fore, the final recommendation of the AVC that, if the plan be adopted, appropriations be sufficient to operate it in an effective manner and in accordance with the best traditions of the American people.

Chairman WOODRUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Bolte.

Are there any questions by members of the committee?

Mr. Allen.

Mr. ALLEN. How long have you been with the American Veterans' Committee?

Mr. BOLTE. I took it up, sir, as full-time work last fall.

Mr. ALLEN. When was it organized?

Mr. BOLTE. That is when it actually began to organize. It is simply a committee of men who met to lay the foundation for a new veterans' organization.

Mr. ALLEN. How many members have you?

Mr. BOLTE. The men who are engaged in organizing now number something over 3,000 in the committee.

Mr. ALLEN. Where are your headquarters, in Chicago, Ill., Wisconsin, or Indiana?

Mr. BOLTE. We have a chapter in Chicago itself.

Mr. ALLEN. How many chapters in there do you have?

Mr. BOLTE. One in South Bend, and I think that is all.
Mr. ALLEN. Where is your present residence?

Mr. BOLTE. New York City.

Mr. ALLEN. On page 1 you have mentioned here that as a result of the regulations issued by the War Department relating to the polling of troops, and so forth, and we have just heard a letter read from a sergeant in the armed services. I was under the impression that men in the armed services were not permitted by the War Department to write to Members of Congress stating their opinion with regard to congressional acts.

Mr. BOLTE. I was a little curious when Mr. Woodrum read the letter, as a matter of fact.

Chairman WoODRUM. I hope I have not gotten someone courtmartialed or anything like that. If we have, we will pass a law against it. There should not be a rule that a private could not write a letter to a Congressman when a general can come in to see him. I would like to say for the record, we have a great many letters from members of the armed services who have written to us about this program. A very few opposed it. An overwhelming percentage have been favorable to it.

If that is not in accordance with the service regulations, I do not know about that.

Mr. BOLTE. Our situation has been, sir, that owing to that regulation we felt a little bit embarrassed at the thought of sending out a straight questionnaire. What we have done is simply to raise the issue in our bulletin which goes to members, both overseas and at home, and a good many members have written in to us on the basis of the bulletin articles and some letters we have published.

It is on that basis and the discussions of our chapter back here we have drawn up this report.

Chairman WOODRUM. Mr. Allen, if it does not interrupt you while we are on this, let me say this letter written by a soldier was in re

sponse to an article which appeared in the Stars and Stripes, which is quoted at the bottom of the mimeographed letter which was circulated.

This article states:

The House Committee on Postwar Military Policy, which recently announced public hearings June 4 on proposals for peacetime compulsory military training, has received more than 6,000 letters and petitions urging defeat of any such legislation, a committee member said today.

Half of the communications emphasized that servicemen should have a voice in the issue. Approximately 100 letters favored a peacetime draft, the spokesman said.

That is what prompted that letter, and we have received some other letters. Excuse me for interrupting.

Mr. ALLEN. It may clear the record to note that this writer was addressing a letter to the Stars and Stripes and he was not addressing a Congressman.

Chairman WOODRUM. That is right.

Mr. ALLEN. On page 4 of your statement you say you believe training should be for one continuous year. Why did you pick out 1 year? Mr. BOLTE. From our own experience in training, sir, we found that a year was about the minimum necessary to turn out a combat soldier with the utmost proficiency.

Mr. ALLEN. Who is "we"?

Mr. BOLTE. The members of the organization. In some cases during the war emergency it has been necessary to send men into combat before they have had the full year and under intensive training it is possible to have that kind of speed-up, but for normal peacetime training we found that a year was about the time required to turn out a good soldier, so more than a year does not seem necessary.

Mr. ALLEN. Then, of course, you disagree with many high-ranking Army and Navy officers, because every week articles in newspapers tell where boys have been killed in Germany after 4 or 5 months training in this country.

I contacted the Army and Navy and I was assured, even though they had only 4 or 5 months' training, they were adequately prepared, but you say if they were sent across at the end of 4 or 5 months they were not adequately prepared?

