to sit in with them as silent observers. The Governor caught the spirit of my request, and arranged for the entertainment. At eightthirty the following evening, he and a number of his officials called for us (Lord Bryce, Doctors Bliss and Hoskins, Messrs. Peet, Schmavonian, and myself), and led us through the winding darkness of the streets of a real Arabian town. The Chief of Police and three of his assistants headed our procession. Each was carrying a table lamp instead of the ordinary lantern. Then I followed, with the Governor of Nabulus on one side, and Viscount Bryce on the other, and behind us, the rest of our party, Mahmoud Tewfik Hamid, the recently elected Deputy of the District, and other prominent Arabs. As we walked through the dark, narrow, little streets bending in every direction, we saw here and there a shoemaker at his work, and a few fruit shops still tempting the few passers-by with their wares. The air we breathed was laden with a pleasing Oriental aroma. At last, we unexpectedly found ourselves in a large square courtyard, in the centre of which was a fountain playing. From this courtyard we were ushered into an illuminated room, about thirty feet square and twenty feet high. Marble divans ran around the sides of this room, covered with beautiful rugs. In the centre were numerous lamps of various kinds, and the walls, too, were hung with rugs. On the divans sat, cross-legged, twenty-four of the most prominent Arabs of the city, smoking, drinking coffee, sipping lemonade, and carrying on an animated conversation. Through the guide, a nephew of the Governor, I requested them to continue their discussions, and to disregard our presence. The guide, in the meantime, informed us as to the pedigree and identity of the Arabs present. Doctor Bliss interpreted for me. The Arabs were discussing the expected completion of a railroad line to Nabulus, and the effect it would have upon the exports of soap, which was the principal product of the city. They were pleased to know that they could make up larger packages than could be carried by the camels, which were the only means of transport at the moment, and they were figuring out the economy of this innovation. After concluding their discussion, they turned to us and acted as our hosts. They spoke with great pride of their lineage. They looked indeed, with their intelligent faces and dignified bearing, like men bred of good stock. One of them told me that he had positive evidence at home that his family had lived in Nabulus for more than five hundred years, and another one traced his lineage back to the prophet Mohammed. The scene reminded one of what you would picture to yourself as the scene of one of the "Thousand and One Arabian Nights." Two sons and two nephews of Ismail Agha Nimr, the owner of the house, were continually flitting about, serving cigarettes, syrup, tea, and coffee. Nothing could have been more gracious or hospitable than their manner toward us. Our homeward walk was made under the full moon, and was as picturesque as had been the one earlier in the evening. Unconsciously, I could not keep from expecting some genii to jump out at me from one of the little doors of the native houses. From Tiberias, our route led us to Damascus, where we spent several days exploring this most ancient of cities, and the beautiful surrounding country, and visiting the ruins at Balbek. Thence, we went to Beirut where the Syrian Protestant College is located—one of the finest American institutions in the Near East. Here we visited a very interesting Jewish settlement also. We then journeyed to Mersine, Adena, Tarsus, and Rhodes, returning to Constantinople on May 1st. (The next of Mr. Morgenthau's articles will appear in The WORLD'S WORK for December) ARISTIDE BRIAND, PREMIER OF FRANCE B His Character, His Talents, and His Accomplishments in By T. H. THOMAS RIAND for many years has been one of the most distinguished of French statesmen. Seven times premier, actively concerned with every phase of French politics since 1890, and having taken a leading part in every matter of outstanding importance throughout that time-such a record alone would entitle him to a place amongst the leading men of his generation. But in addition, Briand stands out both by the variety of his talents-orator, politician, legislator, and diplomat and by the remarkable. record he has made in each. It was as an orator that Briand first made his name, and throughout his long career his prestige in this respect has been so great that even to-day the average Frenchman, and the rank and file of politicians as well, think of Briand first and foremost as an orator. In French public life, moreover, effective oratory is not merely an incidental accomplishment, but an absolute necessity in the practical working of the machinery of government. Even routine legislation is not shaped and determined in caucus and committee rooms: the French Parliament likes to feel independent and to assert itself; and even on fundamental issues the whole attitude of the Chamber or Senate may be changed by the course of a single debate. No French Premier has relied more on himself as an orator than Briand, and none has made the turn on so many critical issues by his own skill in single-handed combatin the great offensives of debate in which a Ministry stands or falls. In spite of all explanations that things are different in France, American readers will cling to the