The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. ShapleyAlvin E. Roth Cambridge University Press, 28. 10. 1988 - Počet stran: 340 Composed in honour of the sixty-fifth birthday of Lloyd Shapley, this volume makes accessible the large body of work that has grown out of Shapley's seminal 1953 paper. Each of the twenty essays concerns some aspect of the Shapley value. Three of the chapters are reprints of the 'ancestral' papers: Chapter 2 is Shapley's original 1953 paper defining the value; Chapter 3 is the 1954 paper by Shapley and Shubik applying the value to voting models; and chapter 19 is Shapley's 1969 paper defining a value for games without transferable utility. The other seventeen chapters were contributed especially for this volume. The first chapter introduces the subject and the other essays in the volume, and contains a brief account of a few of Shapley's other major contributions to game theory. The other chapters cover the reformulations, interpretations and generalizations that have been inspired by the Shapley value, and its applications to the study of coalition formulation, to the organization of large markets, to problems of cost allocation, and to the study of games in which utility is not transferable. |
Obsah
A value for nperson games | |
3 | |
The expected utility of playing a game | |
5 | |
StraffinJr 6 Weighted Shapley | |
average relative payoffs Uriel G Rothblum 9 The potential oftheShapleyvalue Sergiu Hart andAndreuMasColell 10 Multilinear extensions of games | |
Coalitions | |
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The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley Alvin E. Roth Náhled není k dispozici. - 2005 |
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ASPM assume assumptions Aumann Aumann–Shapley price axiom axiomatic Banzhaf Chapter characteristic function characterization coalition structure coincides consider convex convex set Cooperative Games core Corollary cost allocation cost functions defined denote distribution Dubey dummy Econometrica economies efficient equivalent example feasible finite follows Game Theory graph Hence implies integrable interpretation inthe isthe Lemma linear marginal contribution Mathematics measure Mirman monotonic Morgenstern multilinear Nash point neutrality Neyman nonatomic nonempty nonnegative ofgames ofthe onthe ordinary risk outcome payoff players positive price mechanism Princeton probabilistic probability production Proof Proposition result risk neutrality Samet satisfies setof Shapley value Shapley–Shubik Shapley’s Shubik simple games solution concepts strategic subset superadditive symmetric Tauman thatthe thegame Theorem tothe unique uppersemicontinuous utility function vector vote weight system winning coalition ϕ ω