gave England a pretext for rejecting the German efforts to effect an understanding between the two countries. But it is impossible to believe in the honesty of these arguments, which were recently defended, in dialectic perversion of the truth, by Sir Edward Cook in an article entitled "How Britain Strove for Peace." England's aggressive tendency is clearly shown by its above-mentioned agreements with France and Russia, which are today publici juris. Regarding that point there was no self-deception in those English circles which did not belong to the conspiracy; Edward Dicey, one of the most eminent of English publicists, expressed it in point-blank form in February, 1910, when he wrote in The Empire Review: "If England and Germany are friends, the peace of Europe is assured; but if the two nations fall apart, it will be a very unfortunate day for humanity." At that time, when Delcassé tendencies were again asserting themselves in France and a new political storm was brewing in the Balkan countries, King Edward died, on May 6. The hope could now be cherished, the leader of the antiGerman policy of England being gone, that the moment had come when it would be possible to effect an understanding.

Dicey again began to argue for peace, the English-German Friendship Committee, the Albert Committee, the Archbishop of Canterbury, The Manchester Guardian, and The Economist advocated this idea, and Prime Minister Asquith found it profitable under these circumstances to strike the note of peace in a report which he submitted to the lower house regarding the frustrated GermanEnglish negotiations. But he included in this report false and disquieting statements regarding the German fleet. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg replied to these statements in the Reichstag, and this led to the resumption of negotiations regarding a permanent political agreement on the basis of the existing German naval program, provided we would decrease our rate of building war vessels, as we had already offered to do. It soon became evident, however, with what little sincerity these negotiations were entered into on the part of England. With the

direct encouragement of England, which renewed its promises regarding its attitude in the event of war, France, in the latter part of April, and in outright violation of the treaty, began its advance again Fez; and at the same time, as if it was desired that no doubt should arise regarding the solidarity of England and France, The Fleet Annual published an illustration representing the German high sea fleet under full steam, and under it were printed the words "The Enemy." As a sign of our disapproval of the French violation of the treaty we sent the Panther to Agadir, and in place of German-English negotiations GermanFrench negotiations were commenced. Meanwhile England, cherishing the hope that a German-French war would now break out with certainty, armed itself against us in August and September with might and main. This fact was placed beyond all doubt by the well-known disclosures of Captain Faber, (before his electors in Andover.) The Times said later on that the year 1911 had brought three German-English crises, the first in the third week of July, the second in the week ending on Aug. 19, (that was the time of the enormous and very disillusioning labor strikes,) and the third in September. It is amazing that Sir Edward Cook dared to assert under these circumstances that Great Britain had facilitated the conclusion of the FrenchGerman Morocco agreement, which was ratified on March 12, 1912. In the Open Letter on Foreign Policy," which on Nov. 24, 1911, was submitted to the members of the English Parliament, and was signed with the initials E. D. M. and F. W. H., (which is to be resolved into Edmund D. Morel and Francis W. Hirst,) it is expressly stated by these esteemed and honorable politicians:

66

Sir Edward Grey took pains to conceal these facts from the lower house and passed lightly over the disclosures of Faber-when the Imperial Chancellor vigorously opposed him-with skillful legerdemain. In the upper house Grey's policy also met with severe criticism, and from his declarations, as well as from those of Lloyd George made at the same time, only one conclusion could be drawn -that official England was determined to remain steadfast in the form of its political co-operation with France and Russia. Precisely to this was to be attributed the insecurity of the European situation. It has not become publicly known but has been reliably ascertained that the English Naval Attaché in Rome at that time pointed out that England, in the event of a war, which he expected to come, would have to occupy either Belgium or Copenhagen. That, he added, was very brutal, to be sure, but at the same time was rendered necessary by historic developments and by circumstances.

In view of all this we cannot deceive ourselves into believing that the mission which brought Lord Haldane to Berlin in February, 1912, had any other purpose than that of satisfying the voices in England which were calling with everincreasing vigor for an understanding with Germany. The proposals which he submitted to us, after a discussion with Sir Edward Grey, were formulated by the English Cabinet as follows: "Inasmuch as both powers naturally wish to maintain relations of peace and friendship with each other, England declares that it will neither make an unprovoked attack upon Germany, nor support any other power in making such an attack. To attack Germany is neither the direct nor the indirect object of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which England is now a party, nor will England make itself a party to anything that has such an object." This carefully excogitated statement embraced in its Machiavellian wording neither those "oral conversations" at Reval nor the "innocent discussions" engaged in by the English and French General Staffs

discussions which were always revived on occasion of every political crisis. It was only natural, therefore, that we, since these relations between the General Staffs of the powers belonging to the Entente were no secret to us, demanded greater security and a declaration of neutrality on the part of England before consenting to enter into any general understanding.

