originally to express their sense of the practice of lending on interest. Occurring in the Hebrew Scriptures as an adopted word, that of usury is not its primitive meaning. The barrenness, in certain respects, of a language like the Hebrew, rendered it often necessary to employ words in a figurative sense, and the ingenuity of the Hebrew people made them apt in this practice. It means, to bite. This expression was employed figuratively by the Jews to denote the practice of usury, and the secondary meaning seems to have become, in course of time, to be regarded as its real meaning. The word as employed, then, is very expressive of the light in which lending and borrowing on interest stood in the estimation of the Jews, as well as of the inspired penmen who used the Jewish language. It is plain that nothing noble or disinterested on the part of the lender, nothing profitable or desirable on the part of the borrower, could be considered to attach to a practice so stigmatized; but that, on the contrary, from the very nature of the term employed to denote the practice, it was associated in the minds of God's ancient people, with every mean and disgraceful art, and with every low and dishonorable pursuit. The expression seems to have been used metaphorically much in the same way as a word of similar import is often employed now-a-days; as, for instance, when a person has been circumvented in business by a more cunning and crafty neighbor, he is said, very laconically, to have got a “nip.” We may here state, more as matter of information than of argument, that the Greek word for usury is Toxos, "increase," and that the Latin is Fenus or Foenus, "any increase." These two expressions are applied to denote the increase or interest of money. The idea is evidently derived from animal increase, or the production from a parent of an offspring like itself. In this sense it is used by Aristotle, one of the most thoughtful of the ancients, who declares lending out of money on interest or on usury to be a perversion of it from its proper use to an unnatural purpose, the increase of itself; whence, he adds, "comes the name of interest, as be ing the offspring of a parent like itself." The same form of thought is employed by Shakspeare in the passage where he describes usurers as taking a breed of barren metal."* We have seen, then, that the modern idea to which I have referred— that usury denotes an exorbitant rate of interest or increase, however frequently we may see it dropping from the pens of financial writers and others, or to whatever extent that idea may now be attached to the word, derives no countenance at all from any conclusions which can be drawn from the real meaning of the word as originally used. It is of great interest to endeavor to trace in what manner this fictitious meaning be came attached to it. This modification in its import has evidently originated in a change of view on the whole subject of lending and borrowing on interest; and that change of view, again, has originated in a change of feeling on the subject. Usury is a vice; and in its history we may read the history of the rise and progress of every other vice. Men first look on with abhorrence, * According to the etymology of the Greek and Latin words the principal is supposed to generate the interest.-GIBBON. Fufidius, rich in lands, and large increase He prudently deducts his cent per cent.-HORACE, Satires. ther with indifference, then with complacency, then with love. First to be rated, then patronized; vices once seen black as hell, become established institutions in the world. For long ages, the traffickers in the nefarious system were looked upon by all good Christians as are the basest Shylocks of the present day. It is a matter of importance to trace the outward history of this great change a change of thought which has entirely altered the face of society, and given rise to institutions which are producing the direst effects upon the destinies of the human race. The moral causes of this change I have just stated, but its outward causes are to be found in the history of Bible literature since the Reformation. It is patent to all versed in the religious history of the three past centuries, that a change of opinion as regards the authority of the Old Testament has taken place. Seldom do we find a passage quoted from the Old Testament now-a-days; and, even when quoted, is it not often rather as a quaint illustration than as an authority! Who that has read the writings of the fathers of the Reformation and their immediate successors, has not been struck with their firm conviction and implicit faith in the Old Testament declarations? Then, the two portions of the inspired volume were regarded as one genuine revelation of God, equal in authenticity and equal in authority. Attached to their quotations, we find none of those qualifications-none of those defences-none of those apologies, too often associated with them by modern divines. The language of the New Testament is now regarded as carrying an authority in itself, but not more so than was the language of the Old Testament in the eyes of our forefathers. The causes which have led to this state of things are-the want of some principle to determine what passages in the Old Testament are, and what are not, to be regarded as of authority-the entrenchment, by the Church of Rome, behind certain ancient forms which are now admitted to be abolished—and the sapping of modern Socinianism and rationalism. These three things have contributed, in different ways, and according to their different natures, in generating a kind of tacit suspicion of the Old Testament, and an impatience in submitting the faith to Old Testament declarations. Neither must we forget here to state, as of paramount importance, the apparent strictness of these ancient laws as opposed to those lax notions which are but too apt to prevail in the heart of man. Whilst the Roman Catholic Church has adhered to some things long since abolished, and has advanced them as the distinguishing characteristics of her