Mr. BOLTE. As I said in my statement, in a war emergency that period of intensive training does prove enough.

Mr. ALLEN. Actually, when they are going to the front 4 or 5 months is sufficient, but in peacetimes it would require a year? Mr. BOLTE. I would think so; yes.

Chairman WOODRUM. Mr. Andrews, do you have any questions?

Mr. ANDREWS. I assume, Mr. Bolte, you would not look with favor upon the suggestion that after the conclusion of the period of universal military training, a man might serve in the National Guard and thereby discharge his entire obligation in a shorter time?

Mr. BOLTE. You mean instead of staying in for a year and then not being subject to further call?

Mr. ANDREWS. If he did not go into the National Guard, he might be subject to call for 5 or 6 years. There has been some discussion of the possibility of allowing him to discharge his obligation in a shorter time by serving 3 years in the Naval Reserve or National Guard.

Mr. BOLTE. It seems to me the point of the plan is to produce a reserve capable of fighting a war, if necessary, and for that reason I should think anyone who served in it should be subject to call for any period Congress decided upon so he would be useful in the emergency is the whole point of the plan as I understand it.

Chairman WOODRUM. Mr. Kearney.

Mr. KEARNEY. Mr. Bolte, on page 4 you make this statement that

Universal military training should be for training only. Trainees should not be an integral part of the armed services; neither should they be available for combat or any operational requirements which may arise in peace.

I do not quite clearly understand that and I wish you would explain. Mr. BOLTE. I will be glad to if I can. The thought we had there was during the year the men were in training they would not be called upon, for instance, for any policing jobs or occupational jobs which might fall to the Army and that, for instance, if the United Nations Security Council asked for a quota of United Nations troops to put down a threatened aggression in some part of the world, that quota would be supplied by the permanent army personnel rather than by the men in training.

Mr. KEARNEY. You mean by permanent army personnel those men in the services now?

Mr. BOLTE. No, not now; the men in the Regular Army, the professional army.

Mr. ALLEN. I take it, Mr. Bolte, that you are in sympathy with our world cooperation?

Mr. BOLTE. Very much so, yes, sir.

Mr. ALLEN. In other words, you believe in Dumbarton Oaks and, of course, the plan to have a police force police the world against aggressor nations?

Mr. BOLTE. As set forth in the Dumbarton Oaks plan, our membership approves that very strongly.

Mr. ALLEN. Coming back to the peacetime military training, I take it you do not have much confidence that that will be successful and that the police force against all aggressors will be effective; is that true?

Mr. BOLTE. No, sir; it is not. To go back to the statement again, we said that this United Nations striking force should become the main deterrent to wars of aggression.

That is the thing we feel should be used and should be instrumental for preventing wars in the future. However, as we went on to say, we do recognize the possibility that in some way cooperation among the United Nations may break down on any number of levels-economic, social, or military.

In that case, if it does break down, we feel that it would be wise for us to be prepared.

Mr. ALLEN. Then you were not very positive that it would not break down; is that true?

Mr. BOLTE. Well, I would not care to bet on very long odds. I have every hope that it will succeed, but, with the world in its present state, we think it is the smart thing to be ready for any eventuality.

Mr. ALLEN. The peculiar part about it is that the ones who have more sympathy with this and the sponsors of this world organization are, in my opinion, and in my experience, the ones who are coming in

now for this compulsory military training bill. They are the sponsors, the ones who are for the world police force are now the ones who are coming forth and sponsoring that in the event it fails. Is that correct? Mr. VINSON. They do not want to put all their eggs into one basket.

Mr. BOLTE. I think that is it in a nutshell. I think all people must face the fact with the world in its present state a lot of our future difficulties may have to be settled by force in case economic and social collaboration breaks down, and if the force of the United Nations breaks down, we feel we have to be strong enough to prevent wars ourselves.

The idea, as I understand it, is to have the courage to fight small wars, if necessary, so that you do not have to fight big ones. That is what we are interested in.

