jury to particular individuals, or in the destruction of that confidence which is essential to the intercourse of human life: for which latter reason a lie may be pernicious in its general tendency; and therefore, criminal, though it produce no particular or visible mischief to any one. There are falsehoods which are not lies; that is, which are not criminal, as where no one is deceived ; which is the case in parables, fables, jests, tales to create mirth, ludicrous embellishments of a story, where the declared design of the speaker is not to inform but to divert; compliments in the subscription of a letter; a servant's denying his master; a prisoner's pleading not guilty; an advocate asserting the justice, or his belief in the justice, of his client's cause. In such instances, no confidence is destroyed, because none was reposed; no promise to speak the truth is violated, because none was given or understood to be given. 1 "In the first place, it is almost impossible to pronounce beforehand with certainty, concerning any lie, that it is inoffensive, volat irrevocabile, and collects oft-times reactions in its flight, which entirely changes its nature. It may owe, possibly, its mischief to the officiousness or misrepresentation of those who circulate it; but the mischief is, nevertheless, in some degree chargeable upon the original editor. In the next place, this liberty in conversation defeats its own end. Much of the pleasure, and all the benefit, of conversation depend upon our opinion of the speaker's veracity, for which this rule leaves no foundation. The faith, indeed, of a hearer must be extremely perplexed, who considers the speaker, or believes that the speaker considers himself, as under no obligation to adhere to truth, but according to the particular importance of what he relates. But, beside and above both these reasons, white lies always introduce others of a darker complexion. I have seldom known any one who deserted truth in trifles that could be trusted in matters of importance.* "Nice distinctions are out of the question upon occasions which, like those of speech, return every hour. The habit, therefore, when once formed, is easily extended to serve the designs of malice or interest; like all habits, it spreads-indeed of itself. "As there may be falsehoods which are not lies, so there are many lies without literal or direct falsehood. An opening is always left for this species of prevarication, when the literal and grammatical signification of a sentence is different from the popular and customary meaning. It is the wilful deceit that makes the lie; and we wilfully deceive when our expressions are not true in the sense in which we believe the hearer apprehends them. Besides, it is absurd to contend for any sense of words, in opposition to usage, and upon nothing else; -or a man may act a lie, -as by pointing his finger in a wrong direction, when a traveller inquires of him his road; -or when a tradesman shuts up his windows, to induce his creditors to believe that he is abroad: for, to all moral purposes, and therefore as to veracity, speech and action are the same ;-speech being only a mode of action. Or, lastly, there may be lies of omission. A writer on English history, who, in his account of the reign of Charles the first, shoula wilfully suppress any evidence of that Prince's despotic measures and designs, might be said to lie; for, by entitling his book a History of England, he engages to relate the whole truth of the history, or, at least, all he knows of it." * How contrary is the spirit of this wise observation, and the following ones, to that which Paley manifests in his toleration of servants being taught to deny their masters ! I feel entire unity of sentiment with Paley on all that he has advanced in these extracts, except in those passages which are printed in Italic; but Chalmers and Scott have given a complete refutation to his opinion on the innocence of a servant's denying his master, in the extracts given in a preceding chapter; and it will be ably refuted in some succeeding extracts. But, eloquent and convincing as Paley generally is, it is not from his Moral Philosophy that he derives his purest reputation. He has long been considered as lax, negligent, and inconclusive, on many points, as a moral philosopher. It was when he came forward as a Christian warrior against infidelity, that he brought his best powers into the field; and his name will live for ever as the author of Evidences of Christianity, and the Horæ Paulinæ.* I shall now avail my: self of the assistance of a powerful and eloquent writer of more modern date, William Godwin, with whom I have entire correspondence of opinion on the subject of spontaneous truth, though, on some other subjects, I decidedly differ from him. "It was further proposed," says he, "to consider the value of truth in a practical view, as it relates to the incidents and commerce of ordina * I heard the venerable bishop of say that when he gave Dr. Paley some very valuable preferment, he addressed him thus: "I give you this, Dr Paley, not for your Moral Philosophy, nor for your Natural Theology, but for your Evidences of Christianity, and your Horæ Paulinæ," ry life, under which form it is known by the denominations of sincerity. "The powerful recommendations attendant on sincerity are obvious. It is intimately connected with the general dissemination of innocence, energy, intellectual improvement, and philanthrophy. Did every man impose this law upon himself ; did he regard himself as not authorized to conceal any part of his character and conduct; this circumstance alone would prevent millions of actions from being perpetrated, in which we are now induced to engage, by the prospect of success and impunity." "There is a further benefit that would result to me from the habit of telling every man the truth, regardless of the dictates of worldly prudence and custom ;-1 should acquire a clear, ingenuous, and unembarrassed air. According to the established modes of society, whenever I have a circumstance to state which would require some effort of mind and discrimination, to enable me to do it justice, and state it with proper effect, I fly from the task, and take refuge in silence and equivocation." "But the principle which forbade me concealment would keep my mind for ever awake, and for ever warm. I should always be obliged to exert my attention, lest in pretending to tell the truth, I should tell it in so imperfect and mangled a way, as to produce the effect of falsehood. If I spoke to a man of my own faults, or those of his neighbour, I should be anxious not to suffer them to come distorted or exaggerated to his mind, or permit what at first was fact, to degenerate into satire. If I spoke to him of the errors he had himself committed, I should carefully avoid those inconsiderate expressions which might convert what was in itself beneficent, into offence, and my thoughts would be full of that kindness and generous concern for his welfare which such a task necessarily brings with it. The effects of sincerity upon others would be similar to its effects on him that practised it. Plain dealing, truth spoken with kindness, but spoken with sincerity, is the most wholesome of all disciplines." "The only species of sincerity which can, in any degree, prove satisfactory to the enlightened moralist and politician, is that where frankness is perfect, and every degree of reserve is discarded." .... "Nor is there any danger that such a character should degenerate into ruggedness and brutality. "Sincerity, upon the principles on which it is here recommended, is practised from a consciousness of its utility, and from sentiments of philanthropy. "It will communicate frankness to the voice, fervour to the gesture, and kindness to the heart. "The duty of sincerity is one of those general principles which reflection and experience have enjoined upon us as conducive to the happiness of mankind. "Sincerity, and plain dealing are eminently conducive to the interests of mankind at large, because they afford that ground of confidence and reasonable expectation which are essential to wisdom and virtue." I feel it difficult to forbear giving further extracts from this very interesting and well-argued part of the work from which I quote; but the limits necessary for my own book forbid me to to indulge myself in copious quotations from this. I must, however, give two further extracts from the conclusion of this chapter. "No man can be |