This was all the more necessary in view of the fact that Poincaré, the French President, while the negotiations, commenced by Haldane, between Berlin and London were being carried on, had undertaken, in August, 1912, that trip to St. Petersburg, from which he brought beck to France the system of three years' compulsory military service; and at the same time Hartwig, the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade, organized that Balkan Conference, the purpose of which was, first, to break the backbone of Turkey, and, secondly, to serve as a tool for the overthrow of Austria. The introduction and adoption of the German military program made it evident to all the world that we had recognized correctly, and betimes, the dangers which threatened the peace of the world, and in particular the peace of Germany. Furthermore, in a conversation with Prince Lichnowski, Lord Haldane said in so many words that England, in the event of a general war, would have to place itself on the side of France "in order to prevent Germany from becoming too powerful." We must not neglect to mention that during this critical year, as well as in the year 1913, negotiations were again entered into regarding the carrying out of the treaty concluded between England and Germany in the days of Caprivi with respect to an economic penetration of the Portuguese colonies in East and West Africa. The refusal of Sir Edward Grey to give these negotiations the secure form of a treaty, which could be laid before the English Parliament and the German Reichstag, here again shows that he was desirous of effecting only the appearance of an understanding. Both he and France were resolved to postpone their action against

Germany until Russia, which was preparing itself with prodigious exertion, had finished its preparations, which in August, 1913, were critically inspected by General Joffre, and among which is to be included the construction of railways to run through Poland to the Austrian and Prussian frontiers. This consideration also accounts for England's attitude during the Balkan confusion of 1912 and 1913. At the London Conference we were able to co-operate with Sir Edward Grey in settling the great difficulties brought about by the war of the Balkan nations against Turkey, and subsequently their war inter se and the overthrow of Bulgaria. Under the impression created by this political co-operation the peace party in England also seemed to gain ground. On Feb. 18, 1913, Charles Trevelyan, M. P., paid me a visit and assured me with great positiveness that England would under no circumstances wage war. A Ministry which undertook to make preparations for war, he said, would at once be deposed. An inclination to bring about an understanding with Germany, he added, prevailed in all industrial circles. My impression that such was actually the case was confirmed during a sojourn in London in the months of March and April, 1914. On occasion of a political supper à deux with Lord Haldane the latter gave expression to the view that the present grouping of the powers offered the best guarantee of peace, that Sir Edward Grey was holding Russia in check and

we

were holding Austria-Hungary in check, in saying which he emphasized the fact that England had implicit confidence in the German Imperial Chancellor. I replied, saying that in consequence of the existing combination Paris and St. Petersburg would certainly count upon England's help in the event of a war, and would thus bring on the war. We then discussed the situation between England and Germany, and remarked how the present plan, adopted by both Governments, of fortifying both sides of the North Sea was detrimental to the real interests of both. The following letter, which I received from Lord Hal

dane in Berlin on April 17, is an echo of this conversation:

"It was a great pleasure to see you and have had the full and unreserved talk we had together. My ambition is, like yours, to bring Germany into relations of ever closer intimacy and friendship. Our two countries have a common work to do for the world as well as for themselves, and each of them can bring to bear on this work special endowments and qualities. May the cooperation, which I believe to be now beginning, become closer and closer. this I am sure, the more wide and unselfish the nations and the groups questions make her supreme purposes of their policies, the more will friction disappear and the sooner will the relations that are normal and healthy reappear. Something of this good work has now come into existence between our two peoples. We must see to it that the chance of growth is given." *

Of

It is difficult to believe in the sincerity of the sentiments here expressed, when we consider that Lord Haldane belonged to the inner circle of the Cabinet and therefore must have known the secret chessmoves of Grey's policy. Furthermore, he did not resign, as did three other members of the Cabinet-Lord Morley, Burns, and Charles Trevelyan-when, on Aug. 4, Sir Edward's false game was shown up and when treaties grew out of those "conversations" and alliances out of those ententes, which had until then existed under counterfeit names. Even as late as June 13 Sir Edward Grey denied that he had entered into any binding obligations. Six weeks after that, however, England confronted Germany with the fait accompli of a life-and-death struggle. Grey had consciously uttered a falsehood before Parliament, and, as was ascertained from a Russian source, had not only accepted a Russian proposal to conclude a naval agreement, but had expressly given his approval that the deliberations regarding the effectuation of

*This passage from a letter of Lord Haldane is quoted in the original English by Professor Schiemann and is here copied ver

batim.-TRANSLATOR.

this agreement should be participated in by the Naval Staffs of both countries. In so doing he expressly counted upon a war between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, and upon the complete alliance of England. England, at the proper time, was to send merchantmen to Russian ports on the Baltic Sea for the purpose of landing Russian troops in Pomerania, and to send as many ships to the Mediterranean Sea as seemed necessary to insure the ascendency of France. With the help of French money it was intended to overthrow the Ministry of Rodoslawow in Bulgaria and, with the assistance of the Russophile, Malinow, to win over that country to the combination, which was to attack Austria in the rear. All this, which took place before the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, was the political plan of battle adopted by the conspiring powers, which subsequently found an excuse for

their behavior in the alleged coercion of Serbia. The hypocrisy with which the intrigue was carried out is without preccedent. The palm rests, probably, on the friendly visit of the English squadron, under Admiral Beatty, in Kiel. Two days after the assassination of the Archduke the squadron started on its way home, through the Emperor William Canal, for the purpose of joining the concentration of the entire English fleet, which lay, ready for war, off Spithead. That England afterward made common cause with Russia and France for the murderers of the Archduke, and with moral indignation rose against the satisfaction demanded of Serbia by Austria, is all part of the system of the frivolous use of any pretext which might bring England closer to its longed-for goalthe deposition of Germany from her position in the world. Such was England's rôle in the preparation of this wantonly prearranged war.