CHAP. IX.] HAMILTON'S SUDDEN CHANGE OF VIEWS.

433

ton's feelings in respect to a war with France since 1797. During the recent excitement on this subject, he was foremost in advocating extensive preparations for war. He appears to have approved all the measures in that direction during the Congressional session of 1797-98. His hand now clutched the baton of command. He ranked next to Washington, and all understood the latter had accepted the position of Commanderin-Chief only for an exigency, and would be likely to soon retire.

General Washington did not anticipate an "invasion." Mr. Adams had no expectation of a war. The Cabinet were apprised of the French overtures through our Minister at the Hague, and three of the secretaries had no secrets with Hamilton. They communicated with him quite as freely as with the President, and far more confidentially. After reading Pickering's, Wolcott's and McHenry's letters to him throughout the year, it would be absurd to conjecture that any Cabinet secrets or intelligence were withheld from him; and the "military conclave" at Philadelphia had afforded every facility for orally communicating them. King wrote him from London, September 23d, "You will have no war."1

With all this information, and with more of the same tenor constantly accumulating, we have seen that Hamilton subsequently bitterly reproached the President for leaving open a loop-hole for accommodation with France in his speech to the succeeding Congress. We shall find him urging on that Congress vastly more extensive warlike preparations than any yet made. We shall find the ghost of a French invasion raised to serve as an excuse and cover for these preparations-but confidential associates apprised of an utterly different and most stupendous design. We shall find a determined-literally, a dogged-effort on the part of Hamilton and his followers, in the Cabinet and in Congress, to prevent the reopening of negotiations with France. We shall find this faction filled with mortification and rage when that negotiation was reopened, which, with so little difficulty or delay, led to an honorable and advantageous pacification. Whence this almost incredible change in Hamilton's views from those entertained in 1797? The answer

For the letter entire, see Hamilton's Works, vol. vi. p. 359. VOL. II.-28

to this question involves facts which cannot be passed over in the most cursory explanation of the political history of this eventful period.

We must first introduce a remarkable man. Don Francisco de Miranda was born in Caracas, of which his grandfather was governor. His tastes were literary, and he received fine educational advantages; but at seventeen he repaired to Spain, and obtained a captain's commission in its army. He was in the portion of the army destined to act with the French who were sent to North America to aid the British colonies in their war of independence. Miranda, we believe, had no part in that struggle, but he imbibed ideas from the French officers and from the occasion which colored the whole history of his future life. Thenceforth the object of his life was the emancipation of his native land from the thralldom of Spain.

At the close of the American War he visited the United States, and went from thence to England. He traversed Central and Southern Europe-a good deal of it, it is said, on foot -and then repaired to Russia. The Empress treated him with uncommon distinction and kindness, promised to aid in the execution of his plans, and invited him to draw on her treasury for his personal support.1

He returned through France and reached England in the beginning of 1790. The latter was then engaged in the dispute with Spain in regard to the affair of Nootka Sound. Miranda opened his designs against the Spanish power in South America to Mr. Pitt, who received them cordially, and "it was resolved if Spain did not prevent hostilities by submission, to carry the plan into immediate execution."" When the affair between the governments was adjusted, the project was suspended, but the Minister assured Miranda that it would not be lost sight of by himself or any of his successors.

The latter then went to France, and soon became engaged in its Revolution. He rose to the rank of a major-general, was next in command to Dumouriez in Champagne and Belgium, and, when the latter entered Holland, was directed to besiege Maestricht. He was unsupported, and failed. He commanded the left wing in the battle of Neerwinden, and Dumouriez, very

Edinburgh Review, vol. xiii. p. 287.

* Ibid. p. 285.

CHAP. IX.]

THE MIRANDA SCHEME.

435

unjustly it is believed, imputed to him the loss of the day. His South American designs were known to and received the warm approbation of the Girondist leaders."

He declared against the Jacobins, and was soon summoned before the revolutionary tribunal. He escaped conviction, and on the fall of Robespierre escaped confinement. He was subsequently offered the command of an army, but replied, "he had fought for liberty, it was not his purpose to fight for conquest." This was in 1795.'

