"The authority of the former decision upholding the state law, as applied to places all of which were within the state, was in no way impaired and the court fully recognized the power of the state to prescribe maximum charges for intrastate traffic although carried over an interstate road to points on the state line." The reservation in this quotation has been applied and the right to recover damages for a viclation of an absolute prohibition in state laws of a greater charge for the shorter hauls sustained by the Federal courts." 310 § 53. Ferries.-The Supreme Court quotes as a definition of an ordinary ferry the following: 311 "A ferry is a continuation of the highway from one side of the water over which it passes to the other, and is for transportation of passengers or of travellers with their teams and vehicles and such other property as they may carry or have with them." At page 468 the opinion distinguishes such a ferry from one used by a railroad as a means of transporting cars, passengers and freight. Whatever doubt there may have been on the subject of the right of regulation by a state of a railroad ferry across a stream which is the boundary between two states, has been set at rest by a recent decision of the Supreme Court. In this decision the court quotes the definition of "railroad" contained in the Act to Regulate Commerce," and says: 312 313 cussion of the general subject see also Mayor of New York v. and of discrimination in general, New England Transp. Co., 14 see McGrew V. Missouri Pac. Blatch, 159, Fed. Cas. 10197. Ry. Co., 230 Mo. 496, 132 S. W. 312. post, Sec. 337. 1076. 310. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. McGrew Coal Co., 244 U. S. 191, 61 L. Ed. 1075, 37 Sup. Ct. 518; Sou. Pac. Co. v. California Adjustment Co., 237 Fed. 954, 150 C. C. A. 604. 311. St. Clair County v. Interstate Transp. Co.. 192 U. S. 454, 466, 48 L. Ed. 518, 24 Sup. Ct. 300, citing Mayor of New York v. Starin, 106 N. Y. 1, 12 N. E. 631; Brodnax v. Bake, 94 N. C. 675; 313. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. Board, etc., of Hudson County, 227 U. S. 248, 263, 264, 57 L. Ed. 499, 33 Sup. Ct. 269, reversing same styled case, 76 N. J. Law 664, 74 Atl. 954. This case and the St. Clair case, note 262, supra, cites and discusses many authorities. To the same effect see Port Richmond & B. P. F. Co. v. County of Hudson, 234 U. S. 317, 58 L. Ed. 1330, 34 "The inclusion of railroad ferries within the text is so certain and so direct as to require nothing but a consideration of the text itself. Indeed, this inevitable conclusion is not disputed in the argument for the defendant in error, but it is insisted that as the text only embraces railroad ferries and the ordinances were expressly decided by the court below only to apply to persons other than railroad passengers, therefore the action by Congress does not extend to the subject embraced by the ordinances. But as all the business of the ferries between the two states was interstate commerce within the power of Congress to control and subject in any event to regulation by the state as long only as no action was taken by Congress, the result of the action by Congress leaves the subject, that is, the interstate commerce carried on by means of the ferries, free from control by the state. We think the argument by which it is sought to limit the operation of the act of Congress to certain elements only of the interstate commerce embraced in the business of ferriage from state to state is wanting in merit. In the absence of an express exclusion of some of the elements of interstate commerce entering into the ferriage, the assertion of power on the part of Congress must be treated as being coterminous with the authority over the subject as to which the purpose of Congress to take control was manifested." While the language above was used with reference to a railroad ferry, it would seem to be board enough to include an ordinary ferry, and the law is that states have no greater power to regulate a ferry between two states than they have to regulate an interstate railroad.314 Nor can a state close naviga Sup. Ct. 821; reversing same styled case, 82 N. J. L. 536, 82 Atl. 729. 314. See Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Penna., 114 U. S. 196, 29 L. Ed. 158, 5 Sup. Ct. 826; Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204, 38 L. Ed. 962, 14 Sup. Ct. 1087; St. Clair County v. Interstate Transp. Co., 192 U. S. 454, 48 L. Ed. 518, 24 Sup. Ct. 300; Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 365, 41 L. Ed. 747, 17 Sup. Ct. 357; United States v. Union Bridge Co., 143 Fed. 377, affirmed, 204 U. S. 364, 51 L. Ed. 523, 27 Sup. Ct. 367; Manigault v. S. M. Word & Co., 123 Fed. 707, affirmed, Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473, 50 L. Ed. 274, 26 Sup. Ct. 227. 315 tion. Fish, sponges, oysters, etc., in local waters belong to the states and are subject to their control. 316 A municipality, and by parity of reasoning a state, cannot lawfully require a Canadian corporation operating a ferry over a boundary stream lying between Canada and the state in which the municipality is located to take out a license and pay a fee as a condition precedent to receiving and landing passengers and property in said municipality."" The rates for ferriage between two ports in the same state may be regulated by the state, notwithstanding the transportation is over a course which traverses the open sea," but a ferry across the Mississippi River between two States, the Circuit Court of Appeals in Long v. Miller, 262 Fed. 362 holds, is subject to regulation only by Congress. 318 § 54. Bridges.