an environment and an inspiration which make men grow while serying the Nation. And thus he stated:

The military efficiency of the Army will increase, and it will become a real power in developing that upstanding manhood which is the basic factor in national defense. The Army will then be an integral part of the life of the Nation and not merely a thing apart to be used in time of trouble and forgotten meanwhile. Perhaps 50 years from now all this may be accomplished fact Those who are partners in this pioneer enterprise may take inspiration from the knowledge that they are building for the future an edifice that some day will be one of the glories of America.

In the present war the Army and the Navy have been able to profit by and to improve upon the method of training and procedure that such men in the earlier war helped them to develop. And, also, they have not hesitated to break precedent or to endeavor to apply the results of modern science to further improve the training program.

(c) And the third reason for exceptional efficiency is that every psychologist recognizes it as a serious educational blunder to stimulate thought or an idea without simultaneously providing a program of action. And this is most important. Few schools or colleges are able to provide such programs of action and their work correspondingly suffers. Fortunately, however, the Army and the Navy are able to do it, and the results are most beneficial.

PASS THE LAW NOW-WE CANNOT WAIT

There are many reasons for immediate action. The housing and training equipment built up at enormous expense during the present war must not be permitted to disintegrate. More important, the officer personnel who have gained skill and experience and efficiency in training in the war must not be permitted to be so reabsorbed in civil life as to become lost as a valuable means of protection for peace and security of the Nation.

And perhaps more important still, the law creating universal military training should be passed now in order to have it become an integral unit in our foreign policy. The world is today waiting to know to what extent we are ready to play our part in the organization for the preservation of peace. And, the action of the Congress on the question of postwar universal military training is a most important factor in the answer.

The argument that we should wait until the boys come home from overseas has no validity. We know now how they feel and what they think. If there were doubt in this direction, the recommendations of the Spanish-War Veterans, the American Legion, the Disabled Veterans of Foreign Wars, and the Veterans of the Global War should dissipate such doubt. Men who know war don't want to meet war ill prepared.

UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING IS DEMOCRATIC

I do not hesitate to express the conviction that peacetime universal military training is thoroughly democratic and that it is in line with our fundamental and traditional policies when properly understood. From time immemorial America has had laws for compulsory education based upon the theory that education is essential to the preser

vation of our form of Government. And, today, change in world condition makes more than ever a special type of compulsory education-education for national defense-essential to the preservation of our form of government. There is no difference in the two ideas.

The claim that it is un-American or revolutionary again is without foundation. This Nation fought for its freedom on the principle of "No taxation without representation," and the principle that "He who enjoys the protection of a government must be prepared to defend his government" is the corollary and counterpart of the above principle which caused the Colonies to break away from their mother country.

And, furthermore, the idea that all should share alike in whatever is necessary for our freedom is surely a democratic principle.

IN CONCLUSION

Above all else, we in America desire peace, and we want to work for peace and prepare for peace.

But we must know that force in the hands of the righteous is the surest guaranty of peace.

Since man first walked erect on this planet there has been but one guaranty of peace, either between man and man, or between tribes or between nations, and that, from the beginning of time, has been government.

But government that governs must always have two essential features (a) reason and (b) force.

And, without both reason and force there can be no guaranty of

peace.

Weakness is but an invitation for aggressors to attack.

And there is no greater fallacy than the idea that a trained citizenry tends to lead to war. Men who have been trained in the nature and details of war know the horror and tragedy of war and will do everything possible to prevent war.

But the even more important fact is that aggressive nations will never want to make war upon the nation that possesses a large and a well-trained citizenry.

Therefore, in conclusion again, as the most dependable means of national safety and the surest guaranty of freedom and peace, I urge upon the Congress the early adoption of a program of universal military training.

Chairman WOODRUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Williston.

Mr. Leslie J. Tompkins, Mr. Stanley J. Quinn, and Mr. C. M. Penfield, representing the American Defense Society, Inc., are present. I understand you gentlemen wish to divide your time. Is that correct?

Mr. TOMPKINS. That is correct.

Chairman WOODRUM. Which one of you would like to proceed first? Mr. TOMPKINS. As chairman of the society, I would like to introduce Mr. Quinn, who will give you the benefit of his study upon this subject.

Chairman WOODRUM. All right, Mr. Quinn.

STATEMENT OF STANLEY J. QUINN, THE AMERICAN DEFENSE SOCIETY

Mr. QUINN. The thoughts expressed in this brief represent the convictions of the officers and members of the American Defense Society. Over a period, extending from 1915 to the present, this society has consistently urged the need for national defense.

The society is a national organization with membership in every State in the Union. The sole qualification for membership is willingness "to defend the Constitution and the American form of government."

Prior to our entrance into the First World War, the society, with Ex-President Theodore Roosevelt as honorary chairman, went unqualifiedly on record in support of a policy of universal military training. In 1917 it worked for the adoption of the selective-service program which in two wars has substituted for the lack of trained

reserves.

POSTWAR MILITARY POLICY

The postwar policy of the United States should be a well-rounded program embracing land, sea, and air. This general program should include:

1. Universal military training of our youth.

2. A highly trained Regular Army with every branch of a field army represented.

3. Organization of outstanding scientists and military strategists into an independent, continuing body, to conduct research and investigation of all forms of offense and defense.

4. Maintenance of stock piles of military materials ready for any contingency.

5. Retention and fortification of all bases necessary to national defense.

6. Preservation of America's present superiority on the sea, under the plan announced by the Secretary of the Navy.

7. Maintenance of an effective and up-to-date air arm, in the Army and Navy, assuring at all times that we are abreast of all new developments.

