What is tho creditor's remedy? What are the inhibitions sents? or for the purpose of paying its own expenses and contingencies; or for the payment of claims against the Confederate States, the justice of which shall have been judicially declared by a tribunal for the investigation of claims against the government, which it is hereby made the duty of Congress to establish." Paschal's Annotated Digest. pp. 90, 91. As it was contemplated that the cabinet officers should have seats upon the floor, with the privilege of discussion; and as "the President may approve any appropriation, and disapprove any other appropriation in the same bill," this was certainly a great increase of executive power. A bill not estimated for had to receive a two-thirds vote, then encounter opposition by the head of department on the floor; and finally pass by a two-thirds vote over the President's veto. Paschal's Annotated Digest, pp. 87, 88, Art. I., § 6, 7, Clauses, 2, 2. A court of claims was created by the act of 24th Feb., 1855; but the final power to allow or disallow the judgment of the court, still remains. 9 St. 612; 1 Brightly's Digest, 198. Whether the public moneys at the disposal of the postmastergeneral, are technically in the treasury or not, the spirit of this provision applies to them, and ought to be faithfully observed in their expenditure. 3 Opin. 13. No other remedy exists for a creditor to the government. than an application to Congress for payment; he cannot have a lien on the public property in his possession or custody. United States v. Barney, 3 Hall's L. J. 130; 2 Wh. Cr. Cas. 513. The reports of the receipts and expenditures are made to Congress annually, by the Secretary of the Treasury; and they form an important part of the executive documents of the nation. [8.] No title of nobility shall be granted by the as to nobi- United States; and no person holding any office of lity and preprofit or trust under them, shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state. Define nobility? 152. Define office? 150. "NO TITLE OF NOBILITY."-[Lat. Nobilitas.]—Being noble, whether by antiquity of family, or letters patent by the sovereign. Worcester's Dic., NOBILITY.--Here, the collective body of titled and privileged persons in a State; the aristocratic and patrician class; the peerage; as the English nobility, the French, German, Russian nobility. Webster's Dic., NOBILITY; 1 Black. Com. 156157. Perfect equality is the basis of all our institutions. Story's Const. § 1351. A privileged order would certainly destroy our republican form of government. (See sec. X). The same restriction is upon the States. Id. 151. "No PERSON HOLDING ANY OFFICE."-OFFICE. [Lat. Oficium, or opificium; from opus, work, and facio, to do.] Here a public charge or employment. Worcester's Dic., OFFICE. Thus a mar shal of the United States, cannot at the same time, hold the office of commercial agent of France. 6 Op. 409. As to the object, see the Federalist (No. 84; 1 Tuck. Black) Com. App. 295-296; Rawle on the Const. ch. 10, p. 120; Story's Const. $ 1352. An amendment was proposed in 1803, extending the prohibition to all private citizens. But it has never yet been ratified. Story's Const. § 1352. unqualified upon the SEC. X. [1.] No State shall enter into any treaty, What are the alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and inhibitions reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make any State? thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility. 66 About 150. 153. 152. REMARK.-It will be observed that to Congress is either Which of given or denied all the powers herein inhibited to the States except these powers "to make any thing but gold and silver coin a legal tender," "emit are given or denied to bills of credit," or 'pass any law impairing the obligation of con- the United tracts." Thus to the President, by and with the advice of the States? Senate, is given the right to enter into treaties, alliances, or confed- 178. erations. To Congress is given the right to coin money and grant 97, 98. letters of marque and reprisal; and from Congress is denied the 99, 178. power to create a title of nobility or pass ex post facto laws. the power of Congress to emit bills of credit, make tenders in payment of debts, or to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts, the Constitution is silent. Neither of these powers is reserved to the States under the tenth amendment; for they are expressly prohibited. Those who deny them to Congress do so upon the ground, that because they are denied to the States and not granted to Congress, they do not exist in either government. But on the other hand, it is answered, that the right to borrow money on the credit of the United States carries the right to emit bills of credit and to 78, 82. make them lawful tenders; and, as ex post facto laws relate to 143, 156. crimes, the power to pass bankrupt laws carries along the power to impair the obligation of contracts by the Federal Government. 