impression that oratory is chiefly an ornamental attribute of the politician, that what chiefly counts is the tangible result accomplished in legislation. In this respect, as well, Briand has a distinguished record. In his earlier days he took a great part in the general social legislation with which Millerand's name is particularly associated-laws which amounted to a social reform in France. Although he and the Socialist party no longer see eye to eye, he has never changed his sympathies in this respect. As late as 1919, Briand came forward so vigorously and so insistently in support of the 8 hour day law that Parliament to its surprise was forced to carry through the long deferred bill, instead of passing the buck to the next parliament. Briand from the beginning took an ardent part in the struggle against Clerical-Royalist domination in France, and it fell to him, while yet a young deputy, to draw up the bill for the separation of Church and State, and to take charge of the bill in its passage through parliament. These tasks he carried out in such a way that the various Republican groups, which for years had been split over this issue and working at cross purposes, now all pulled together; and the bill went through with surprising ease and promptness. The bill was so fairly drawn that a majority of French Bishops voted to accept it at the time, and to-day the whole Church in France, and the Vatican as well, bitterly regret that a mistaken judgment led the Church to refuse it. Briand, moreover, never joined in the bitter and rather fanatic anti-Clerical proceedings of the Combes machine: and this year it has fallen to him to close the quarrel by the reëstablishment of diplomatic relations with the Vatican. The Separation Law made Briand's reputation: it was the final triumph of a thirty years' struggle; and constitutes probably the most important and significant single piece of legislation in the history of the Third Republic. In the rather confused period which followed, Briand's chief legislative undertaking was the bill for Electoral Reform-generally summed up under the title Proportional Representation. This was an effort to correct the various log-rolling abuses that had developed in French elections. By playing up local jealousies and keeping alive petty fac tional divisions, and above all by extraordinary acrobatics in swapping votes, skilfully led minorities could keep in the saddle. Parliamentary constituencies were becoming private bailiwicks, devoted to personal political fortunes and exploited by the classic methods of the pork-barrel. By this local manipulation, political machines were able to render general elections well-nigh meaningless from a nation wide viewpoint; and national political parties were kept in a state of chaos. The movement for reform arose in many quarters; and although only one out of many, Briand was one of its most loyal and active supporters. In 1912, he helped Poincaré carry the bill through the Chamber, and the next year as Premier staked the fate of his Ministry on the passage of the bill through the Senate. The issue had now become a struggle between the Radical party organization (the old guard long in control of things) and the country at large. The Senate was a stronghold of the Radicals, and although they were rather afraid of the country on this issue, Clemenceau, fearless as ever, came to their support; they screwed up their courage, and Briand was overthrown. Briand was now left as the champion of the cause of electoral reform. It seemed a lost cause: the 1914 elections were not encouraging, and then the war swept over the political field. But in 1919, when the war was over and the Treaty out of the way, Briand managed to bring the thing forward again. He was not in the Ministry and was practically in opposition; Clemenceau seemed secure in power; he was as hostile to the measure as ever, and opposed it as far as he dared. Parliament, moreover, was on the eve of dissolution; the parties supposedly in power were as hostile as Clemenceau, and fully expected to be able to sidetrack the bill before the elections came. But by his courage in forcing the issue, by his skilful and stubborn tactics, and by playing on the fears of deputies about to go before the country, Briand, to the general astonishment, carried the law through, and won his long struggle for a great legislative issue. A HARMONIZER IN POLITICS logical line of policy. In part, this is a matter of temperament: he is tolerant and patient and instinctively prefers smoothing things over to having a row. But it is also a matter of intellect. Briand has foresight and a broader vision than most political leaders. He can realize that there are two sides to a question, that both, sooner or later, have to be taken into account, and that in the end even a defeated minority must be satisfied rather than left forever struggling and discontented. His method has always been to satisfy as many people as he can, to do only what is possible, and to produce a practical and possible solution rather than a clear cut party victory. All this has brought about most of the difficulties and opposition Briand has had to face; has, in fact, determined the course of his political career; and it is only in the light of this that his career can be understood. Toleration is not a conspicuous trait in the French temperament and is not a part of the game in French politics. To party regulars, Briand