faith, the Protestant churches, on the other hand, in their anxiety to preserve inviolate that faith once delivered to the saints, have suffered many of the mosaic laws to become a dead letter. In clearing away the cumbrous ruins of the ceremonial laws, they have, in some measure, unconsciously permitted the most precious treasures to be removed along with these ruins. The heats of ecclesiastical debate, and theological strife, have acted as repellant forces, and instead of our practice having become welded to the Old Testament laws, the anchor chain has been severed, and the social fabric has been ever since allowed to drift among rocks and quicksands. We need not bring forward witnesses to this truth when they may be seen by reflecting men on every side. Amidst a ruin so extensive and complete, the most careful observer can hardly grope his way. It is also to be lamented that notwithstanding all that has been written by excellent and pious men in the way of exposition and interpretation, no intelligible principle has yet been laid down to determine what portions of the mosaic law are to be received as of binding and permanent authority. We have, in this matter, been pretty much left in uncertainty and doubt; and the natural result has been that those laws which, in their comprehensive simplicity and beauty, were designed to be the great statute book of the world, have either been altogether lost sight of, r made to twist and conform to those very things which they in reality condemned. The Jewish nation was undoubtedly set forth, with regard to its laws, as a model nation to all others. Have we not seen, for example, the same troubles and distresses which immediately ensued on its rejection of the simple divine form of government, and the foolish zeal for the centralization of power, experienced over and over again in the history of every subsequent monarchy and oligarchy? Could any law, for example, human or divine, be more perfectly calculated to raise up a race of patriots and freemen, than that which regulated the restoration of property and possessions on the year of jubilee? And that this law of release had practically this effect, witness the pathetic song of the exiled Jews by Babel's streams, with whose saddening strains we are all familiar. That they had some things special and particular we would be the last to deny, but it is not the less true that they possessed many things in common. Yet it has been erroneously considered that when that nation passed away into obscurity, it was proper that its laws-political, social, and civil, -should also pass with it into oblivion. It is a grave matter that so small a share of inquiry is accorded in the pulpit ministrations of the day, to that interesting and instructive polity recorded in the Old Testament, which was at once the excellency and characteristic of the Jewish nation. Looking at this constitution through the perverted medium of our social atmosphere, there appears in it some things the nature and obligation of which it is now difficult to determine. But, taken as a whole, there can be no manner of doubt that this noble constitution is eminently fitted to subserve the great ends of all good governments, and that those temporal sanctions by which it is enforced are the best guaranties towards its execution. It is the torn shreds of this constitution which still preserve nations and governments from dissolution and ruin. It is not an economy fitted and designed, as many have sup posed, to separate and seclude. It is antagonistic to nothing but vice and disorder. It is the precious legacy and the common property of mankind, and will yet bind them together in a universal brotherhood. Its characters have been written in lines of living light, and striking indeed is the contrast which it bears to the fugitive and transitory enactments of human legislation. But although many of the mosaic laws have been allowed to depart as things out of date, the same cannot be said as regards those which bear upon the sin of usury. These enactments have been indelibly stamped upon the human mind. They may have become obscured during the course of ages, but the feeling that there is something vicious in the practice of usury, has never been, and never will be, obliterated. Legal izing the thing has had a reactive influence upon public opinion. It is impossible that the present views on the subject can be traced to legisla tion itself. That legislation is the result of public opinion. Nevertheless, these statutes have had the effect of stereotyping those very views upon the public mind. In so far as this human legislation is the counterpart of the divine, so far has it familiarized our minds with the idea of the sinfulness of usury; but, in so far as human law has legalized a thing in itself positively simple, to that extent has it riveted on the minds of men those lax notions regarding this sin which now prevail. It is foreign to my purpose, in this article, to enter upon the subject of the effects of usury upon trade, a matter upon which the public mind seems to be, in some measure, awakening. I will conclude by evincing my belief that the nation which first adopts the platform of cash payments in a pure metallic currency, introduces herself at once to the high road of prosperity and fame. Her produce would be raised, and commodities acquired, untaxed by those large draughts which usury constantly makes. Every description of labor would meet an appropriate reward, and comfort and prosperity prevail. Her foreign commerce would be conducted on the best of terms, for every other nation would be anxious to sell where payment was so prompt and sure. She would not occupy that degrading position which indebtedness must ever entail. The fame of that nation would resound to the ends of the earth, and her unoccupied lands would speedily be filled up by an industrious, happy, and contented people. Are these not objects worthy the attention of the statesmen of America? JOURNAL OF MERCANTILE LAW. DAMAGED WHEAT-COAL OIL. N. S. Nettleton vs. the ship