UNIVERAL MILITARY TRAINING

I. LESSONS OF THE PAST

In all previous wars, including that in which we are now engaged, we have increased our casualties and our war expenditures because of the length of time required to train and equip raw recruits.

A. The Revolutionary War

On February 9, 1776, Gen. George Washington in a letter to Congress said:

To bring men to be well acquainted with the duties of a soldier requires time. To bring them under proper discipline and subordination not only requires time but it is a work of great difficulty, and, in this Army where there is so little distinction between officers and soldiers, requires an uncommon degree of attention. To expect, then, the same service from raw and undisciplined recruits as from veteran soldiers is to expect what did not, and perhaps never will happen.

Gen. Henry Lee, a distinguished officer in the Revolution, was more outspoken:

A government—

he said,

is the murderer of its citizens which sends them to the field uninformed and unfaught, where they are to meet men of the same age and strength, mechanized by education and discipline for battle.

B. The War of 1812

The Capitol at Washington was burned by the enemy in the War of 1812. Referring to the ignominious record of an improvised defense in that war, the report of the Secretary of War, in 1903, has this

to say:

The cost of dispersing the 800 British Regulars, who from the first to the last had made prisoners of Hull's (American) Army at Detroit, let loose the Northwestern Indians, defeated and captured Winchester's command at Frenchtown, and twice invaded Ohio, having experienced but one rebuff at the hands of a stripling in command of 160 Regulars at Fort Stevenson, teaches a lesson worth the attention of any statesman or financier. *The above facts would seein

to offer proof that the same mistake in statesmanship which, in time of peace gives us a nonexpensive Military Establishment, is certain to bring about, in time of war, useless sacrifice of human life, unlimited waste of money and national humiliation.

C. Mexican War

With no settled policy of national defense, the United States in this war, as in preceding conflicts, was successful despite its reliance on untrained militia.

As Huidekoper says in his work, the Military Unpreparedness of the United States (p. 90):

Viewed from any angle, the success of the war was in no wise attributable to the legislative or executive wisdom of the Government, and what businessman would venture to claim that the manager of a company or corporation could, or ought to be retained who was unable to keep more than 21,000 men at work at any given time in spite of his having 91,000 at his disposal.

D. Spanish-American War

In the Spanish-American War, for lack of adequate peacetime preparation, we depended upon volunteer and State-provided troops without proper training or equipment.

Many of these raw recruits who suffered from embalmed beef and disease could not be used in combat.

Referring to these conditions, Lieutenant General Miles declared:

Our field artillery, our siege guns, and all our heavier guns were constructed for and used black powder.

This in time of action proved to be a great disadvantage; and in fact the regiments of volunteers which were present with our Army in Cuba had to be withdrawn from the firing line on account of obsolete firearms with which they were armed, while the field artillery was subject to the same disadvantage.

It is safe to say that with an army of 75,000 properly equipped at the time of declaration of war, peace could have been secured without requiring a single volunteer to leave the country, and thus the necessity of the enormous volunteer army and the expense and inconvenience incident to its organization could have been avoided.

E. World War I

The United States entered the First World War unprepared militarily and psychologically for the conflict. President Wilson, in 1916,

was reelected on the slogan, "He kept us out of war." However, for the first time in our history the National Government adopted selective-service system that provided the millions of men who were shipped to Europe.

When we entered the war our Regular Army and Air Force were relatively negligible. At the outbreak of the war we had only 55 serviceable airplanes, of which 51 were obsolete and 4 others nearly so. The pressure of events required that our troops be trained abroad, and be supplied with artillery provided by our allies.

As William A. Ganoe says in his History of the United States Army:

Even considering the difficulties of transporting overseas, it is conceded that we could have been a great factor in stemming the German tide sooner, and could have saved thousands of lives and dollars lost during our delay for training purposes, had we as a nation been imbued with discipline and knowledge in the beginning. To cap all, the selective service revealed that almost half of 'the young manhood of our country was either defective or unfit for fighting. Had a large percentage of our youth had the opportunity for the development best accorded in military camps, and had such exercises been carried on for limited periods before the war, no one can doubt that this appalling figure would have been materially reduced. And in the meantime the boy would have become more commercially efficient, and a more self-reliant citizen.

F. The Present War

In the 23 years between the armistice of 1918 and the attack at Pearl Harbor, the Nation forgot all the lessons of the past. We scrapped our battleship program. We placed our trust in pacts and allowed our military establishments to dwindle.

Even when the war clouds began to gather, we made no move to make adequate preparations for the storm.

In spite of the pleas and warnings of our military leaders, we believed that we could preserve a neutral position.

We paid for this lack of policy in the humilitation of Bataan and the loss of Wake and Guam.

In this report to the Secretary of War in January 1944, Gen. H. H. Arnold, commanding general of the Air Forces, said:

December 7, 1941, found the Army Air Forces equipped with plans but not with planes. When the Japanese struck, our combat aircraft strength was little better than a corporal's guard of some 3,000 planes; of these, only 1,157 were actually suited to combat service.

We had 159 four-engined bombers. At the various bases outside of the United States, we had only 61 heavy, 157 medium, and 59 light bombers, plus 636 fightersa total of 913 combat planes. These were apportioned among Alaska, Hawaii, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Panama, Trinidad, Newfoundland, Iceland, Greenland, the Virgin Islands, British Guiana, and the Windward Islands.

Of our total 1,157 combat planes, 526 were strategically located to meet possible attacks on the Hawaiian and Philippine Islands. Within a few hours that number was reduced to 176.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POSTWAR POLICY

In the light of our past mistakes, this society recommends as the base of our postwar policy the institution of universal military training of our youth.

The reasons for this recommendation may be enumerated as follows: 1. We have no reason to assume that in the next war, if it comes, we shall be again allowed to arm ourselves after hostilities open.