is an outsider and a dangerous one; and to professionals of the organization, his notions of moderation and general harmony seem suicide, starvation, and the negation of all things. His first difficulty was with the Socialists, the party in which he made his first entry into politics. In 1885, Socialism in France covered a wide range of persons and ideas. Briand, like Millerand and Jaurès, belonged to the wing known as Reformists, or by its still more expressive name of "Possibilists": men who wished not to produce a general blow up but to improve things by degrees as occasion offered. Practically speaking, the Reformists, translated into American politics, would have been Bull Moose. On these lines all went well for some years, but by degrees the party tightened its organization and began to lay down official views and doctrines for its own members-tying itself up, so to speak, for fear of falling apart. Finally, against its own convictions, the party accepted its defeat by the German Socialists in an international congress: on the issue of coöperation with "bourgeois" parties in government. Already disgusted at the idea of having his political see HE essential trait of Briand's political ideas laid down for him by an organization, TH conciliate, and persuade rather than to go on the warpath and fight it out; to find a middle ground or devise a compromise rather than to drive through to the bitter end a relentlessly idea of a political party taking to the bush and condemning itself to eternal oppositionand placidly allowed himself to be "excluded." He would affirm, probably, that he is still a Socialist in the sense he was then; and he could affirm with perfect truth that it is the Socialist party that has changed. This was a first lesson in the difficulty of reconciling personal convictions with party loyalty and party doctrines-and Briand never allowed the alternative to be forced on him again. His next step ended in a similar contest with bitter-ender partisan spirit, in the application of the Separation Laws. His long struggle with the Radical party arose from his insisting on applying the laws in a tolerant spirit, and trying to reconcile a bitterly divided country. But the Radicals had laid the foundation of their power on the issue of antiClericalism; they wished, not to settle this issue but to keep it alive forever. Decrying Briand as a backslider, they succeded in harassing him into resigning from office-(at the end of his first ministry.) HIS GENERAL STRIKE "COUP" INSTANTLY there was an effort to lead Briand to the opposite extreme. The Conservatives and Clericals, who had been his most determined enemies, now seeing him at odds with the Radicals, tried, somewhat clumsily, to adopt him into their own ranks as a political convert. Briand refused, sensibly enough, to turn Reactionary out of spite, and did not budge; but the contamination of this sudden reactionary favor injured him for a time. Soon after occurred the famous incident of his defeating a general strike by calling under the colors the entire personnel of certain railroads. This feat has always been cited as an example of the iron hand; as a matter of fact it was an example of Briand's extreme adroitness. The threatened strike was bit terly unpopular throughout the country and was accepted without any enthusiasm by the intending strikers themselves. Briand's adroit move gave them an easy opportunity to call all bets off, and allowed the Unions to save their faces and give way. This trifling matter, however, is more responsible than any other one thing for the commonly accepted caricature of Briand as a Red-Radical turned "safe and Conservative." By 1914, therefore, Briand had been dropped by the Socialists; accepted and then cast aside in turn by the Radicals; and unsuccessfully "vamped" by the Conservative Right. With Poincaré and Millerand, he had vainly attempted to gather together the Moderate But Republicans for the elections of 1914. the elections rather left him in the lurch. "Moderation" in French politics was apparently a poor platform, and it seemed as if the ebb-tide of Briand's career had set in. But the war instantly showed that his work had counted-that all these parties which had fought him appreciated his worth and the intelligence of his purpose. He was instantly drafted into service in the first Coalition War Cabinet; and was, in fact, one of its cornerstones. When, after a year's battering, this Cabinet was threatened by dissension, Briand was called upon to take the helm, as the inevitable man for the situation. The great Coalition Ministry he then formed, representing every party and bringing together old opponents of many years' standing, was the justification of Briand's whole record of toleration and fair dealing in the midst of party conflicts. No other man could have brought about so united an effort-and even Briand could not keep it united for more than so long. Again it was the Radicals who flared up in opposition, this time from bitter, relentless hostility to Joffre and his G. H. Q.and again Briand did his best to smooth things out by meeting both sides halfway. Perhaps it would have been better to have stood his ground and fought it out, for by making one concession after another, he had in the end no ground to stand on. The military leaders considered he had abandoned them, and the politicians would not forgive his having resisted them for so long. But Briand had