Engineer Commander George Edward Andrew, H. M. S. Kent.

Engineer Commander Edward John Weeks, H. M. S. Invincible.

Paymaster Cyril Sheldon Johnson, H. M. S. Invincible.

Carpenter Thomas Andrew Walls, H. M. S. Invincible.

Carpenter William Henry Venning, H. M. S. Kent.

Carpenter George Henry Egford, H. M. S. Cornwall.

PETTY OFFICERS AND MEN. Ch. P. O. D. Leighton, O. N. 124,238, Kent.

P. O., 2d Cl., M. J. Walton, (R. F. R., A. 1,756,) O. N. 118,358, Kent.

Ldg. Smn. F. S. Martin, O. N. 233,301, Invincible, Gnr's. Mate, Gunlayer, 1st Cl.

Sigmn. F. Glover, O. N. 225,731, Cornwall.

Ch. E. R. Art., 2d Cl., J. G. Hill, O. N. 269,646, Cornwall.

Actg. Ch. E. R. Art., 2d Cl., R. Snowdon, O. N. 270,654, Inflexible.

E. R. Art., 1st Cl., G. H. F. McCarten, O. N. 270,023, Invincible.

Stkr. P. O. G. S. Brewer, O. N. 150,950, Kent.

Stkr. P. O. W. A. Townsend, O. N. 201,650, Cornwall.

Stkr., 1st Cl., J. Smith, O. N. SS 111,915, Cornwall.

Shpwrt., 1st Cl., A. N. E. England, O. N. 341,971, Glasgow.

Shpwrt., 2d Cl., A. C. H. Dymott, O. N. M. 8,047, Kent.

Portsmouth R. F. R. B. 3,307 Sergt. Charles Mayes, H.. M. S. Kent.

F. C. D. STURDEE.

LONDON, March 18, (Correspondence of The Associated Press.)-The Associated Press has received the second installment of the historical review emanating from French official sources of the operations in the Western theatre of war, from its beginning up to the end of January. It should be understood that the narrative is made purely from the French standpoint. The additional installment of the document, dealing with the victory of the Marne, Sept. 6th to 15th, is as follows:

F one examines on the map the respective positions of the German and French armies on Sept. 6 as previously described, it will be seen that by his inflection toward Meaux and Coulommiers General von Kluck was exN.B.posing his right to the offensive action of our left. This is the starting point of the victory of the Marne.

On the evening of Sept. 5 our left army had reached the front PenchardSaint-Souflet-Ver. On the 6th and 7th it continued its attacks vigorously with the Ourcq as objective. On the evening of the 7th it was some kilometers from the Ourcq, on the front Chambry-Marcilly-Lisieux-Acy-en-Multien. On the 8th, the Germans, who had in great haste reinforced their right by bringing their Second and Fourth Army Corps back to the north, obtained some successes by attacks of extreme violence. They occupied Betz, Thury-en-Valois, and Nanteuil-le-Haudouin. But in spite of this pressure our troops held their ground well. In a brilliant action they took three standards, and, being reinforced, prepared a new attack for the 10th. At the moment that this attack was about to begin the enemy was already in re

treat toward the north. The attack became a pursuit, and on the 12th we established ourselves on the Aisne. LEFT OF KLUCK'S ARMY THREAT

ENED.

Why did the German forces which were confronting us and on the evening before attacking so furiously retreat on the morning of the 10th? Because in bringing back on the 6th several army corps from the south to the north to face our left the enemy had exposed his left to the attacks of the British Army, which had immediately faced around toward the north, and to those of our armies which were prolonging the English lines to the right. This is what the French command had sought to bring about. This is what happened on Sept. 8 and allowed the development and rehabilitation which it was to effect.

On the 6th the British Army had set out from the line Rozcy-Lagny and had that evening reached the southward bank of the Grand Morin. On the 7th and 8th it continued its march, and on the 9th had debouched to the north of the Marne below Chateau-Thiery, taking in flank the German forces which on that day were opposing, on the Ourcq, our left army. Then it was that these forces began to retreat, while the British Army, going in pursuit and capturing seven guns and many prisoners, reached the Aisne between Soissons and Longueval.

The rôle of the French Army, which was operating to the right of the British Army, was threefold. It had to support the British attacking on its left. It had on its right to support our centre, which from Sept. 7 had been subjected to a German attack of great violence. Fi

nally, its mission was to throw back the three active army corps and the reserve corps which faced it.

On the 7th it made a leap forward, and on the following days reached and crossed the Marne, seizing, after desperate fighting, guns, howitzers, mitrailleuses, and 1,300,000 cartridges. On the

12th it established itself on the north edge of the Montagne-de-Reime in contact with our centre, which for its part had just forced the enemy to retreat in haste.

THE ACTION OF FERE-CHAM

PENOISE.

Our centre consisted of a new army created on Aug. 29 and of one of those which at the beginning of the campaign had been engaged in Belgian Luxemburg. The first had retreated on Aug. 29 to Sept. 5 from the Aisne to the north of the Marne and occupied the general front Sézanne-Mailly.

The second, more to the east, had drawn back to the south of the line Humbauville-Chateau-Beauchamp-Bignicourt

Blesmes-Maurupt-le-Montoy.

