still be carried into execution or not. The German Government, therefore, on the evening of July 29, was convinced that the Russian Chief of the General Staff was speaking the truth on the day of his interview with the German Military Attaché, and that the latter's suspicions were unfounded. Evidently the Czar had good grounds for his astonishment that the German Emperor felt himself, on the 29th, embarrassed as a peacemaker by measures taken on the 25th, since on the 28th, while fully cognizant of them, he had made no allusion to them, nor believed that they would impede his efforts. And we, too, are justified in our astonishment and have the right to ask what happened on that 29th day of July to make the German Emperor so suddenly change his ideas and his tone in his dispatches to the Czar. What happened to make him fear, as a grave and imminent danger, that mobilization against Austria which had only been deliberated upon, while knowing all the time that Russia, after having threatened mobilization, still hesitated before passing from words to deeds; while Austria, too, was not in the least alarmed even two days later when the mobilization was not only threatened but had already begun?

In vain do we seek the cause of this mysterious change in the White Book, where immediately after this imperial dispatch the thunderbolt of an ultimatum is launched under the date of July 31. On that date the Chancellor charges the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg to intimate to Russia that she must stop every measure of war within twelve hours, and he begins his telegram with these words: "In spite of negotiations still pending * * * Russia has mobilized her entire army, hence also against us. Wherefore, &c."

General mobilization! But this is another surprise. All the documents and information we have read up to the present in the White Book speak of a partial Russian mobilization against Austria. In a moment, without telling us when or how, nor by what channel the information reached the German Government, the Russian general mobil

ization and the consequent German ultimatum are announced to us, at one and the same time, as if between one and the other no greater lapse of time had passed than that which separates the lightning-flash from the thunder-clap. And thus, in fact, it was. In the narrative part of the White Book we are told that the Russian Government ordered a general mobilization on the afternoon of July 31, and that the ultimatum was delivered by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg on July 31 at midnight-less than twelve hours afterward! If one bears in mind the time needed for the news of the mobilization to reach the German Embassy at St. Petersburg and from thence to be transmitted by dispatch to Berlin; if one also reflects on the time necessary to telegraph the ultimatum from Berlin to St. Petersburg and to deliver it to M. Sazanoff at the Russian Foreign Office, one is forced to conclude that the German Government, by its ultimatum, decided on war while one might light and smoke a cigar. So much haste, and why? Was the atmosphere so threatening that no delay was possible? No. Not only did the negotiations between Austria and Russia continue on July 30 and 31, but actually on the 31st they were much more promising than they had been during the previous days. And precisely on the 31st Austria made the greatest stride toward a compromise that she had hitherto made; for she consented to discuss her note to Serbia with Russia and the European powers, and the Czar telegraphed to the Emperor of Germany promising on his word of honor that so long as diplomatic discussions continued his troops should not be moved.

What, then, had happened?

Few are they that know, and they will defer speaking as long as possibleuntil the nations, decimated and impoverished by the war, shall demand of their sovereigns and of their Ministers an account of their every act, word, and intention. For the present we can only make surmises. But it appears to me that the key to the mystery may be found in two documents of capital importance in the Orange Book and the Blue Book. The first is the document

which, in the Orange Book, bears the number 58, and consists of a telegram dispatched by Sazanoff to the Russian Ambassador at Paris on July 29; the second is the document numbered 85 in the Blue Book--a telegram dispatched by the British Ambassador at Berlin on the evening of the 29th. Two dispatches sent forth on that day on which so many strange events happened-on that day when the German Emperor, as we have seen, had sent two such different dispatches to the Czar at an interval of seven hours; one at 6 o'clock in the evening, the other at one hour after midnight.

The telegram which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs dispatched to his Ambassador in Paris-it is to be regretted that the hour of its dispatch is not given-runs thus:

"The German Ambassador today informed me of the decision of his Government to mobilize if Russia did not stop her military preparations. Now, in point of fact, we only began these preparations in consequence of the mobilization already undertaken by Austria, and owing to her evident unwillingness to accept any means of arriving at a peaceful settlement of her dispute with Serbia. As we cannot comply with the wishes of Germany, we have no alternative but to hasten our own military preparations and to assume that war is probably inevitable.