tried to maintain a real coalition, a union of all parties in the struggle; and in such an enterprise, victory, or at least some dividend of success, was necessary. By 1917, Briand was worn out and gave up the struggle. He had carried France through the most critical military period of the war (up to then) and had almost won out. Perhaps if the British Government and the French Parliament could have been persuaded to continue the Somme offensive on through the winter, victory would have been forthcoming. But if Briand had not achieved victory, he had accomplished much. How much, was evident by the tragic contrast that followed. His opponents, who came in under Painlevé, managed almost to lose the war within a few weeks. For the rest of the war, Briand was rather in the background. He came forward again in earnest only at the end of the last Parlia ment, when he put through the bill for electoral reform. Then followed one more chapter in the old story. Briand tried to unite all the Republican parties in the election, but only Republicans—leaving all Reactionaries out of the coalition. Once more his advice was rejected, and again it proved that it would have been wiser to have taken it. In the anxiety to unite the greatest possible vote against the Bolshevizing platform of the Socialists, the pendulum of the election swung much too far to the right. The old "Republican majority" lost control; and there resulted a chamber divided against itself, in which no party and no natural grouping of parties can make up a coherent majority. It is the brunt of this situation which Briand has to meet to-day: in having to carry on a coalition Ministry embracing by necessity nearly all the parties in Parliament -an unnatural and extraodinarily difficult basis of government. He has to face an opposition made up likewise of fragments from all parties, opposite extremes of wholly divergent views, everything from Royalists to extreme Socialists, with nothing in common but the fact that they are against him; and led, curiously enough, by a few followers of Clemenceau, a sort of shock battalion inspired by a fixed, stubborn, personal hostility to Briand. In spite of the general confidence and favor he now enjoys, Briand's task is extraordinarily difficult in itself, quite apart from outside circumstances. The opposition will have no lack of difficulties and disappointments to exploit against him-and the unbalanced and uncertain status of party power in the Chamber, makes it impossible to count with any confidence on even the immediate political future. BRIAND AS DIPLOMAT ORIAND turned to diplomacy late in life from force of circumstances, but it seems to have become by now his favorite "line." When he formed his war-time Ministry, the question of international relations was of dominant importance, and Briand took the Ministry of Foreign Affairs into his own charge. His work there is a large part of the history of the war. He took the initiative and played the leading part in bringing into closer accord and into a common line of action the diplomatic and military policies of the Allied nations, which had been tending more and more to follow each a line of its own. It was Briand who conceived, or at least gave life to, the idea of the single front, and he went far toward realizing it. In 1916, for the first and last time, the Allied armies on all fronts joined in great coördinate attacks, conceived as a united military effort. On the Western Front, Briand brought about the close coöperation between the French and British armies. which made possible the Battle of the Somme; and finally persuaded the British to put Haig under the orders of Nivelle. This advantage was promptly thrown away by Painlevê, but it is fair to remember that a year before the conference at Doullens, Briand had succeeded in establishing the Single Command. Amongst other things, Briand negotiated and carried through the agreements with England in settlement of the very mixed problems and conflicting interests in Asia Minor. Although they antedated the 14 points (in time as in other respects) these agreements did safeguard effectively the interests of France, and Briand set great store by what he had done. Clemenceau abandoned much of all this at the Peace Conference. Briand never forgave him, nor has he ever forgiven Lloyd George for this successful backhander against himself. He seems indeed to have taken this as a lesson for all subsequent dealings with Lloyd George. With the experiences of the war in mind, Briand appreciates better than any one the necessity of maintaining the union between the Allies. But he evidently considers that a common policy involves a certain amount of give and take; and that "union" does not merely mean France trailing in the wake of British commercial policy on the Continent(in Silesia or elsewhere.) IN BRIAND AND THE GERMANS IN REGARD to Germany and reparations, Briand's position is particularly difficult. He has to take into account the exacting and not very practical attitude of one section of French opinion (and has also to depend on this section for part of his majority in parliament). On the opposite flank, he has to stand his ground against the fitful and not altogether altruistic impulses of the British for economic reconciliation with Germany. Quite apart from political and international complications, and purely as a practical matter, it is difficult enough to deal with the vast diffi |