Collected Papers, Svazek 2MIT Press, 2000 - Počet stran: 792 Robert Aumann's career in game theory has spanned over research - from his doctoral dissertation in 1956 to papers as recent as January 1995. Threaded through all of Aumann's work (symbolized in his thesis on knots) is the study of relationships between different ideas, between different phenomena, and between ideas and phenomena. "When you look closely at one scientific idea", writes Aumann, "you find it hitched to all others. It is these hitches that I have tried to study". The papers are organized in several categories: general, knot theory, decision theory (utility and subjective probability), strategic games, coalitional games, and mathematical methods. Aumann has written an introduction to each of these groups that briefly describes the content and background of each paper, including the motivation and the research process, and relates it to other work in the collection and to work by others. There is also a citation index that allows readers to trace the considerable body of literature which cites Aumann's own work. |
Obsah
38 | 3 |
CORE as a Macrocosm of GameTheoretic Research 19671987 | 5 |
An Interview | 6 |
Report of the Committee on Election Procedures for Fellows with M Bruno | 7 |
F Hahn and A Sen 8 Foreword to A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games | 8 |
A Study in GameTheoretic Modeling | 9 |
Knot Theory 10 Asphericity of Alternating Knots | 10 |
Utility and Subjective Probability 11 The Coefficients in an Allocation Problem with J B Kruskal | 11 |
155 | 187 |
51 | 217 |
52 | 257 |
53 | 283 |
54 | 333 |
55 | 339 |
56 | 358 |
57 | 382 |
Assigning Quantitative Values to Qualitative Factors in the Naval Electronics | 12 |
39 | 13 |
A Correction 15 Measurable Utility and the Measurable Choice Theorem | 15 |
Linearity of Unrestrictedly Transferable Utilities | 16 |
A Definition of Subjective Probability with F J Anscombe | 17 |
Letter from Robert Aumann to Leonard Savage and Letter from Leonard | 18 |
A Discussion of Some Recent Comments | 19 |
Repeated 20 Acceptable Points in General Cooperative nPerson Games | 20 |
Acceptable Points in Games of Perfect Information | 21 |
LongTerm CompetitionA GameTheoretic Analysis with L S Shapley | 22 |
Survey of Repeated Games | 23 |
Cooperation and Bounded Recall with S Sorin | 24 |
Some Thoughts on the Minimax Principle with M Maschler | 29 |
Irrationality in Game Theory | 55 |
42 | 59 |
43 | 91 |
44 | 109 |
45 | 135 |
5555 | 420 |
59 | 447 |
465 | 483 |
47 | 507 |
63 | 549 |
65 | 573 |
70 | 623 |
71 | 639 |
73 | 653 |
675 | |
48 | 701 |
712 | |
722 | |
731 | |
Name Index | 759 |
767 | |
768 | |
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agents appeared apply assume assumption Aumann axioms bargaining bounded bundle called Chapter close coalition commodity comparison competitive complete concave concept condition consider consists continuous continuum contribution convex cooperative core corresponding defined definition denote depends discussion dividend economic endowment equal equilibrium example exists expected fact finite fixed follows formal function given Hence implies income individual initial integrable least Lemma limit majority Mathematical means measure natural Note obtain original outcome particular payoff players positive possible precisely preferences Princeton probability problem produce proof Proposition proved rational reasonable relation result satiation satisfying Shapley value side situation solution space strategies structure Studies subset sufficiently Suppose theorem Theory tion traders transferable unique University utility utility functions value allocation vector voting weights yields