STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL AUBREY W. FITCH, UNITED STATES NAVY, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (AIR) Admiral FITCH. The question of whether or not the United States is to have universal military training in peacetime is obviously a matter of broad national policy and as such not one to be decided by the military forces. But the effects of this decision upon the military readiness of this country in case of war or emergency are profound. Therefore it appears to me proper and essential that the Congress and the people understand clearly the military benefits to be gained by its adoption and the military hazards which will result from failure to provide such training. I shall attempt briefly to outline these points particularly as they will affect the special portion of the armed forces for which I am responsible-that is, naval aviation. It is not for me to predict or discuss the probability of this country engaging in another war. The responsibility of the armed services is such that we must proceed at all times on the assumption that war is possible. On this assumption, I must make it very clear that only by a large standing military force or by some form of universay military training does it appear practicable to provide reasonable assurance of the future military security of this country. To anyone who has studied the science of war, or indeed to anyone of our generation who has lived through two great wars with any intelligent observation, the vital importance of time in war is axiomatic. The tragic cost of "too little, too late" is a matter of such historical frequency as to have become almost trite. Twice in 25 years this country has become involved in a major war while unprepared to wage such war. Each time we have been fortunate in being granted time to good our deficiencies. In each war, events have proven the need for that time of preparation. In 1917-18 it required nearly 18 months before we were ready to bring effective forces to bear against the enemy. Even then it was necessary to use many only partially trained men, at a tragically unnecessary cost of their lives. In the present war, it was nearly a full 18 months after Pearl Harbor before we were able to strike the first effective blow against the enemy; and during that year, had Germany not been fully occupied against our allies, we should have been hard pressed to defend this country. In both of these crises-in 1917 and 1942-adequate numbers of men-men by the millions-were immediately available. The American people have never hung back from military service once war is declared. After Pearl Harbor the Navy could have enlisted overnight more than sufficient men to man every ship and plane. But modern war is a complex business, conducted with unbelievably complicated equipment. There is scarcely a task in all the great military machine, either ashore, afloat, or in the air, which does not require special technical training. This is probably especially true in the field of naval aviation. The most patriotic and eager volunteer, without such training, is helpless to defend his country. And such training takes time. It takes more and more time as war becomes more and more complex. Since 1941 the Naval Air Technical Training Command, whose task is to train all of the nonflying personnel required to support our Naval Air Forces, has trained over 300,000 men for these intricate duties. These men have required an average of about 11 months each in the naval service before they attained the minimum skills necessary to be useful to the modern fighting forcewhich is naval aviation-before they were able to perform such tasks as operating radar equipment, servicing the great powerful engines of our fighting planes, overhauling and preparing intricate torpedoes and guns, and the hundreds of other similar tasks all necessary to a modern fighting machine. Building up this force of trained men is a task which had to be done before we were ready to conduct the war necessary for the security of the United States. Even under the stress of emergency it was a heartbreakingly slow task. At the end of 1941 there were 15,500 skilled aviation ratings in the Navy. A year later there were 62,000. It was not until the end of 1943, after two long years of war, that we had trained 143,000 and were approaching the minimum number required to support our naval air tasks. Thank God, gentlemen, time was granted us to carry on this training. Can we be sure, if another such emergency should arise, that time again will be available? If, in 1941, there had been available to us not millions of untrained recruits but equal numbers of men who had undergone at least basic training in the military skills necessary to defend their country, the situation would have been far different. If, under these circumstances, we had been forced to go to war, there can be little doubt in the mind of any reasonable man that we could have brought our great force to bear far sooner, that the war would have been greatly shortened, and there would have been an incalculable saving of lives and suffering. I have noted in the press from time to time the recurrence of a dangerous fallacy as to the trend of modern war. This is that since war is becoming more and more a matter of machines rather than masses of men, future wars may be fought by small corps of technicians controlling