a personal interview, and, even after that interview, I tried every means in my power to avoid withdrawing your army, and delayed my decision as long as I dared to delay it. I assure you, general, it was not a hasty and inconsiderate act, but one that caused me more anxious thought than any other of my life. But after full and mature consideration of all the pros and cons, I was reluctantly forced to the conclusion that the order must be issued. There was to my mind no alternative. Allow me to allude to a few of the facts of the case. You and your officers, at our interview, estimated the enemy's force, in and around Richmond, at two hundred thousand men. Since then, you and others report that they have received and are receiving large re-enforcements from the south. General Pope's army, now covering Washington, is only forty thousand. Your effective force is only about ninety thousand; you are thirty miles from Richmond, and General Pope eighty or ninety, with the enemy directly between you, ready to fall with superior numbers upon one or the other, as he may elect. Neither can re-enforce the other in case of such an attack. If General Pope's army be diminished to re-enforce you, Washington, Maryland, and Pennsylvania would be left uncovered and exposed. If your force be reduced to strengthen Pope, you will be too weak to even hold the position you now occupy, should the enemy turn round and attack you in full force. In other words, the old army of the Potomac is split into two parts, with the entire force of the enemy directly between them. They cannot be united by land without exposing both to destruction; and yet they must be united. To send Pope's forces by water to the peninsula, is, under present circumstances, a military im |