* * ""

Now do you understand, O alert reader, what a strange kind of peacemaker the German Emperor was? On July 29, when it was known at Berlin that Russia, at the supreme moment of passing from words to deeds by mobilizing against Austria, hesitated; when Austria, who must have been somewhat more interested in the matter than Germany, had not been consulted and showed no anxiety on account of the menaced Russian mobilization, Germany intimates to Russia that she must disarm in the face of Austria, and threatens to mobilize and hence to make war if she does not. How can so singular a step be explained, concerning which the White Book is silent, except by attributing to the German Government the firm intention of diplomatically browbeating Russia and, if threats

proved vain, to make war and constrain Austria to follow her? Does it or does it not appear to you that in this telegram Germany is surprised in a flagrant aggression? Moreover, let us now read Document 85 in the Blue Book, and we shall discover matters of far graver import. This document, as we have said, is a dispatch sent to the Minister for Foreign Affairs by the British Ambassador at Berlin on the evening of July 29. And what does the British Ambassador telegraph to his Foreign Minister? He telegraphs that he was asked to call upon the Chancellor on that night, who had just returned from Potsdam. In the introductory narrative of events the information is given that the Ambassador was sent for late at night. Grave and urgent, therefore, were the matters which the Chancellor had to communicate to the Ambassador, and matters appertaining to the discussion that had taken place in the Conciliabule or Council with the Emperor at Potsdam, since the Chancellor had scarcely returned to Berlin from Potsdam before he sent for the Ambassador, and sent for him late at night, at so unusual and inconvenient an hour! He had, in fact, to ask him, neither more nor less, if Great Britain would promise to remain neutral in a European war, on the understanding that Germany respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, and took from France only her colonies.

This document speaks clearly enough. It tells us that war was virtually decided upon on the evening of July 29 at that colloquy or Council between Chancellor and Emperor which was held at Potsdam, and which certainly took place between the first and the second telegram sent to the Czar by the Emperor. Thus alone can the haste be explained with which the Chancellor on his return to Berlin sent for the British Ambassador and had that conversation with him which, as the introductory narrative to the Blue Book tells us, seemed so strange to the British Government when it was known in London.

Now, by the light of these two documents many things are clear. There was a party in Germany powerful at Court

and in the Government which, for ten years, had been urging Germany to take up arms. This party, probably between the 28th and the 29th, had surrounded the Emperor who, on the 28th, still appeared animated by reasonable intentions. Austria, by declaring war on Serbia, had only too effectively furnished the war party at Berlin with a terrible argument -the argument that war was inevitable. And if war could not be prevented was it not better for Germany to precipitate it? So Emperor and Government allowed themselves to be persuaded to intimate to Russia that she must disarm, and, at the same time, the Emperor changes his tone in his correspondence with the Czar. It is not improbable that on July 29 the Emperor and the German Government still deluded themselves that Russia would yield to threats as she did in 1908 and during the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis, and the Russian Government's hesitation to mobilize may have encouraged this delusion.

But, during the afternoon, a telegram arrives at Berlin from the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg which we may search in vain for in the White Bookthe telegram which we have cognizance of from Document 58 published in the Orange Book. In this telegram the conversation between the German Ambassador and the Russian Minister is reported, and it is therefore now known at Berlin that Russia refuses to suspend her military preparations: the German Government, in fact, understands that this time Russia will not yield to threats. The Chancellor hastens with the telegram to Potsdam, and at Potsdam the decision is taken to dispatch a last and more menacing ultimatum to Russia and, if that failed of its effect, to go to war. The Chancellor returns to Berlin that same night to ask of the English Ambassador the price of British neutrality; the Emperor dispatches his telegram to the Czar, one hour after midnight, which partially reflects the answer given to the German Ambassador by Sazanoff; and at two in the morning of the 30th the German Ambassador calls on Sazanoff for one last fateful colloquy. Of this we have information in the document published in

the Blue Book which relates how the German Ambassador burst into tears when he perceived that Russia would not give way. He understood that war was now decided upon.