vast destructive machines. Our experience is quite the contrary. As the machinery of war increases in destructiveness, it also increases in complexity. This complexity results in tremendous problems of maintenance and supply and training, all of which in turn require increased manpower. This war has demanded a military force of this country approximately three times as great as the last war. For the first time in its history this country has felt the real pinch of demands on its manpower. There is nothing in the trend of military development which indicates that, if the United States ever engages in another great war, the manpower needs of the military forces will not be greater still. Another dangerous fallacy which is sometimes expressed is that because the average young American possesses more inherent mechanical skill and aptitude than his contemporaries in most other nations, these skills may be rapidly adapted to military needs in wartime with minimum of training. It is true that we are blessed with a national mechanical aptitude and this is a great factor in our potential military strength. But military strength for modern war is only partially made up of the armed forces. The industrial power and capacity of the Nation is as vital an element as the strength of the Army or Navy. The finest armed force is built on a foundation of sand unless this industrial capacity is strong to support and supply it. Therefore in time of war the skilled technicians of industry are most needed in their industrial capacity and cannot be made available for service in the armed forces without weakening the vital industrial organization. I could mention and might make a very good case for the value to the individual young man in his future civilian pursuits of the technical training and craftsmanship which he would be taught under military training. But it seems to me that this tends to confuse the issue. It is desirable that the trainee should benefit from the proposed training; but the essential point is the need-the urgent need-for such training because in no other way can the military readiness and security of the United States be insured during the uncertain years ahead. From the military point of view, gentlemen, the question is as simple as A B C: (A) If the United States should ever again be forced to fight a major war, the armed forces will require millions of trained men. (B) To train men requires time, and until the men are trained, the United States is not militarily secure. (C) Unless it can be guaranteed that this country will not again be forced to war, or being forced to war will be granted time for training, we must insure adequate peacetime training. This essential and vital peacetime training can only be properly assured by the institution of universal military training. Chairman WOODRUM. Thank you very much, Admiral. Now, Admiral, how long have you been ashore in the Naval Operations? Admiral FITCH. Just 1 year, sir. I came ashore a year ago last May, from Guadalcanal. Chairman WOODRUM. You have been out in the present conflict? Admiral FITCH. I have been out 4 years, sir. I was a year and a few months before the war began. I went out in May 1940, and came back in May 1944. Chairman WOODRUM. The Atlantic, or Pacific, or both? Admiral FITCH. I was in the Pacific the whole time. Chairman WOODRUM. Mr. Bates. Mr. BATES. What ships were you in command of, in the Pacific? Admiral FITCH. I was in the battle of the Coral Sea. The Lexington was my flagship, and then, after that, I had another task force, Eleven, and still another task force, and then, when the situation developed in the South Pacific, I was sent there in command of the Allied Air Forces, consisting of the air forces of our own Army, Navy, Marine, and of New Zealand; and I remained there as second in command to Admiral Halsey until May of last year. Chairman WOODRUM. Thank you very much, Admiral. We appreciate your coming. Vice Admiral Randall Jacobs, U. S. Navy, Chief of Naval Personnel, is our next witness. Admiral JACOBS. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen. STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL RANDALL JACOBS, UNITED STATES Admiral JACOBS. The Navy witnesses who have preceded me have told, and those who follow me will tell you, that, in the judgment of the Navy Department, we cannot have a national defense provid ing a reasonable degree of national security unless it includes a universal military training program. You have been and will be told. that henceforth the means must exist to expand the peacetime Regular Navy to effective wartime strength with a speed equaling the speed of modern warfare; that such an expansion is possible only through the maintenance of a large reservoir of reserve manpower trained in time of peace and ready for immediate mobilization and service in time of war; and, finally, that the only practicable way of maintaining the required reservoir is a program of universal military training. My testimony is intended to particularize the general content of a universal military training program which the Navy believes will produce proficient fighting men under an equitable and democratic system. Before commencing this, however, I want to impress upon you the enormous size of the trained reserve it is considered imperative to maintain. I have here a chart which portrays this graphically. The chart is attached