a like encomium has been passed, by another author, on the Morals of Seneca, it is an evidence of its great excellence. It was addressed by its illustrious author to his son when a student at Athens, under Cratippus, a philosopher of eminence, and of whom Cicero entertained the highest opinion. The troubles at Rome, consequent upon the defeat of Pompey, the murder of Cæsar, and the dangerous power of Anthony and his associates, urged Cicero into the retirement of his villas, where he dedicated his time to the noblest of purposes, the instruction of his son in the duties which appertain to nearly every relation of life; and which he hoped to see him practice, when the dark clouds, which then hung over Rome, should pass away. It is reasonable to suppose that a work composed under such circumstances would have commanded all the resources, and the best feelings of that great man. It is, indeed, all that could have been anticipated, 'the noblest present ever made by a parent to a child.' We find in it little, if any thing, that can be called false morality. There is an earnestness, truly charming, in his inculcation of the virtues, and especially of his favourite maxim, that nothing should be accounted useful, but what is honest; a doctrine which puts to the blush the boasted theory of some of the modern christian utilitarians; and which is sustained by Cicero, not only with zeal, but with great force of argument. A great many useful, curious, and interesting questions in casuistry are proposed and solved by him. He holds, for example, that the distinction taken by some, (in order to justify the Alexandrian merchant,) viz: that not to tell may be honest, when to conceal is dishonest, is without foundation in pure morals. The case put is where the merchant of that city had shipped to Rhodes a quantity of grain, when that article was extremely scarce and dear at that place, but great quantities had been shipped

for Alexandria to Rhodes, and were then on the way; which fact, known to him alone, he did not conceal, but merely did not disclose. The justification he says is a distinction without a difference, and to be resorted to only by 'your shifting, sly, cunning, deceitful, roguish, crafty, foxish, juggling kind of fellows.' He holds also, that an orator may defend the guilty, provided his case be not wholly villanous and abominable, that much being allowed by the nature of his vocation; but that his duty will never permit him to accuse the innocent. That oaths made to lawful enemies are binding; not so of those made to pirates; hence the oath made by Regulus to the Carthagenians was obligatory, though its performance would certainly end in death: this point he maintains, in opposition to all the arguments of various philosophers. That a vicious. and unjust action is equally wicked, and to be avoided, though done so in secret as never to be known,-and that this would be the case, were it possible to conceal it even from the Gods-a most sublime and useful morality. That it was not sinning against virtue for Pythias to pledge his life for his friend Damon. That when an action is certainly dishonest, it is impious even to deliberate whether it shall be done or not. That the conduct of Scævola, in paying for an estate more than the owner estimated it at, because Scævola knew it to be worth more, was honest and profitable; and that the distinction, taken by some, between prudence and honesty, has no foundation in pure ethics. That the seller is in all cases bound to disclose to the full extent of his knowledge all defects, whether patent or latent, of his commodity; and that all commendation, in neglect of this duty, is additionally dishonest. That a person who has ignorantly received bad money for his goods, cannot honestly pass it off to another. That if an ignorant man offers to sell gold, believing it to be

copper, honesty enjoins us to inform him of his mistake. That if when at sea a plank can save but one person, he who knows his own life to be of less value than that of the other, would not be justified in snatching from him the tabulam in naufragio. That the opinion of some philosophers is wicked, which justifies the saving at sea a valuable horse in preference to a worthless slave. That a son who knows that his father designs to betray, in any way, his country, cannot honestly be silent; but is bound to disclose the fact, though the father perish thereby: but that in case of ordinary crimes committed by a parent, the son should rather defend than accuse the father, since it is much more to the general interest of a country that its citizens should reverence their parents, even to this extent, than that the sacred relation between child and parent should be weakened by an obligation to disclose them.

The foregoing are a few of the numerous points discussed in the volume under consideration. The book is replete with sentiments of the most elevated morality: and though it may be familiar to many classical scholars, as it is generally a part of the course of academic instruction, we have preferred to speak of this, as we shall generally of the works recommended in this Course of Study, in such a manner as may invite the student's attention, which we believe cannot be so well done as by giving a concise statement of their prominent contents, and such other interesting matters appertaining to them, as properly come within the scope of bibliography.

Of this work there are two English translations; one by L'Estrange, and the other by Cockman, accompanied with a variety of valuable notes.

The student will perceive that we have recommended the translation of this work. On the subject of translations, we shall perhaps find it not easy to make ourselves understood.

Whilst we would anxiously caution the student against the habit of generally reading translations, we would guard him against that false and injurious contempt of them, inspired by an idle emulation of classical learning; which often deters him from a perusal of any other than their originals. Few young men read the dead languages with that facility, without which a perusal of the Latin and Greek authors in the original is an idle waste of time; and admitting them to read the languages with ease, to feel the beauties, and enter into the spirit of what Quinctilian denominates the simple style, it is but reasonable to suppose that those who have devoted years to the critical investigation of a particular author, have attained a more accurate knowledge of his meaning, than could be acquired by even the most attentive consideration of minds engaged in a variety of other pursuits. These translations, besides, are usually illustrated by numerous annotations; and we see no reason why the student should insist on being his own pioneer, when he has the choice of broad and secure avenues. Is it not irrational, because you have a torch, to refuse the light of the sun? These observations apply chiefly to a certain description of writers, historical, didactic, and philosophical; but an occasional reference even to these in the original is strongly recommended. Homer, Virgil, Horace, Juvenal, Martial, &c.-the orations of Demosthenes, Cicero, Isæus, Lysias, Isocrates, &c. should be read chiefly in the original; but still who hesitates to read with pleasure Pope's translation of the Iliad and Odyssey? Or who would conceive his time misspent in occasionally perusing the translations of any of the above authors? Such works as the excellent translations of Aristotle's Ethics and Politics, by Gillies; of Tacitus, by Murphy; of Polybius, by Hampton; Plato, by Taylor; Herodotus, by Beloe; Plutarch, by Langhorne; Thucydides,

by Smith; Livy, by Baker; should be read by legal students chiefly in their translations, by all means occasionally perusing the original, in order to catch the peculiar beauties of the style. Such time as the student or lawyer can afford to this species of reading, should certainly be given to the perusal of the classics in the original, as they will not only extend his knowledge, but verse him in the elegancies of their respective tongues. But the student, even if he be an excellent classical scholar, should hold good translations in high respect: and while some of these he may be permitted to disregard, in compliance with his classical taste, or more often his classical pride, others are in every respect, as valuable to him as their originals, or are at least auxiliary to their complete understanding.

In regard to works on the Roman Civil Law, while we would recommend translations, as well for the facilities they afford to the student, as for the sake of the illustrations by which they are accompanied, we would at the same time, in most cases, advise an attentive perusal of the originals, as their language is often peculiarly expressive, and their maxims, rules, and definitions are full, comprehensive, and sententious, scarcely admitting of adequate translation. This observation applies with peculiar force to the Institutes, Digests, and Code of Justinian; and, indeed, to most of the Roman legal writers. But Bynkershoek, Hugo, Warnkoeing, and the numerous modern authors on Roman law, and the jurisprudence of the continent, (as far as they have been translated,) will be read to advantage in their new garb. We have anticipated these observations on the Roman law, (which the student will take up near the close of his studies,) because they now fall in with our views on the subject of translations generally, and could not well have been separated. The object of these