In addition to the Regular Army component, the War Department plan contemplates the retention of our two reserve components of the Army provided for in the National Defense Act-the National Guard and the Organized Reserves.

The National Guard has performed and should continue to perform the dual function as (1) the instrument of security for individual States in time of peace, and (2) as an instrument of security for the whole Nation in time of war. It is our first line of reserve in an emergency and it has again demonstrated its worth in the present war. The Chief of Staff, United States Army, in accordance with the provisions of section 5 of the National Defense Act, has appointed a General Staff Committee consisting of an equal number of members of National Guard and Regular Army to develop policies for the postwar National Guard. As a result of the recommendations of the committee, the War Department has approved a mission for the National Guard for recommendation to the Congress. This mission is to strengthen and improve the National Guard so as to make it capable of immediate expansion to war strength fully able to furnish units trained and equipped, fit for service anywhere in the world. In time of war when called into national service, the National Guard should be able to defend the critical areas of the United States from land, sea, or air attacks and assist in covering the mobilization and concentration of other Reserve forces.

This is a high aim and will require the maintenance of higher standards than have ever before been imposed upon the National Guard. The War Department, however, believes it necessary and possible of accomplishment. It can be accomplished if we have universal militray training, since the National Guard will then be in a position to recruit volunteers from among the young men of the Nation who have completed their year of training under a universal military training system.

As in the case of the National Guard, so in the case of the Organized Reserve, the Chief of Staff has appointed a General Staff Committee under the provisions of section 5 of the National Defense Act consisting of Reserve officers and Regular Army officers whose duty it is to develop policies for the future of the Organized Reserve component.

The Chief of Staff has recently approved for planning purposes a mission for the Organized Reserve. This mission, like that for the National Guard, is based upon the premise that universal military training will be enacted into law. This mission contemplates an Active and Inactive Reserve. The Active Reserve will be capable of furnishing in the event of an emergency units effectively organized and trained in time of peace for rapid mobilization, expansion, and deployment. The Inactive Reserve will provide a reservoir of individuals with military experience for assignment as needed to positions for which their capabilities and experience fit them.

Reserve officers provided for in the National Defense Act would not only be used to furnish the great majority of the officers of the Organized Reserve units, but would also largely assist in the very important function of training the young men undergoing universal military training. The Reserve officers themselves would be greatly benefited by receiving training in command, which they had very little opportunity to do from 1920 to 1940. Since the most important duty of

our Reserve officers at the time of a general mobilization is the training of citizen soldiers, such training would contribute much to the efficiency of the over-all military establishment.

The plans also contemplate that the type of units which will be organized in the National Guard and Reserve components will be such that, together with the regular forces, they will constitute balanced forces for the Army of the United States; that is, forces containing the proper proportions of all the types of units needed in a modern

army.

May I reiterate that the War Department firmly believes that the missions outlined for the Reserve components of our Army are attainable only if we have universal military training. Thorough study shows that only in this way can the opportunity be provided to utilize to the fullest extent possible the capabilities of our Reserve components under the National Defense Act in developing an effective protective force for national security.

Several times I have referred to the importance of universal military training in relation to the plans for our postwar military organization. At this juncture I believe it is appropriate to discuss briefly what sort of universal military training we believe to be best and how it is planned to use its product.

The system of induction should be simple and not time consuming. and the functions of registration, examination, and selection of trainees should be performed by a civilian agency and not by the Army. They would not come under Army control until they arrived at an Army reception center.

It is the view of the War Department, based on experience, that universal military training should be for one continuous year in order that the training be effective and complete, so that it will be as economical as possible, and create the minimum disruption of the civilian trainee's career. Experience has further demonstrated that the maximum advantage will be obtained from training given between the ages of 17 and 20 years. This age bracket would also fit in most readily with a young man's normal civilian career. Moreover, there should be enough flexibility to prevent undue interference with an individual's educational program. For instance, let us say that it is the view of the Congress that a boy normally commence his training at age 18. Some young men may finish high school at 17. Then he should be allowed to enter the training program before he arrives at age 18, provided he has the consent of his parents. It is not intended, however, that the high-school education of a boy who has not completed high school by age 18 should be interrupted; such young man should have his military training deferred until he finishes high school, but he should enter military training prior to reaching the age of 20 years.

It is deemed highly desirable that trainees be inducted on a quarterly basis with the view to making the most economical use of all facilities and trainer personnel employed in connection with the training

program.

From a planning standpoint, the War Department wants to make it crystal clear to this committee that it does not recommend or desire that trainees be inducted into the Army for military service. They should be inducted into training organizations for training purposes only. When the year of training is completed it is recommended that

graduate trainees become members of the Enlisted Reserve Corps of the Army for a period of 5 years, but during that time they are not to be subject to any further compulsory training or service except in the event of a national emergency declared by the Congress.

The War Department also recommends that men should be allowed to receive training in the branch of their choice, insofar as quota limitations permit. Furthermore, those who so desire should be given every opportunity possible to qualify as Reserve officers when they demonstrate outstanding capacity for leadership and successfully complete their year of training.