to the back of my prepared statement. The peacetime Navy is shown in the left-hand column with an enlisted strength of 500,000. This figure is purely illustrative and is assumed merely to give a graphic portrayal of our personnel problems. The actual strength of the postwar naval establishment must be decided by the studies now being made and by the future course of world events. You will note that the wartime Navy shown in the right-hand column is almost four times as large as the peacetime Navy, about 1,800,000. This figure is not necessarily the total wartime Navy, which may be much larger. On December 31, 1944, the Navy, exclusive of Marines and Coast Guard, consisted of 300,101 officers and 2,817,652 enlisted personnel. This right-hand column showing a personnel requirement of 1,800,000 is merely effective war strength. That is an estimate of the number of men required to man the naval establishment within the first year of another war. In other words, 1,800,000 men will be required to man the naval vessels it is planned to retain at the end of this war in active, training, and reserve status and to man the naval air force and shore stations required to support the fleets. The center column in this chart is the additional personnel necessary to effect the transition from peace to war. Translated into numbers it aggregates about 1,300,000 and is slightly less than 300 percent greater than the size of the proposed Regular Navy. I will explain the legend of the chart in more detail so that you may see how the additional personnel would be utilized. As I have said, the peacetime Navy is shown in the column at the left of the chart. The solid color at the bottom portrays the active fleets and their air arm, the diagonal hatching represents the training fleets and the cross hatching the ships in reserve, and the building at the top represents the peacetime shore establishments. The addition of the personnel in the center column is required to expand the peacetime. Navy into the wartime Navy. The personnel indicated by the diagonal and cross hatching man the ships composing the training fleets and the fleets in reserve and merge into the active fleets and air arm of the wartime Navy. The shore establishment personnel in the center column expands the peacetime shore establishment into the war time shore establishment. The transition is completed by the addition of the personnel in the center column represented by the vertical hatching. These are the armed guard personnel for merchant ships, unnecessary in the peacetime Navy, but vital to the wartime. Navy. I have shown you this chart to emphasize the size of the reserve required to expand the peacetime Navy to effective war strength quickly. Fortunately for us, the enormous population potential of this country renders the procurement of this number of men a minor problem. Between 800,000 and 900,000 physically fit young men attain the age of 18 each year. However, if the expansion is to be accomplished with the requisite degree of speed, the members of this reserve must be capable of performing their naval duties with little. additional training. Our experience in this war has taught us precisely the requirements needed to accomplish this. Our present conclusions upon the subject of naval training have successfully stood the test of battle. Our recommendations concerning the elements essential to a worthwhile universal military training program are based upon those conclusions. It is our belief that the two most important ingredients in a naval training program are the length of training and the age for training. Accordingly, I will discuss these point's first and then the other factors we feel should be included in a universal military training program consonant with our democratic tradition. TRAINING NOT CONSCRIPTION However, before embarking on this discussion, I want to make one point with all the clarity and all emphasis at my command: We are proposing training not conscription. These two words are not synonymous as some opponents of this legislation appear to believe. Conscription is compulsory military service. It is the undemocratic method by which many foreign countries maintain large standing armed services in time of peace. Our proposal is radically different. Under it, men would, in time of peace, be trained by the armed services but would not be called upon for service. During the period of training, they could not be used for any operation requirements of the peacetime Navy. They would be trained at training schools and training fleets set aside for that particular purpose. We believe that trainees should be available for service only if the Congress declares the existence of a National emergency. LENGTH OF TRAINING Perhaps the most important single factor in a universal military training program is the length of the training period. The product of this training must be a competent man-of-war's man. Unless the program attains this, it would be as dangerous to our future security as was the Maginot line to the security of France. It would lead to the same false reliance on the national defense. To produce proficient reservists the period of training must cover 1 continuous year. If a shorter period would suffice the Navy would recommend it. It is true we could teach men to pass powder in less time than a year. However, a modern fighting ship is a collection of intricate |