CHAPTER VI. ROBBERY. SEC. 224. Robbery defined. 225. How force or fear must be employed. 227. Taking property secretly. 228. Robbery in first degree. 229. Id.; second degree. 230. Id.; third degree. 231. Punishment of robbery in first degree. 233 Id.; in third degree. § 224. Robbery defined, - Robbery is the unlawful taking of personal property, from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or property, or the person or property of a relative or member of his family, or of any one in his company at the time of the robbery. Must be by force or violence. Plato's case, 2 C. H. Rec. 31. What force sufficient to constitute offense. Mahony v. People, 3 Hun, 202, aff'd. Ownership. Brooks v. People, 49 N. Y. 436. Threats. People v. McDaniels, 1 Park. 198. Proof of corpus delicti. Bloomer v. People, 1 Abb. Dec. 146. See McCoskey v. People, 5 Park. 299; Mahoney v. People, 5 Lans. 329; S. C., 59 N. Y. 659; People v. McDaniels, 1 Park. 198; People v. Hall, 6 id. 642; Com. v. Holland, 1 Duvall (Ky.), 182; State v. Gorham, 55 Ñ. H. 152; Statev. McCune, 5 R. I. 60; Long v. State, 12 Ga. 293; People v. Loop, 3 Park. 559; Quinlan v. People, 6 id. 9; People v. Rose, 52 Hun, 33; Bloomer v. People, 3 Keyes, 9; 1 Abb. App. Dec. 146; People, ex rel. Hutchinson, v. O'Neill, 21 N. Y. State Rep'r, 274; 6 N. Y. Cr. 226; People v. McGinty, 24 Hun, 62; Murphy v. People, 3 id. 114; Hope v. People, 83 N. Y. 418; Arnold v. State, 52 Ind. 281; State v. Hollywood, 41 Iowa, 200; State v. Calhoun, 72 id. 432; Evans v. State, 80 Ala. 4; Shinn v. State, 64 Ind. 13; People v. Glynn, 54 Hun, 332; People v. Barondess, 41 N. Y. State Rep'r, 662. To constitute § 225. How force or fear must be employed. robbery, the force or fear must be employed either to obtain or retain possession of the property or to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking. If employed merely as a means of escape it does not constitute robbery. See Hope v. People, 11 W. Dig. 386: McGinty v. People, id. 510; McCoskey v. People, 5 Park. 299; People v. Foley, 9 N. Y. State Rep'r, 34; Mahoney v. People, 3 Hun, 202; People v. Glynn, 54 id. 332; Hope v. People, 83 N. Y. 418; 11 W. Dig. 386; People v. McGinty, 24 Hun, 62; 11 W. Dig. 510. 226. Degree of force immaterial. either of the ways specified in the last employed is immaterial. When force is employed in section, the degree of force Mahoney v. People, 3 Hun, 202; 59 N. Y. 659; People v. McGinty, 24 Hun, 62; People v. Foley, 9 N. Y. State Rep'r, 34; 27 W. Dig. 217. § 227. Taking property secretly. The taking of property from the person of another is robbery, when it appears that although the taking was fully completed without his knowledge, such knowledge was prevented by the use of force or fear. Pocket picking. Norris's case, 6 C. H. Rec. 163. Snatching articles. Anderson's case, 1 id. 163; McCloskey v. People, 5 Park. 299; People v. Hall, 6 id. 642. § 228. Robbery in first degree. - An unlawful taking or compulsion, if accomplished by force or fear, in a case specified in the foregoing sections of this chapter, is robbery in the first degree, when committed by a person, 1. Being armed with a dangerous weapon; or 2. Being aided by an accomplice actually present; or 3. When the offender inflicts grievous bodily harm or injury upon the person from whose possession, or in whose presence, the property is taken, or upon the wife, husband, servant, child, or inmate of the family of such person, or any one in his company at the time, in order to accomplish the robbery. State v. Farrar, 41 N. H. 53; Moody v. People, 20 Ill. 315; State v. Stoyell, 54 Me 24; People v. Parshall, 6 Park. 129; Carpenter v. People, 8 Barb. 603; Com. v Cook, 12 Metc. 93; Com. v. Nickerson, 5 Allen, 518; People v. McInerney, 5 N. Y. Cr. 48. § 229. Id.; second degree.