The machinery through which these Reserve officers would be obtained would be the ROTC and officer candidate schools. A greatly enlarged ROTC would be necessary, and the caliber of instruction should be raised materially from that given in the past, since each student would have had a year of universal military training. Of course, many boys cannot go to college, and many may attend institutions which have no ROTC; for such of these as were qualified, officer candidate schools would be conducted. The material covered in ROTC and in OCS would be similar and would be calculated to give the young man the basic military foundation to be an officer.

Another opportunity should be offered the graduates of universal military training; that is, give opportunities to obtain commissions. in the Regular Army. Following the past practice of not limiting our supply of Regular Army officers to West Point graduates, Reserve officers who attain their commissions, either through ROTC or an OCS system, should be permitted to accept active duty and be eligible for selection as Regular officers. Rather than commissioning peoplein the Regular Army directly from the Regular Army enlisted ranks, it would be desirable for Regular Army enlisted men to attend the same OCS and receive Reserve commissions and be eligible for active duty and selection as Regular officers on the same basis as other young Reserve officers. Furthermore, it is suggested for the consideration of the Congress that the young men who receive appointments as cadets at the United States Military Academy under the methods prescribed by law, should be selected only from the young men of the country who have completed their year of training, and who have demonstrated adequate ability and leadership qualities.

If such a system is provided, the War Department contemplates that there will be a considerable number of graduate trainees who will volunteer for additional training and that those persons will become reserve officers, key noncommissioned officers, or specialists.

Graduate trainees who volunteer for such further training may be placed in Organized Reserve units. Thus, in time of emergency there would exist an appreciable number of units with trained cadres which could be quickly mobilized and expanded. We accomplished this in part between 1918 and 1940 by having organized units in the Reserve. Unfortunately, they consisted only of officers since we had no universal military training program under which to provide the enlisted men. The effectiveness of these reserve officers during the present warand there are 186,000 of them in the Army today-would have been greatly enhanced if we could have had the units to which they belonged at the time of mobilization at least partly organized with key enlisted personnel. Graduate trainees who are not members of Or

ganized Reserve units will be in a reservoir status, so that in time of emergency they can be mobilized quickly and assigned to units where their skills can be most advantageously employed.

In order to illustrate graphically the flow of personnel through such a system as I have described to their ultimate integration in the armed forces, four charts have been prepared and are appended to my state

ment.

Of course, in order to put our system of personnel mobilization and industrial mobilization into operation in time to be effective, it is necessary to keep informed on what other nations can do with their military organizations and with the weapons they have developed. This knowledge should include accurate information of their armed forces, their industrial potential for war production, their economic and manpower resources, the political and social influences which might lead them to war, and other factors affecting their war-making

power.

Let us turn now to the next cause for delay in the mobilization for World War II; the industrial side of the picture. We must assume that any plan drawn up with respect to industrial mobilization must be adaptable to meet the demands of a future war whenever and wherever it may be. It must remedy the deficiencies we have encountered in this war and must be made with the thought in mind that any future enemies will try to destroy us industrially at the outset of another war.

In other words, we must have available at all times a workable. blueprint for the immediate utilization of our vast industrial resources for the prompt production of the necessary munitions of war. This plan must be keyed to our peacetime programs for research and development in the field of new weapons and equipment and must be paralleled by an adequate program for the provision of critical and strategic materials not normally available in sufficient quantities at the outbreak of the war, but necessary for the manufacture of munitions.

At the present time we are studying some of the many aspects of such an industrial mobilization plan. Illustrative of the type of studies to which I have referred which are now being conducted

are:

1. Lessons learned in industrial mobilization for World War II. 2. Our experience in maintaining adequate production during the

war.

3. Studies of laws of both permanent and temporary character enacted by the Congress to authorize and facilitate war production and to finance and control manpower, materials, and facilities.

Plans are being drawn for the improvement and modernization of our present arsenal system by the transfer of machine tools and production equipment owned by the War Department but not in use by private industry.

Likewise, the War Department is giving serious consideration to manufacturing plants built and owned by the Government so that it may be in a position to advise the Congress as to which of these plants should be integrated into our permanent arsenal system and how others may be disposed of so as to assure their availability for munition manufacture in the event of a future war.

As a corollary to a plan for industrial mobilization there is need for an adequate system of research and development, without which our industrial plan would have little merit. As we visualize it in the War Department the best scientific brains in the country must remain available in peacetime for the development and improvement of new weapons and equipment. Since this important aspect of our plans has already been presented in detail in previous hearings held by this committee, I will not elaborate on it.

I have outlined for you the plans for the postwar Army. Each of the four fundamentals around which our plans are built is aimed at the one great problem-how to effect the mobilization of our potential military strength in the shortest possible time.

In conclusion, may I emphasize again that we believe universal military training is the most effective mechanism which will insure our ability to mobilize our citizen soldiers, trained and equipped to fight, in time to meet a threat to our security.

(The four charts submitted by General Tompkins are as follows:)