94–96. The whole ground is narrow; and hence we have to be controlled by the precedents of the past and what is necessary and proper. None deny the concurrent power of Congress to make gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts. But the argument is that it can make nothing else a lawful tender. 269. powers de 153. TO ENTER INTO ANY TREATY, &C., TO "COIN MONEY."- Why are These powers being national cannot exist in the States. Federal- national ist, No. 44; Rawle's Const. ch. 10, p. 136. They belonged to the Con- nied? federation, ante, p. 11, Art. 6. The same remark is true as to letters of marque and reprisal and coining money. Story's Const. § 1354-1357. 154. 178, 195. EMIT BILLS OF CREDIT.-To constitute a bill of credit, Define a bill within the Constitution, it must be issued by a State, involve the of credit? 88. Where does the power as to legal tenders reside? 269. 83, 97, 98. What may be a legal tender? 88. faith of the State, and be designed to circulate as money, on the credit of the State, in the ordinary uses of business. Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257, 311; Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 204. As to what are such bills of credit, see Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet. 410, 434-448; same case, 8 Pet. 40; Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 205; McFarland v. The Bank of Arkansas, 4 Ark. 410; Darrington v. State Bank of Alabama, 13 How. 12; Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 317-18. The loan certificates of Missouri were bills of credit, and formed no valid consideration for a contract. Mankster v. The State, 1 Mo. 321; Lopez v. The State, 1 Mo. 451; Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet. 410, 435. And see State of Indiana v. Warm, 6 Hill, 33; Delafield v. State of Illinois, 26 Wend., 192; Sturges v. Crowinshield, 4 Wheat. 204-205; Madison's Letter to C. J. Ingersol, 2d Feb. 1811. Story's Const. § 1358-1373. Bills of credit in the colonies were understood to apply to all paper money, whether funds were provided for their repayment or not. (See 2 Hutch. Hist. 208, 381.) Story's Const. § 1368. This author and the cases cited exhaust the whole learning upon the subject. "Emit bills of credit," was omitted in the Constitution of the Confederate States. The result was that many of the States issued large amounts of bills intended to circulate as money. Paschal's Annotated Digest, p. 91, Arts. 806--811. 155. "MAKE ANY THING BUT GOLD AND SILVER COIN A TENDER IN PAYMENT OF DEBTS."-The things in this article, not also prohibited to Congress, are allowed to be exercised by it, if the power come within the purview of either of the express or implied powers granted. Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, 27 N. Y. Rep. 418, 423, 442. "The interpretation which I give to this clause is, that the United States possess power to make any thing besides gold and silver a legal tender. * *They have a right to make bank paper a legal tender. Much more then, have they the power of causing it to be received by themselves in payment of taxes." (4 Elliot's Debates, 367, 368; Mr. Alston of South Carolina.) Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, 27 N. Y. R. 418; The Pennsylvania Cases, 52 Penn. St. R. (2 Smith) 1–100. There is no express delegation of power to Congress to legislate on the subject of legal tenders, neither is there any prohibition in the Constitution, upon Congress forbidding such legislation, or declaring what shall or shall not make a legal tender; the omission was not accidental. Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, 27 N. Y. 422. It was the opinion of Mr. Madison, that Congress would have the power to declare bills or notes issued on the credit of the United States, a legal tender, unless prohibited by the Constitution. Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, 27 N. Y. 419, 420, 422, 423, 426. The first legal tender act was in favor of foreign coin. (Act 1st July, 1793.) Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, 27 N. Y. 424, where are cited all the acts on the subject. A contract dated 16th December, 1851, payable "in gold or silver coin, lawful money of the United States," may be paid in United States legal tender notes, as lawful money of the United States. Rodes v. Bronson, 34 N. Y. R. 649. When the contract matured, it was payable in the only lawful money of the country. The power 83, 97-99. of Congress to declare treasury notes legal tenders for debts contracted previously to its passage, as well as those contracted subsequently, has been affirmed by this court. (Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, 34 N. Y. R. 654.) Rodes v. Bronson, 34 N. Y. 654. to change A law of Congress to change the currency in which a contract Does a law may be discharged, does not impair the obligation of the contract. of Congress (Faw v. Marsteller, 2 Cr. 20; Dowmans v. Dowmans, 1 Wash. the currency Virg. 26; Pong v. Lindsay, Dyer, 82; Barrington v. Potter, Dyer, impair the 81 B. fol. 67; United States v. Robertson, 6 Pet. 644; Conkey v. contracts? Hart, 4 Kern. 22; Mason v. Haile, 12 Wh. 370.) Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, 27 N. Y. Rep. 455-8. The above authorities also settle, that if a contract be made payable in a particular currency, and that currency ceases to exist before it is due, it must be discharged in the lawful currency at the date of maturity. See, particularly, Faw v. Marsteller, 2 Cr. 20, and Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, 27 N. Y. Rep. to be uncon A law will not be held to be unconstitutional, unless it is clearly When will a and plainly so. (Morris v. The People, 3 Den. 381; Ex parte law be held McCollom, 1 Cow. 564; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cr. 87; Ogden v. San- stitutional? ders, 12 Wh. 29; Adams v. Howe, 14 Mass. 345.) Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, 27 N. Y. Rep. 460. ex post facto law? 156. "PASS ANY BILL OF ATTAINDER OR EX POST FACTO LAW." Define ex --These terms relate to criminal law only; but as the words “ post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts,' are only separated by a comma, many of the judges treat the words in 142–143. this connection as synonymous; and thus seem to make ex post facto apply to contracts. The critical reader is referred to the phrase in Burrill's law dictionary, for the civil law origin of the term, wherein will be found its exact application. Que ab initio inutilis fuit institutio, ex post facto non convalescere non potest. Translated: An institution or act which was of no effect at the beginning (when made or done), cannot acquire force or validity from after matter. Nunquam crescit ex post facto præteriti delicti æstimatio. The estimate of the character of a past offense is never enhanced by after matter. See 1 Kent's Com. 409. Here follows an instance where it is used in reference to contracts. Ex post facto, literally construed, operating upon a previous fact, yet the restricted sense stated, is the one in which it has always been held. It was the sense in which it was understood at the time the Constitution was adopted, both in this country and in England. (1 Blackstone's Com. 46; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dallas, 390.) Locke v. New Orleans, 4 Wallace, 173, 174. 157. THE OBLIGATION OF THE CONTRACT.-The laws which What laws exist at the time and place of the making of the contract, enter enter into into and form a part of it; and they embrace alike those which tion of the affect its validity, construction, discharge and enforcement. contract? the obliga 155-159. 160-161. How are 155. (Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 92; Bronson v. Kinzie. 1 How. 319; As, if the acts so change the remedies as materially to impair the The ideas of validity and remedy are inseparable, and both are the validity parts of the obligation, which is guarantied by the Constitution and remedy connected against invasion. The obligation of the contract "is the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement.' (Sturges v. Crowninshield, 12 Wheat. 257.) Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wallace, 552; Story v. Furnam, 25 N. Y. (11 Smith), 223. Where the State incorporated a bank, with no other stockholder than the State, which issued bills, for which all the bank assets were legally bound (and which provided that the issues were receivable for all public dues), laws which withdrew the funds from the bank, and appropriated them to various other purposes than paying the notes of the bank, impaired the obligation of the contract, and were unconstitutional. (Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608.) Curran v. The State of Arkansas, 15 How. 310. The guaranty that the bills were receivable for all public dues, was a contract with the bill-holders; and to repeal the guaranty, impaired the contract as to bills then in circulation. Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 205; affirmed. Hawthorn v. Caleff, 2 Wall. 23. A law repealing a bank charter, does not impair the obligation of a contract, because the property bona fide heid, is still a fund for the creditors. (Muma v. The Potomac Co. 8 Pet. 281.) Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 310, 331; This seems not to be so, as to creditors, where the corporators are liable personally for the issues. Corning v. McCulloch, 1 Comst. 47, 49; Conant v. Van Schaick, 24 Barb. 87; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311; Hawthorne v. Caleff, Id. 311. The legislature may repeal the guaranty that the bills shall be received for all public dues; but the repeal only operates upon future issues, the guaranty remaining as to those outstanding. Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 206. What of the repeal of bank charters? 157. What is the doctrine of bridges? A bridge charter, which declared that no other bridge should be built within the designated limits, is a contract, within the meaning of the Constitution. Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co. 1 Wall. 146-7. But a railroad bridge is not a bridge, within the meaning of a statute of New Jersey of 1790. Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co. 1 Wall. 147. A railroad bridge does not necessarily impair the right of an ordinary toll-brilge. (Mohawk Bridge Co. v. Utica & S. R. R. Co. 6 Paige, 561; Thompson v. |