-Such unlawful taking or compulsion when accomplished by force or fear, in a case specified in the foregoing sections of this chapter, but not under circumstances amounting to robbery in the first degree, is robbery in the second degree, when accomplished either 1. By the use of violence; or 2. By putting the person robbed in fear of immediate injury to his person or that of some one in his company. People v. McDaniels, 1 Park. 198; People v. Holfelder, 5 N. Y. Cr. 179. § 230. Id.; third degree.-A person who robs another, under circumstances not amounting to robbery in the first or second degree, is guilty of robbery in the third degree. 231. Punishment of robbery in first degree. -Robbery in the first degree is punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding twenty years. § 232. Id.; in second degree.-Robbery in the second degree is punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding fifteen years. § 233. Id.; in third degree.-Robbery in the third degree is punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten years. CHAPTER VII. DUELS AND CHALLENGES. SEC. 234. Dueling, defined and punished. 235. Challenger, abettor, etc. 236. Challenge defined. 237. Attempts to induce a challenge. 238. Posting for not fighting. 239. Duel outside of state. 240. Where such person may be indicted and tried. § 234. Dueling, defined and punished. A person who fights a duel or engages in any combat with another, with deadly weapons, by previous agreement, or upon a previous quarrel, although no death or wound ensues, is punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years. A person convicted under this section is thereafter incapable of holding, or of being elected or appointed to any office or place of trust or emolument, civil or military, the state. within See § 458, post. Herriott v. State, 1 McMullan, 126; Barker v. People, 3 Cow. 686; S. C., 20 Johns. 457; Angler v. People, 34 Ill. 486; State v. Perkins, 6 Blackf. 20; Com. v. Hart, 6 J. J. Marsh. 119. $235. Challenger, abettor, etc.-A person who challenges another to fight a duel, or who sends a written or verbal message, purporting or intended to be a challenge to fight a duel, or an invitation to a combat with deadly weapons, or who accepts such a challenge or message, or who knowingly carries or delivers such a challenge or message, or who is present at the time appointed for such a duel or combat, or when such a duel or combat is fought, either as second, aid, or surgeon, or who advises or abets, or gives any countenance or assistance to such a duel or combat upon previous agreement, is punishable by imprisonment for not more than seven years. Norton's case, 3 C. H. Rec. 90; Wood's case, id. 139. Form of challenge. Ives v. State, 12 Ala. 276; State v. Perkins, 6 Blackf. 20. § 236. Challenge defined. Any word, spoken or written, or any sign, uttered or made to any person, expressing or implying, or intended to express or imply, a desire, request, invitation, or demand, to fight a duel, or to meet for the purpose of fighting a duel, is deemed a challenge. See § 459, post. State v. Perkins, 6 Blackf. 20; Com. v. Tibbs, 1 Dana, 524. § 237. Attempts to induce a challenge.-A person guilty of sending or using to another any word or sign whatever, with intent to provoke or induce such person to give or receive a challenge to fight a duel, is guilty of a misdemeanor. King v. Phillips, 6 East, 464; Rex v. Rice, 3 id. 581. § 238. Posting for not fighting.