Miranda, not long after, was met at Paris by certain representatives from Mexico, and the South American provinces, to concert on a plan for securing their common independence from Spain. They drew up an instrument, and Miranda was directed to present it to the British Government. It was dated December 22, 1797, and contained among others the following proposals: the aid of Great Britain was to be asked, and South America was to pay thirty millions sterling for its aid; the fourth article proposed a permanent defensive alliance between England, the United States, and South America; the sixth

Brissot pays him the following high-colored tribute in a letter to Dumouriez, dateć Paris, November 28th, 1792:

"L'Espagne se mûrit pour la liberté; son Gouvernement reprend ses préparatifs; faut donc faire ses préparatifs pour réussir; ou plutôt pour y naturaliser la liberté. I faut faire cette révolution et dans l'Espagne Européenne et dans l'Espagne Américaine. Tout doit coincider. Le sort de cette dernière révolution dépend d'un homme; vous le connaissez, vous l'estimez; c'est Miranda. Dernièrement les ministres cherchèrent par qui ils remplaceraient Desparbés à St. Domingue-un trait de lumière m'a frappé; j'ai dit, nommez Miranda-Miranda d'abord aura bientôt appaisé les miserables querelles des colonies; il aura bientôt mis à la raison ces blancs si turbulents, et il deviendra l'idole des gens de couleur. Mais ensuite avec quelle facilité ne pourra-t-il pas faire soulever, soit les îles Espagnoles, soit le continent Américain qu'ils possedent? A la téte de plus de 12,000 hommes de troupes de ligne qui sont maintenant à St. Domingue, de 10,000 à 15,000 braves Mulatres que lui fourniront nos colonies, avec quelle facilité ne pourra-t-il pas envahir les possessions Espagnoles? Ayant d'ailleurs une flotte à ses ordres, et forsque les Espagnols n'ont rien à lui opposer. Le nom de Miranda lui vaudra une armée; et ses talens, son courage, son genie, tout nous répond du succès. Les ministres sont tous d'accord sur ce choix, mais ils craignent que vous ne refusiez de céder Miranda, d'autant plus que vous l'avez choisi pour remplacer Labourdonnaye. J'ai promis ce matin à Monge que je vous écrirais, et il m'a donné sa parole qu'il nommerait Miranda Gouverneur-Général si vous consentiez à le laisser partir. Hatez vous donc d'envoyer votre consentement. Vous ajouterai-je que notre excellent ami Gensonné est du même avis-il vous en écrira demain, Clavière et Petion sont enchantés de cette idée."

2 Edinburgh Review, vol. xiii. p. 289.

This entire article, as presenting the basis and objects of the league, is too curious not to be presented entire:

"Une alliance défensive formée entre l'Angleterre, les Etats Unis d'Amérique, et l'Amérique Méridionale, est tellement recommandée par la nature des choses, par la gituation géographique de chacun des trois pays, par les produits, l'industrie, par les besoins, les mœurs, et le caractère de ces trois nations, qu'il est impossible que cette alliance ne soit pas de longue durée; surtout si on prend soin de la consolider par l'analogie dans la forme politique des trois Gouvernements, c'est-à-dire par la jouissance d'une liberté civile, sagement entendue; ou pourrait même dire avec confiance, que c'est le seul espoir qui reste à la liberté, audacieusement outragée par les maximes détestables avouées par la république Française. C'est le seul moyen encore de former

article stipulated the opening of the navigation between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, by the isthmus of Panama, and by the lake of Nicaragua, and the guaranty of its freedom to Great Britain; the ninth and tenth articles provided for ceding to the United States all territory east of the Mississippi, and for a stipulation by the latter to furnish a small military force to aid in effecting the revolution; the eleventh article proposed to resign all the Spanish islands except Cuba, the possession of which was necessary, as the Havana commanded the passage from the Gulf of Mexico.'

Mr. Pitt welcomed the return of Miranda to England, and in January, 1798, the latter had an interview with the Minister, whom he found ready to reëmbark with ardor in his plans. As it was anticipated that Spain would offer no effectual resistance to the armies of France, and that both she and her colonies would consequently henceforth be used for the advantage of France, England considered it expedient to anticipate the latter power in securing these advantages by despoiling her own ally.