Mr. ALLEN. In the beginning we had the Fulbright resolution and Bretton Woods, but at that time I was not so enthusiastic about world cooperation, but I believe now I have more confidence in it than some who were out openly for world cooperation.

Chairman WOODRUM. Mr. Bolte, we do not want to get too much in detail in this particular hearing. We appreciate your comment. We are more concerned with the broad over-all policy of whether there should be a system, subsequently to be decided upon in detail.

We are very glad to have your statement and glad you came down. Mr. BOLTE. Thank you very much, sir.

Chairman WoODRUM. The committee is glad to have present the very distinguished commentator, George Fielding Eliot.

Major Eliot, will you feel free to speak to us?

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEORGE FIELDING ELIOT, COMMENTATOR, COLUMBIA BROADCASTING CO.

Major ELIOT. My only excuse for being here, gentlemen, is because I have for a good many years been studying the military and foreign policies of the United States, and I have come to the very definite conclusion that for the future, as far as it can be foreseen, this country has to be a strong military power, both as a support to whatever peace organization we may eventually join after the proper constitutional action has been taken on the proposals now being made at San Francisco and such subsequent proposals as may follow and also as a form. of reinsurance in case the international system that we are now endeavoring to set up should not prove a successful means of supporting international security and our own security.

I think a part of such a program for a strong America has to be training for our young men. We have seen the growth in speed and range and destructive power of the weapons of war.

We came to the end of the last war with air power just in its infancy. We have seen how air power has developed since. We are coming to the end of this war with such weapons as guided missiles and jet-propelled airplanes and the use of air-borne troops just being developed.

A scientist to whom I was talking the other day said there was no reason beyond the necessity for a little research and a little experiment and improvement in present methods why anybody could not

prepare at any place in the world a rocket which could be fired with reasonable accuracly against any spot on the face of the earth.

We know what has been done in the way of moving armies by air. Coming down from New York on the train last Thursday, I talked with a young officer who said, "Sunday, when I was in Cairo," with perfect nonchalance. That is the sort of world we are living in and it is the world in which the time limit on which this country has previously depended as a part of its security, as a part of its military defense, has disappeared.

We have fought two wars in this century in which we had plenty of time to prepare because the wars began elsewhere and we had allies who held the ring while we got ready. I think that many Americans are influenced by what they learned about history in their schoolbooks; that we came over to this country to avoid the turmoil and difficulties of the Old World and over here we found security and the ability to live our own lives without being menaced by people just across the border.

We have come to think of ourselves as being more or less detached and safe, but we are no longer detached and safe. We can no longer count on a long period of time in which to prepare this Nation for any emergency that may come upon us.

Part of that necessary preparation is the training of young men in handling the infinitely complex weapons and equipment of war, not only rifles and bayonets and so on, but the tremendously varient mechanisms which make up the equipment of modern fighting forces.

I do not think we need to overemphasize the use this training will be in civilian life because I do not think this program con be justified except as a part of the military policy of the United States.

Its educational and physical benefits, it seems to me, can be better obtained by other means if those are our objectives, but they are not our objectives. Our objective in putting forward such a program as this is the national security. I do not think we can go beyond that in considering it.

When you come to consider the position which the United States will occupy in an association of nations such as is now in course of consideration at San Francisco, you come inevitably to the realization that it requires strength, apparent strength.

Military power is clearly apparent to all. A weak and unready United States could not be the influence for good and the influence for right and justice within such an organization which a strong and ready and determined United States could be.

That may be unfortunate. We may not like the moral implications of that point of view, but all history arises to attest to its truth. The fact of the matter is that we are building at San Francisco not a democratic world state but a perpetuation of a military alliance by the victory nations into an alliance for the purpose of preserving the fruit of their victory, that is, their security against such attacks as those which Germany and Japan launched upon the world and which we entered into in this alliance in order to defeat under the pressure of necessity.

That being the case, it is obvious that in a partnership of victorious states to preserve the common security of all of them, in a world where it is the interest of every peace-loving people-I do not like that phrase,