Fanny Fosdick. This was a libel filed to recover against the ship for failing to deliver at this port, in good order, 990 sacks of wheat shipped at New Orleans in December fast, for which usual bills of lading were signed. On January 10th the wheat was unladen into lighters in New York, and the libelant alleged it was found to have been damaged by being improperly stowed near coal oil, the stench from which penetrated the wheat. The evidence showed that it was the custom to stow together on board of general ships, sugar, molasses, hides, oils, and other articles of a volatile character, unless otherwise agreed between the parties, or upon notice given to the vessel not to stow particular articles together. No such agreement or notice was shown. There were 150 barrels of coal oil stowed in the lower hold of the ship, and about 200 bags of wheat were stowed some 15 feet from the oil. The rest was stowed between decks. When unladen, no separation was made between that stowed in the lower hold and that between decks. The testimony as to the smell of the oil and its effects upon the wheat varied considerably; and it was shown that the wheat was in apparently good condition, but that the smell of it seriously diminished its market value. It was not shown positively whether this smell was permanent or would be driven off by ventilation, and the samples in court were declared by witnesses to be free of objectionable flavor. Judge Betts considered that, on the evidence, there was no fault on the part of the ship in lading the wheat in connection with the cargo she was carrying. The ship did not take strictly the responsibility of a common carrier in respect to the carriage of the grain. The shipper must be assumed to have laden it on board with the knowledge of the usage of trade at that port in respect to general ships, and that ship owners in that class of business were not liable for prejudices to a cargo, arising from gasses or fumes generated out of the contents of her 37 VOL. XL.-NO. V. lading during a voyage, not occasioned by any fault of the stowage and security of the cargo on board, (Baxter vs. Leeland, 1 Blatch., 526.) It was reasonable on the evidence to infer that the 790 bags stowed between decks would not be injured by the coal oil in the hold full 60 feet off, and there would fail to be furnished proof rendering the ship liable at any rate for more than the damage to the 200 bags. The libelants having voluntarily mixed that with the rest, they cannot claim to hold the ship liable for any damage occasioned thereby. They had established no right of action against the ship. Libel dismissed with costs. IN ADMIRALTY. In the United States Circuit Court. Before Judge Betts. Enoch Cook vs. David D. Mattory, &c. In the latter part of April, 1853, a collision occurred in the roadstead of Pernambuco, between the bark Hannah Sprague, lying at anchor there, and the ship Coriolanus, under way and attempting to get out the harbor to sea. Both were American vessels on return voyages to the United States from foreign ports. and came to Pernambuco for supplies, intending to pursue their respective voyages immediately. The ship came to her anchorage a few hours previous to the arrival of the bark, the latter being brought to an anchor a few hundred yards east wardly and leeward from her, in plain sight, and both lying in the open roadstead, about a mile from the shore. The company in each vessel were well aware of the position of the other, and of their mutual purpose to get to sea again directly. Late in the afternoon a boat from the bark went to the ship, then making ready to sail, and brought from her a barrel of pork for the use of the former, and at about nightfall the ship got under way and passed out to sea across the stern of the bark, a few lengths off, each vessel being plainly seen from the other. The wind was blowing about a four knot breeze from the southeast, with a heavy sea swell. The ship run off upon a tack in shore, a distance differently estimated by witnesses, some witnesses on each vessel speaking of both vessels as all the while remaining in sight of each other, whilst others thought they were wholly out of view when the ship tacked northwardly, with intent to make a course north out of the roadstead into the broad sea. The night was partially thick and obscure until after a slight shower of rain, when the breeze subsided, and scarcely a steer age wind continued, and the ship was found to be drifting in towards the land on a current. It was discovered after she came round on the latter tack, that she was drifting and bearing down on the bark, and the ship called out to the bark to pay out chain to let her go by, and the bark, according to the evidence, did pay out chain. The vessels, however, came in collision and the bark was injured. The court held that the bark being lying at anchor in an open roadstead, and so well known, that the collision must have been caused prima facie by the other party, and their evidence to overthrow that presumption was more than counterthe balanced by the evidence on the part of the bark. Decision in favor owner of the bark, with a reference to a commissioner to ascertain the damage. UNDERVALUATION OF SUGAR. The United States vs. H. Pratt McKean, et al. This was an action to recover duties on an importation of sugars from Manilla, in January, 1856. The sugars were shipped on a rising market, and in the invoice were valued at the price of the time of shipment, upon which the govern ment claimed to recover duties not only on the increased value, amounting to $1,356 55, but 20 per cent additional duties, under the act of July 30, 1846, section 8, amounting to $12,977 90. The case was tried in December, 1857, and the court ruled that plaintiff had given no legal proof entitling them to demand the additional duties, to which the plaintiff excepted, and a verdict was taken for plaintiff, by consent, for the smaller sum of $1,356 55, subject to the opinion of the court. The judge decided that the increase of 20 per cent, though called additional |