-A person who posts or advertises another for not fighting a duel, or for not sending or accepting a challenge to fight a duel, or who, in writing or in print, uses reproachful or contemptuous language to or concerning any one, for not sending or accepting a challenge to fight a duel, or for not fighting a duel, is guilty of a misdemeanor. Vermont v. Davidson, 30 Vt. 377. $239. Duel outside of state. -A person who leaves this state with intent to elude any provision of this chapter, or to commit any act without this state, which is prohibited by this chapter, or who being a resident of this state, does any act without this state, which would be punishable by the provisions of this chapter, if committed within this state, is guilty of the same offense, and subject to the same punishment, as if the act had been committed, or was to have been consummated within this state. See § 188, supra; § 461, post. Code Cr. Proc., § 133. Lex loci. Com. v. Boot, Thach. Cr. C. 390; State v. Taylor, 3 Brev. 243; Harris v. State, 58 Ga. 332; Ivey v. State, 12 Ala. 276. 240. Id.; where may be indicted and tried. A person offending against any provision of the last section may be indicted and tried in any county within this state; but the person so offending may plead a former conviction or acquittal in another state or country for the same offense; and if such plea is admitted or established, it shall be a bar to further proceedings against him, for such offense. See § 185, supra. $241. Witnesses. —A person offending against any provision of this chapter is a competent witness against any other person offending in the same transaction, and must not be excused from testifying or answering any question, upon an investigation or trial for an offense under this chapter, upon the ground that his testimony might tend to convict him of a crime. But evidence given by a person so testifying, cannot be received against him, in any criminal action or proceeding. See § 712, post. State v. Dupont, 2 McCord, 334; Wood's case, 3 C. H. Rec. 139. 246. Liability of editors and others. 247. Publishing a true report of public official proceedings. 248. Qualification of last section. 249. Indictment for libel in newspaper. 250. Libel against non-resident. 251. Punishment restricted. 252. Power of court, place of trial. 253. Privileged communications. 254. Threatening to publish libel. § 242. Libel defined. —A malicious publication, by writing, printing, picture, effigy, sign or otherwise than by mere speech, which exposes any living person, or the memory of any person deceased, to hatred, contempt, ridicule or obloquy, or which causes, or tends to cause any person to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure any person, corporation or association of persons, in his or their business or occupation, is a libel. What is a libelous publication. Steele v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 214; Mezzaara's case, 2 C. H. Rec. 119; Spooner's case, 3 id. 97; People v. Judah, 2 Wh. Cr. C. 26; Stone v. Cooper, 2 Den. 293; Fry v. Bennett, 28 N. Y. 324; More v. Bennett, 48 id. 472; Sunderlín v. Bradstreet, 46 id. 188; Littlejohn v. Greeley, 13 Abb. Pr. 41. Must be malicious. Coleman's case, 2 C. H. Rec. 49; Cooper v. Greeley, 1 Den. 347; Riggs v. Denniston, 3 Johns. Cas. 198; White v. Delavan, 17 Wend. 49; Powers v. Dubois, id. 63; Cramer v. Riggs, id. 209; Weed v. Foster, 11 Barb. 203; Stillwell v. Barter, 19 Wend. 487; Moffat v. Cauldwell, 3 Hun, 26. Repetition of libel after recovery. Woods v. Pangburn, 75 N. Y. 495. Libelous charges. Dwyer v. F. J. Co., 11 Daly, 248, 251; Kingsbury v. Bradstreet, 35 Hun, 212; U. S. Ass. v. Mer. Agency, 16 Abb. N. C. 419; Weed v. Foster, 11 Barb. 203; Ryckman v. Delavan, 25 Wend. 186; Fidler v. Same, 20 id. 51; Turrill v. Dolloway, 17 id. 426; Robertson v. Bennett, 44 Supr. 66; Williams v. Godkin, 5 Daly, 499; Edsall v. Brooks, 26 How. 426; Sanderson v. Caldwell, 45 N. Y. 401; Giles v. State, 6 Ga. 276; Morey v. Morning J. Ass'n, 123 N. Y. 207; Moore v. Francis, 121 id. 199; More v. Bennett, 48 id. 475; Carroll v. White, 33 Barb. 615; Wright v. Paige, 36 id. 438; aff'd, 3 Trans. App. 134; Perkins v. Mitchell, 31 Barb. 465; Nash v. Benedict, 25 Wend. 645; Ryer v. Fireman's J. Co., 11 Daly, 251; Hetherington v. Sterry, 28 Kans. 426; Bradley v. Cramer, 59 Wis. 309; State v. Smily, 37 Ohio, 30; Steketee v. Kimm, 48 Mich. 322; Smith v. Smith, 73 id. 445. See further, Shelley v. Sun P. Co., 38 Hun, 474; 109 N. Y. 611; Bergman v. Jones. 