The enemy, in view of his right being arrested and the defeat of his enveloping movement, made a desperate effort from the 7th to the 10th to pierce our centre to the west and to the east of Fére-Champenoise. On the 8th he succeeded in forcing back the right of our new army, which retired as far as Gouragançon. On the 9th, at 6 o'clock in the morning, there was a further retreat to the south of that village, while on the left the other army corps also had to go back to the line Allemant-Connantre.

Despite this retreat the General commanding the army ordered a general of fensive for the same day. With the Morocco Division, whose behavior was heroic, he met a furious assault of the Germans on his left toward the marshes of Saint Gond. Then with the division which had just victoriously overcome the attacks of the enemy to the north of Sézanne, and with the whole of his left army corps, he made a flanking attack in the evening of the 9th upon the German forces, and notably the guard, which had thrown back his right army corps.

The enemy, taken by surprise by this bold manoeuvre, did not resist, and beat a hasty retreat.

On the 11th we crossed the Marne between Tours-sur-Marne and Sarry, driving the Germans in front of us in disorder. On the 12th we were in contact with the enemy to the north of the Camp de Chalons. Our other army of the centre, acting on the right of the one just referred to, had been intrusted with the mission during the 7th, 8th, and 9th of disengaging its neighbor, and it was only on the 10th that, being reinforced by an army corps from the east, it was able to make its action effectively felt. On the 11th the Germans retired. But, perceiving their danger, they fought desperately, with enormous expenditure of projectiles, behind strong intrenchments. On the 12th the result had none the less been attained, and our two centre armies were solidly established on the ground gained.

THE OPERATIONS OF THE RIGHT.

To the right of these two armies were three others. They had orders to cover themselves to the north and to debouch toward the west on the flank of the enemy, which was operating to the west of the Argonne. But a wide interval in which the Germans were in force separated them from our centre. The attack took place, nevertheless, with very brilliant success for our artillery, which destroyed eleven batteries of the Sixteenth German Army Corps.

On the 10th inst. the Eighth and Fifteenth German Army Corps counterattacked, but were repulsed. On the 11th our progress continued with new suc: cesses, and on the 12th we were able to face round toward the north in expectation of the near and inevitable retreat of the enemy, which, in fact, took place from the 13th.

The withdrawal of the mass of the German force involved also that of the left. From the 12th onward the forces of the enemy operating between Nancy and the Vosges retreated in a hurry before our two armies of the East, which immediately occupied the positions that the enemy had evacuated. The offen

sive of our right had thus prepared and consolidated in the most useful way the result secured by our left and our centre.

Such was this seven days' battle, in which more than two millions of men were engaged. Each army gained ground step by step, opening the road to its neighbor, supported at once by it, taking in flank the adversary which the day before it had attacked in front, the efforts of one articulating closely with those of the other, a perfect unity of intention and method animating the supreme command.

To give this victory all its meaning it is necessary to add that it was gained by troops which for two weeks had been retreating, and which, when the order for the offensive was given, were found to be as ardent as on the first day. It has also to be said that these troops had to meet the whole German army, and that from the time they marched forward they never again fell back. Under their pressure the German retreat at certain times had the appearance of a rout.

In spite of the fatigue of our men, in spite of the power of the German heavy artillery, we took colors, guns, mitrailleuses, shells, more than a million cartridges, and thousands of prisoners. A German corps lost almost the whole of its artillery, which, from information brought by our airmen, was destroyed by our guns.

"THE RUSH TO THE SEA." LONDON, March 18.-The third installment of the historical review of the war, emanating from French official sources and purely from the French . viewpoint, has been received by The Associated Press. The French narrative contains a long chapter on the siege war from the Oise to the Vosges, which lasted from Sept. 13 to Nov. 30. Most of the incidents in this prolonged and severa warfare have been recorded in the daily bulletins. The operations were of secondary importance, and were conducted on both sides with the same idea of wearing down the troops and the artillery of the opposing forces with the view of in

fluencing the decisive result in the great theatre of war in the north. The next chapter deals with "the rush to the sea," Sept. 13 to Oct. 23, and is as follows: GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE

ACTION.

As early as Sept. 11 the Commander in Chief had directed our left army to have as important forces as possible on the right bank of the Oise. On Sept. 17 he made that instruction more precise by ordering a mass to be constituted on the left wing of our disposition, capable of coping with the outflanking movement of the enemy." Everything led us to expect that flanking movement, for the Germans are lacking in invention. deed, their effort at that time tended to a renewal of their manoeuvre of August. In the parallel race the opponents were bound in the end to be stopped only by the sea; that is what happened about Oct. 20.

In

The Germans had an advantage over us, which is obvious from a glance at the map the concentric form of their front, which shortened the length of their transports. In spite of this initial inferiority we arrived in time. From the middle of September to the last week in October fighting went on continually to the north of the Oise, but all the time we were fighting we were slipping northward. On the German side this movement brought into line more than eighteen new army corps, (twelve active army corps, six reserve corps, four cavalry corps.) On our side it ended in the constitution of three fresh armies on our left and in the transport into the same district of the British Army and the Belgian Army from Antwerp.

For the conception and realization of this fresh and extended disposition the French command, in the first place, had to reduce to a minimum the needs for effectives of our armies to the east of the Oise, and afterwards to utilize to the utmost our means of transport. It succeeded in this, and when, at the end of October, the battle of Flanders opened, when the Germans, having completed the concentration of their forces, attempted with fierce energy to turn or to pierce