463 Opinion of the Court. in a foreign country in which the law sanctioned such contract and payment; and that when they made demand in this country for the payment of half wages, the master was entitled to deduct the advances made in the foreign country. In so holding, the Court said: "Conceding for the present purpose that Congress might have legislated to annul such contracts as a condition upon which foreign vessels might enter the ports of the United States, it is to be noted, that such sweeping and important requirement is not found specifically made in the statute. Had Congress intended to make void such contracts and payments a few words would have stated that intention, not leaving such an important regulation to be gathered from implication. There is nothing to indicate an intention, so far as the language of the statute is concerned, to control such matters otherwise than in the ports of the United States. The statute makes the payment of advance wages unlawful and affixes penalties for its violation, and provides that such advancements shall in no cases, except as in the act provided, absolve the master from full payment after the wages are earned, and shall be no defense to a libel or suit for wages. How far was this intended to apply to foreign vessels? We find the answer if we look to the language of the act itself. It reads that this section shall apply to foreign vessels 'while in waters of the United States.' "Legislation is presumptively territorial and confined. to limits over which the law-making power has jurisdiction. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347, 357. We think that there is nothing in this section to show that Congress intended to take over the control of such contracts and payments as to foreign vessels except while they were in our ports. Congress could not prevent the making of such contracts in other jurisdictions. If they saw fit to do so, foreign countries would continue to permit such contracts and advance payments no matter what our declared law or policy in regard to them might be as to vessels coming to our ports. "In the same section, which thus applies the law to foreign vessels while in waters of the United States, it is provided that the master of any such vessel, who violates the provisions of the act, shall be liable to the same penalty as would be persons of like character in respect to a vessel of the United States. This provision seems to us of great importance as evidencing the legisla tive intent to deal civilly and criminally with matters in our own jurisdiction. Congress certainly did not intend to punish criminally acts done within a foreign jurisdiction; a purpose so wholly futile is not to be attributed to Congress. United States v. Freeman, 239 U. S. 117, 120. The criminal provision strengthens the presumption that Congress intended to deal only with acts committed within the jurisdiction of the United States." On the same day, in Neilson v. Rhine Shipping Co., 248 U. S. 205, it was likewise held, upon the same general considerations, that the Seamen's Act of 1915 did not make invalid advances that had been made to seamen by the master of an American vessel in a foreign port. And later, in Strathearn S. S. Co. v. Dillon, 252 U. S. 348, 355 (1920), in distinguishing § 4 of the Seamen's Act-which in express terms declared that contracts denying seamen the right to demand half of their earned wages at ports reached in the course of a voyage, should be void, and gave seamen on foreign vessels while in American harbors the right to enforce its provisions in the courts of the United States -from § 11 of the Act dealing with advance wages, this Court said: "In the case of Sandberg v. 5 The provisions in § 4 of the Seamen's Act, which had amended R. S. § 4530, were the same in these respects as in the amendment made by the Merchant Marine Act which is set forth in Note 4, supra. 463 McDonald Opinion of the Court. we found no purpose manifested by Congress in § 11 to interfere with wages advanced in foreign ports under contracts legal where made. That section dealt with advancements, and contained no provision such as we find in § 4. Under § 4 all contracts are avoided which run counter to the purposes of the statute. Whether consideration for contractual rights under engagements legally made in foreign countries would suggest a different course is not our province to inquire. It is sufficient to say that Congress has otherwise declared by the positive terms of this enactment. The libelants concede that under § 11 of the Seamen's Act, as interpreted by this Court in the Sandberg case, it would have been necessary to deduct the advances that had been made in England in computing the wages due them when the demand was made in this country, but insist that the law was thereafter changed in this respect by the amendment made by the Merchant Marine Act of 1920. By § 32 of the Merchant Marine Act, Section 10 of the Dingley Act was further amended so as to make the third sentence of paragraph (a) dealing generally with advance payments, read as follows: "The payment of such advance wages whether made within or without the United States or territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof, shall in no case except as herein provided absolve the vessel or the master from the full payment of wages after the same shall have been actually earned, and shall be no defense to a libel suit or action for the recovery of such wages." This amendment made no change in any other part of paragraph (a), or in paragraph (e) referring to foreign vessels, which remained in full force. The libelants contend that in making this amendment Congress intended to meet the effect of the decisions in both the Sandberg and Neilson cases, and to extend the Opinion of the Court. 275 U.S. prohibition of advance wages to foreign vessels in foreign ports, as well as to American vessels in foreign ports. We cannot sustain this contention. That this amendment expressed no intention to extend the provisions of the statute to advance payments made by foreign vessels while in foreign ports, is plain. This Court had pointed out in the Sandberg case that such a sweeping provision was not specifically made in the statute, and that had Congress so intended, "a few words would have stated that intention, not leaving such an important regulation to be gathered from implication." The amendment, nevertheless, not only contained no such specific statement, but made no reference whatever to foreign vessels;-left unchanged and in full force all of paragraph (e) which alone referred to foreign vessels, including the specific provision which, as held in the Sandberg case, indicated that the prohibition of advance wages was intended to apply to foreign vessels only while in waters of the United States;-made no change in the criminal provisions which strengthened the presumption that Congress intended to deal only with acts committed within the jurisdiction of the United States;-and merely inserted the phrase "whether made within or without the United States or territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof" in paragraph (a) which made no reference to foreign vessels. This phrase, read in the light of the context, is given full effect when applied to American vessels; and thus construed is entirely consistent with the provision in paragraph (e) relating to foreign vessels while in American waters. In short, the language of the amendment indicates no intention to extend the prohibition of the statute to advance wages paid by foreign vessels while in foreign ports. Nor can such an intention be "gathered from implication," or from anything in the legislative history of the amendment, in which no reference was made to foreign vessels. The decree is Affirmed. Counsel for Parties. INGRAM-DAY LUMBER COMPANY v. McLOUTH. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. No. 126. Argued December 6, 7, 1927.-Decided January 3, 1928. 1. Plaintiff contracted to furnish defendant a specified quantity of lumber, knowing that it was to be used by defendant in building boats but not that they were being built under a contract between the defendant and the Fleet Corporation. Afterwards, the Fleet Corporation, acting under Executive Orders and the Act of June 15, 1917, cancelled its contract, notifying defendant to make no further commitments or expenditures, and defendant, without acting or purporting to act under authority of the Corporation, stopped deliveries of lumber by the plaintiff. Held: (1) That the damages recoverable by the plaintiff from the defendant, were not measured as where "just compensation" is claimed from the United States under the statute for cancellation of the government's own contracts, but included anticipated profits. P. 473. (2) Plaintiff's rights under its own contract.were not dependent on the continued existence of defendant's contract with the Fleet Corporation. P. 474. 2. Appellate review in this case, where a jury was waived in writing, held limited to the sufficiency of the facts specially found to support the judgment and to rulings excepted to and presented by bill of exceptions. P. 474. 13 F. (2d) 581, reversed. CERTIORARI, 273 U. S. 684, to a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals which affirmed a judgment, 6 F. (2d) 471, not including anticipated profits, recovered by the petitioner in an action brought against McLouth and revived against his administrator. Mr. Wm. J. Shaw, with whom Messrs. W. A. White, Sidney T. Miller, George L. Canfield, and Ferris D. Stone were on the brief, for petitioner. |