94 id. 52; Carpenter v. Hammond, 1 N. Y. State Rep'r, 551; People v. Isaacs, 1 N. Y. Cr. 148; Hayes v. Ball, 72 N. Y. 420; People v. Parr, 42 Hun, 313; People v. Seaman, 6 N. Y. State Rep'r, 765; People v. Stark, 59 Hun, 54; 35 N. Y. State Rep'r, 152; People v. Clegg, 32 íd. 701; Clark v. Anderson, 33 id. 866. § 243. Libel a misdemeanor.-A person who publishes a libel, is guilty of a misdemeanor. People v. Stark, 59 Hun, 58; 35 N. Y. State Rep'r, 155. § 244. Malice presumed. How justified or excused.—A publication having the tendency or effect, mentioned in section 242, is to be deemed malicious, if no justification or excuse therefor is shown. The publication is justified when the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends. The publication is excused when it is honestly made, in the belief of its truth and upon reasonable grounds for this belief, and consists of fair comments upon the conduct of a person in respect of public affairs, or upon a thing which the proprietor thereof offers or explains to the public. Art. 1, § 8, N. Y. Const. Rumors, no justification. Powers v. Skinner, 1 Wend. 451. That article was copied no defense. Hotchkiss v. Oliphant, 2 Hill, 510. Nor that author's name was given. Dole v. Lyon, 10 Johns. 447. Truth must be established. Rice v. Withers, 9 Wend. 138. Truth goes to the intent. People v. Tracy, 2 Wh. Cr. C. 358. Justifiable motives. Baldwin's case, 3 C. H. Rec. 61. See Root v. King, 7 Cow. 613; S. C., 4 Wend. 114; Washburne v. Cook, 3 Den. 110; Fry v. Bennett, 28 N. Y. 324. See Hamilton v. Eno, 81 N. Y. 122; Brooks v. Harrison, 91 id. 89; Byam v. Collins, 111 id. 150; Hunt v. Bennett, 19 id. 176; Snyder v. Andrews, 6 Barb. 43; Daly v. Byrne, 1 Abb. N. C. 150; Root v. King, 7 Cow. 613; Cooper v. Barber, 24 Wend. 105; Fidler v. Delevan, 20 id. 57; Stilwell v. Barter, 19 id. 487; Bartholomey v. People, 2 Hill, 248. $245. Publication defined. To sustain a charge of publishing a libel, it is not necessary that the matter complained of should have been seen by another. It is enough that the defendant knowingly displayed it, or parted with its immediate custody, under circumstances which exposed it to be seen or understood by another person than himself. Lyle v. Classon, 1 Cai. 581; Van Cleef v. Lawrence, 2 C. H. Rec. 41; Trumbull v. Gibbons, 3 id. 97; Snyder v. Andrews, 6 Barb. 43; Lewis v. Few, 5 Johns. 1; Southwick v. Stevens, 10 id. 443; Giles v. State, 6 Ga. 76; Prescott v. Tousey, 50 Supr. 12; Warnock v. Mitchell, 43 Fed. Rep'r, 428; Sesler v. Montgomery, 78 Cal. 486; Schenck v. Schenck. 20 N. J. L. 208; Wood v. Winans, 47 Hun, 362; rev'd on other grounds, 122 N. Y. 445. § 246. Liability of editors and others.- Every editor, or proprietor of a book, newspaper or serial, and every manager of a partnership or incorporated association, by which a book, newspaper or serial is issued, is chargeable with the publication of any matter contained in such book, newspaper or serial. But in every prosecution for libel the defendant may show in his defense that the matter complained of was published without his knowledge or fault and against his wishes, by another who had no authority from him to make the publication and whose act was disavowed by him so soon as known. Andres v. Wells, 7 Johns. 260; Huff v. Bennett, 4 Sandf. 120; Fry v. Bennett, 28 N. Y. 324; Com. v. Kneeland, Thach. Cr. C. 846; Rex v. Gatch, 1 Moo. & M. 433; Shelley v. Sun. P. Ass'n, 48 Hun, 474; 109 N. Y. 611 Ropke v. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 9 N. Y. State Rep'r, 709; Hunt v. Bennett, 19 N. Y. 175; Purdy v. Rochester P. Co., 96 N. Y. 372; Sunderlin v. Bradstreet, 46 id. 188; Press Co. v. Stewart, 119 Penn. St. 584; Bruce v. Reed, 104 id. 408. |