the States will be consented to by them? This is neither the language of confidence nor respect. Virginia, when she speaks respectfully, will be as much attended to as she has hitherto been when speaking this language. It is a most awful thing that depends on our decision-no less than whether the thirteen States shall unite freely, peaceably, and unanimously for the security of their common happiness and liberty, or whether everything is to be put in confusion and disorder? Are we to embark in this dangerous enterprise, uniting various opinions to contrary interests, with the vain hopes of coming to an amicable concurrence?

It is worthy of our consideration that those who prepared the paper on the table found difficulties not to be described in its formation-mutual deference and concession were absolutely necessary. Had they been inflexibly tenacious of their individual opinions they would never have concurred. Under what circumstances was it formed? When no party was formed, or particular proposition made, and men's minds were calm and dispassionate. Yet under these circumstances it was difficult, extremely difficult, to agree to any general system.

Suppose eight States only ratify it, and Virginia proposes certain alterations as the previous condition of her accession. If they should be disposed to accede to her proposition, which is the most favorable conclusion, the difficulty attending it would be immense. Every State which has decided it must take up the subject again. They must not only have the mortification of acknowledging that they have done wrong, but the difficulty of having a reconsideration of it among the people, and appointing new conventions to deliberate upon it. They must attend to all the amendments, which may be dictated by as great a diversity of political opinions as there are local attachments. When brought together in one assembly they must go through and accede to every one of the amendments. The gentlemen who within this House have thought proper to propose previous amendments have brought no less than forty amendments-a bill of rights which contains twenty amendments and twenty other alterations, some of which are improper and inadmissible. Will not every State think herself equally entitled to propose as many amendments? And suppose them to be contradictory. I leave it to this convention, whether it be probable that they can agree to anything but the plan on the table, or whether greater difficulties will not be encountered than were experienced in the progress of the formation of this Constitution.

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The motion of Mr. Wythe prevailed by a majority of ten, 89 to 79. In the form of ratification, after stating that every power not granted remained with the people, the convention added:

With these impressions, with a solemn appeal to the searcher of hearts for the purity of our intentions, and under the conviction that whatsoever imperfections may exist in the Constitution ought rather to be examined in the mode prescribed therein than to bring the Union into danger by a delay with a hope of obtaining amendments previous to the ratification.

The convention at the same time agreed upon a bill of rights, consisting of twenty articles, and the same number of amendments to the body of the Constitution. The most important of the latter were: that Congress should not lay direct taxes until the States had refused them; that members of the Senate and House should be incapable of holding any civil office under the authority of the United States; that no commercial treaty should be ratified without the concurrence of two-thirds of the whole number of the members of the Senate, and that no treaty ceding or suspending the territorial rights or claims of the United States, or any of them, or their rights to fishing in the American seas, or navigating the American rivers, should be but in cases of the most extreme necessity, nor should any such treaty be ratified without the concurrence of three-fourths of the whole number of the members of both Houses; that no navigation law or law regulating commerce should be passed without the consent of two-thirds of the members present in both Houses; that no person be capable of being President of the United States for more than eight years in any term of sixteen years; that the judicial power of the United States should extend to no case where the cause of action originated before the ratification of the Constitution except in disputes between persons claiming lands under grants of different States and suits for debts due to the United States; that Congress should not alter, modify, or interfere in the times, places, or manner of holding elections for Senators or Representatives, or either of them, except when the legislature of any State

should neglect, refuse or be disabled by invasion or rebellion to prescribe the same; that the clauses which declare that Congress should not exercise certain powers be not interpreted to extend their powers, but be construed as making exceptions to the specified powers, or inserted merely for greater caution; that the laws ascertaining the compensations of the members be postponed in their operation until after the election of Representatives immediately succeeding the passage of the same; that some tribunal other than the Senate be provided to try impeachment of Senators.

NEW YORK CONVENTION

A majority of the convention of New York, which met on June 19, were strongly opposed to the new system of government. The most important point discussed was the proportion of representation fixed by the Constitution for the popular House. This divided the convention into the two camps of those inclined toward a strong government, and those who feared the centralization of power in the hands of a comparatively few men of ability and political prestige.

As ten States had ratified the Constitution, and it must necessarily go into operation, no alternative was left New York but to unite or secede. By a small majority the system was adopted and amendments recommended. These amendments were more numerous as well as more radical than those of any other State.

CHAPTER XV

DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTION

[LETTERS IN THE PRESS]

Letters of "Fabius” (John Dickinson of Pennsylvania)—“The Federalist” Papers, by Alexander Hamilton [N. Y.], James Madison [Va.], and John Jay [N. Y.]: Introduction by Hamilton; Digest of the Arguments Conclusion, by Hamilton-Adoption of the Constitution.

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ANY attacks on the proposed Constitution were made in the newspapers. To these John Dickinson replied in his "Letters of Fabius," and Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay in articles over the common signature of Publius, which were collected and published under the title of "The Federalist." Dickinson wrote for the common people, and Hamilton, Madison, and Jay for persons of superior education.

The letters of "Fabius" were published early in 1788, while ratification of the Constitution was in doubt, in order to "simplify the subject so as to facilitate inquiries" regarding it and remove current objections to it. The substance of the papers is here presented in dialogue form, the language of the original being preserved so far as practicable.

THE LETTERS OF FABIUS

JOHN DICKINSON

Objection. The proposed system has such inherent vices as must necessarily produce a bad administration, and at length the oppression of a monarchy and aristocracy in the federal offices.

Reply. The power of the people, pervading the proposed system by frequent elections, together with the strong con

federation of the States, forms an adequate security against every danger that has been apprehended.

The proof of the salutary, purifying, and preserving qualities of this popular rule removes all the particular objections to the Constitution as menacing liberty by unnecessary taxation, standing armies, the abolishment of trial by jury in federal judicial procedure, and limitations of freedom of the press and freedom of commerce, etc. The question then is: not what may be done, when the Government shall be turned into a tyranny, but how the Government can be so turned.

Objection. The number of federal officers is too small. Reply. If this is a fault it will be remedied in the natural course of the country's development by the unavoidable multiplication of offices. The Senate continues the present representation of the sovereignties of the States, and through State jealousy it will never renounce its powers, including representation. The House of Representatives will grow only with the country's growth and corresponding legislative needs.

Objection. The federal officers hold their offices too long. Reply. This cannot hold against the Representatives who are elected every two years. The Senators, from their smaller numbers, should serve a longer term, to balance, by their greater experience in legislation, the greater power of the Representatives (that of the purse).

Objection. The President will not be independent.

Reply. He is not chosen by the people, who have not the necessary information before them of the qualifications of men proposed for the office, nor by Congress, lest it should disturb the national councils, nor by any standing body whatever, for fear of undue influence, but by a specially appointed body of private citizens whose qualifications for such service are known by the people and who are uninfluenced by any other consideration than the worth of the men considered for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency.

Objection. The President may become a dictator.

Reply. Two-thirds of Congress may pass any law over his

veto.

Objection. The Senate may become a dictator.

Reply. The terms of office of the Senators expire at different times, and the political complexion of the State legislatures which elect them will be constantly changing. Machiavel and Cæsar Borgia together could not form a conspiracy in such a Senate destructive to any but themselves and their accomplices. Objection. The Constitution is not broad enough.