-Bridges across a stream which is a boundary between two states accommodate interstate commerce, and like ferries, are included in the definition of railroads in the Act to Regulate Commerce." The rules of law stated in the preceding section as applicable to ferries, apply equally to such bridges. There are, however, bridges across navigable streams which are wholly within the boundaries of a state. As to these, Mr. Justice Field said that the states had full power to regu 315. Levy v. United States, 92 Fed. 344, 34 C. C. A. 392, reversed, Levy v. United States, 177 U. S. 621, 44 L. Ed. 914, 20 Sup. Ct. 797. holding that the evidence was insufficient to show that the waters were used in interstate commerce. 316. The Abby Dodge, 223 U. S. 166, 56 L. Ed. 390, 32 Sup. Ct. 310, and cases cited and discussed in the opinion. 317. Sault Ste. Marie v. International Transit Co., 234 U. S. 333, 58 L. Ed. 1337, 34 Sup. Ct. 826 318. Wilmington Trans. Co. v. R. R. Com. of Calif., 236 U. S. 320 151, 59 L. Ed. 508, 35 Sup. Ct. 276. 319. Note 263, supra. 320. Cardwell V. American Bridge Co., 113 U. S. 205, 208, 209, 28 L. Ed. 959, 5 Sup. Ct. 423. See also Wilson V. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet., 27 U. S. 245, 7 L. Ed. 412; Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 13 How., 54 U. S. 518, 564, 14 L. Ed. 249; Gilman v. Philadelphla, 3 Wall., 70 U. S. 713, 18 L. Ed. 96; Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 459, 24 L. Ed. 525; Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, 27 L. Ed. 442, 2 Sup. Ct. 185; Miller v. Mayor of New York, 109 U. S. 285, 27 L. Ed. 971, 3 Sup. Ct. 270. late within their limits matters of internal police, which embraces among other things the construction, repair and maintenance of roads and bridges, and the establishment of ferries; that the states are more likely to appreciate the importance of these means of internal communication and to provide for their proper management, than a government at a distance; and that, as to bridges over navigable streams, their power is subordinate to that of congress, as an act of the latter body is, by the Constitution, made the supreme law of the land; but that until Congress acts on the subject their power is plenary. When Congress acts directly with reference to the bridges authorized by the state, its will must control so far as may be necessary to secure the free navigation of the streams." The same principle is announced by Mr. Justice Hughes in the Minnesota Rate cases, as follows:"21 "A state is entitled to protect its coasts, to improve its harbors, bays and streams, and to construct dams and bridges across navigable rivers within its limits, unless there is conflict with some act of Congress. Plainly, in the case of dams and bridges, interference with the accustomed right of navigation may result. But this exercise of the important power to provide local improvements has not been regarded as constituting such a direct burden upon intercourse or interchange of traffic as to be repugnant to the federal authority in its dormant state." Where, under authority of a state, a bridge has been erected over a navigable stream within the state, the owners having erected such bridge with full knowledge of the paramount authority of Congress cannot complain when, under authority of the federal government, such bridge is required to be removed. as an obstruction to navigation." Nor is this rule different 321. Simpson v. Shepard, 230 U. S. 352, 403, 58 L. Ed. 151, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, citing authorities. 322. Union Bridge Co. V. United States, 204 U. S. 364, 51 L. Ed. 523, 27 Sup. Ct. 367, followed in Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 177, 54 L. Ed. 435, 30 Sup. Ct. 322 306. See also, The Brig Aurora, 7 Cranch, 11 U. S. 382, 3 L. Ed. 378; Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 23 U. S. 1, 6 L. Ed. 253; Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 36 L. Ed. 294, 12 Sup. Ct. 495; C. W., etc., R. Co. v. Com'rs. 1 Ohio St. 77; Moers v. City of Reading, 21 Pa. St. 188; Locke's Appeal, when the bride has been erected under authority of an Act of Congress. 323 A state court may not compel the removal of abridge over a navigable stream, such bridge being used in interstate com 325 § 55. Regulating Charges for Transportation by Water.— The Act to Regulate Commerce applies,' “to any common carrier or carriers engaged in the transportation of passengers or property whelly by railroad (or partly by railroad and partly by water when both are used under a common control, management, or arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment,)" and since the enactment of the Panama Canal Act to interstate transportation by water. There is a transportation service which is performed by vessels over inland waters wholly within one state. When this transportation service is open to all who apply therefor, that those engaged therein are common carriers is too well settled to justify extensive citation of authorities. Being common car 72 Pa. St. 491, 498; Buttfield v. 326 Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281, 52 L. 323. Hannibal Bridge Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 194, 55 L. Ed. 699, 31 Sup. Ct. 603. The rule as to bridges would apply to dams, Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet., 27 U. S. 245. 7 L. Ed. 412; Pound V. Turck, 95 U. S. 459, 24 L. Ed. 525. 324. Kansas City S. R. Co. v. K. W. Valley Drainage District, 233 U. S. 75, 58 L. Ed. 837, 34 Sup. Ct. 564. 325. Sec. 335, post, and the power granted by the Panama Act, post. 377. 326. Moses v. Bettes, 4 Heisk. (Tenn.) 661, 13 Am. Rep. 1; Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 21 How. 62 U. S. 7, 22, 23, 16 L. Ed. 41; Brown v. Clayton, 12 Ga. 564. In |