Either Miranda opened his projects directly, or through Mr. King, to Alexander Hamilton, about the same time he did to Mr. Pitt; or else the transmission of intelligence between them across the ocean was uncommonly rapid, for Miranda wrote Hamilton April 6th, 1798:

"Celle-ci vous sera remise mon cher et respectable ami, par mon compatriote Don *** *****, chargé des dépêches de la plus haute importance pour le Président des États Unis; il vous dira confidentiellement ce que vous voudrez apprendre sur ce sujet. Il paraît que le moment de notre émancipation approche; et que l'établissement de la liberté sur tout le continent du nouveau monde nous est confié par la Providence. Le seul danger que je prévois c'est l'introduction des principes Français qui empoisonneraient la liberté dans son berceau, et finiraient par détruire bientôt la votre." 2

Hamilton wrote King August 22d, 1798:

"I have received several letters from General Miranda. I have written an answer to some of them, which I send you to deliver or not, according to your estimate of what is passing in the scene where you are. Should you deem it expedient to sup

une balance de pouvoir capable de contenir l'ambition destructive et dévastation du système Français.' For a synopsis of the articles (and fourth entire), see Edinburgh Review, vol. xiii. p. 290, et seq.

This letter is not published in the Works of Hamilton. The extract we have given will be found in the Edinburgh Review, vol. xiii. p. 291, published more than forty years before the answer, which we shall give, appeared in print.

CHAP. IX.]

HIS CORRESPONDENCE WITH MIRANDA.

437

press my letter, you may do it, and say as much as you think fit on my part in the nature of a communication through you.

With regard to the enterprise in question, I wish it much to be undertaken, but I should be glad that the principal agency was in the United States, they to furnish the whole land-force if necessary. The command in this case would very naturally fall upon me; and I hope I should disappoint no favorable anticipations. The independency of the separate territory under a moderate government, with the joint guaranty of the cooperating powers, stipulating equal privileges in commerce, would be the sum of the results to be accomplished.

Are we yet ready for this undertaking? Not quite. But we ripen fast, and it may, I think, be rapidly brought to maturity, if an efficient negotiation for the purpose is at once set on foot on this ground. Great Britain cannot alone insure the accomplishment of the object. I have some time since advised certain preliminary steps to prepare the way consistently with national character and justice. I was told they would be pursued, but I am not informed whether they have been or not."

SIR:

The inclosed letter to Miranda was as follows:

NEW YORK, August 22d, 1798.

I have lately received by duplicates your letter of the sixth of April, with the postscript of the 9th of June. The gentleman you mention in it has not made his appearance to me, nor do I know of his arrival in this country; so that I can only divine the object from the limits in your letter.

The sentiments I entertain with regard to that object have been long since in your knowledge, but I could personally have no participation in it, unless patronized by the Government of this country. It was my wish that matters had been ripened for a cooperation in the course of this fall, on the part of this country. But this can now scarcely be the case. The winter, however, may mature the project, and an effectual cooperation by the United States may take place. In this case, I shall be happy, in my official station, to be an instrument in so good a work.

The plan, in my opinion, ought to be-a fleet of Great Britain, an army of the United States, a Government for the liberated territory agreeable to both the cooperators, about which there will be no difficulty. To arrange the plan, a competent authority from Great Britain to some person here, is the best expedient. Your presence here will, in that case, be extremely essential.

We are raising an army of about twelve thousand men. General Washington has resumed his station at the head of our armies. I am appointed second in command.

With esteem and regard,

I remain, dear sir, etc.,

ALEXANDER HAMILTON.2

As late as the 11th of May, 1797, we find Hamilton insisting on pacific measures towards France, and proposing, in order to secure the desired result, not only to join Jefferson in a commission to the Directory, but to confer on him a separate commission as "envoy or ambassador extraordinary for representation.""

1 Hamilton's Works, vol. vi. p. 347.

2 Ibid. p. 348.

• Ibid. p. 247.