Any one who reads the White Book attentively and compares it with the Blue Book and the Orange Book will inevitably be led to believe that the war was decided upon at Berlin, not, indeed, after Russia had begun her general mobilization, but on the evening of the 29th, and before even she had begun her partial mobilization against Austria. This being admitted, it is easy to explain why the ultimatum was decided upon with such haste when the news that Russia was proceeding to mobilize the whole of her army had scarcely reached Berlin. To declare war a pretext was necessary, for it would have been strange indeed that Germany, in a dispute that had arisen between Russia and AustriaGermany who, as an ally, was only a secondary party to the quarrel--should have declared war on Russia because she was mobilizing her army against Austria at a time when Austria declared that she did not interpret this message as a threat. Even the German professors who signed the famous manifesto would then have perceived that Germany alone was the aggressor. Hence the news that arrived on the 31st of the precautionary measures taken by Russia, for a general mobolization, came pat, (and that nothing more as yet was intended on the part of Russia is proved by Document 113 in the Blue Book,) and the pretext was immediately seized upon, since war had already been decided. The precipitation with which. the German Government dispatched the ultimatum on July 31 can be explained only in two ways: either we must admit that the German Government had suddenly gone mad; or that war had already been decided upon before, namely, on that fateful evening of July 29.

Unfortunately for Germany, precisely on that very day Austria-Hungary appears to have become terrified and hesitated. She, too, had contrived her Balkan adventure, hoping that Russia would let things drift. When she perceived that a European war was imminent she

F

IVE diplomatic communications relating to the detention of American ships and cargoes by the British Government, exchanged by cable between Great Britain and the United States, were made public textually and in paraphrase by the State Department at Washington on Aug. 3, 1915. Generally considered, the British sponses to the American representations in opposition to the course of the British Government are a denial of the American contentions, but a disposition is shown by Great Britain to "make reasonable concessions to American interests," to quote a phrase of one of the notes.

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In connection with the American protest against British prize-court procedure, the British Government suggests that appeals in behalf of American interests claiming to have been injured be taken to the proper British tribunals and, if these appeals are denied, that recourse be had to an international tribunal. But Great Britain hopes that her disposition to make reasonable concessions will prevent the necessity for such action arising."

66

The British communications are signed by Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs. They comprise an answer to the American protest of March 30 against the application of the British Order in Council for preventing supplies from going into Germany-an answer to a brief telegram from this Government serving notice of an intention to insist upon the rights of American citizens without limitation by Orders in Council, and of a refusal to recognize the validity

An

of prize-court proceedings in derogation of the rights of American citizens, and an answer to a note sent by Secretary Lansing on July 15 objecting to compulsory unloading at a British port of goods from Belgium brought in the American steamer Neches, the compulsion being applied on the ground that the goods originated in territory held by an enemy of Great Britain. The Americommunications furnished to the press for publication consisted of paraphrases of the brief telegram, serving notice with respect to the Orders in Council and prize-court proceedings and the note sent in connection with the seizure of the cargo of the Neches.

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The response of Sir Edward Grey with respect to the Neches is one of the most interesting in the series. German and British methods of warfare at sea are cited to show justification for the strict measures taken by Great Britain to restrain trade with Germany.

In another British communication, that of July 23, in answer to the American note of March 30, on the subject of the restrictions imposed on American commerce by the British Orders in Council, Sir Edward Grey defends the Order in Council measures on the ground that it is incumbent on Great Britain and her allies "to take every step in their power to overcome their common enemy in view of the shocking violation of the recognized rules and principles of civilized warfare of which he has been guilty during the present struggle." Sir Edward Grey recalls that the attention of the American Ambassador in London already