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Argument for the Railway Corporations.

201 U. S.

controversy was in the actual possession of receivers appointed by the Circuit Court of the United States. The fact that the purpose of the action was to aid in the collection of judgments at law by preserving certain assets properly applicable to the satisfaction of said judgments, and by establishing and quieting the title of the receivers to property of which they were in possession or with which they were vested, and which it might become necessary to sell in the course of a complete administration of the property of said corporation defendants for the benefit of their creditors. The fact that the ground of action was the attempted impairment of the obligation of a contract by the ordinances, resolutions and legislative acts of the defendant, acting through its common council, and the imminent danger of further action in the same direction with still more destructive consequences. Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450; Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 276; Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U. S. 131; Morgan's Company v. Texas Central Ry., 137 U. S. 171; In re Tyler, 149 U. S. 164; Rouse v. Letcher, 156 U. S. 47; White v. Ewing, 159 U. S. 36; Pope v. Louisville &c. Ry., 173 U. S. 570; Porter v. Sabin, 149 U. S. 473, 479; Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 608, 618; Price v. Abbott, 17 Fed. Rep. 506; Armstrong v. Trautman, 39 Fed. Rep. 275; Compton v. Jesup, 68 Fed. Rep. 263; S. C., 15 C. C. A. 397; Lanning v. Osborne, 79 Fed. Rep. 657, 662; Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Continental Trust Co., 95 Fed. Rep. 497, 505; S. C., 36 C. C. A. 155; Davis v. Martin, 113 Fed. Rep. 6, 9; S. C., 51 C. C. A. 27.

A Federal question was presented.

Co. v. Vicksburg, 185 U. S. 65.

Vicksburg Water Works

It makes no difference whether the repudiation by the city was legislative or administrative in its character-by ordinance or resolution. Walla Walla v. Water Co., 172 U. S. 1; American Waterworks &c. Co. v. Water Co., 115 Fed. Rep. 171; Riverside &c. Ry. Co. v. Riverside, 118 Fed. Rep. 736.

The jurisdiction in these actions cannot be impaired by collateral attacks on the judgments at law. Cuddy, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 280; Cutler v. Huston, 158 U. S. 423; Dowell v. Ap

201 U. S.

Argument for the Railway Corporations.

plegate, 152 U. S. 327; W. B. Conkey Co. v. Russell, 111 Fed. Rep. 417.

There was no collusion in bringing the suit. The only possible subject of collusion was in the choice of tribunals as between the courts of Illinois and the courts of the United States. "Collusion" can not be predicated of such choice. The right to make a choice was one given to the complainant by the Constitution and laws of the United States, without restriction as to motive. There being a real debt and a real diversity of citizenship, the motive of the creditor in bringing the suit is not a matter of inquiry in this court. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286, 310; Dickerman v. Northern Trust Co., 176 U. S. 181, 190; Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U. S. 327, 336; Crawford v. Neal, 144 U. S. 585; Cheaver v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108, 123; Smith v. Kernochen, 7 How. 198, 216. See also Sage v. Memphis &c. R. R. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 571.

The Circuit Court had jurisdiction to render a decree protecting the possession and quieting the title of the receivers. The whole attitude of the municipal authorities was calculated to lead irresponsible persons to take the law into their own hands. It needed only some overt and conspicuous official act, like the notice from the Commissioner of Streets, to turn loose forces of chaos and destruction. The Mayor had by his public declarations and messages, made police protection a political impossibility.

That a court of equity has power to give relief against such an intolerable condition of affairs is clear. In holding that equity will give such relief, this court has shown no disposition to be restrained within the narrow limits of ancient precedents. Cases of this kind are sui generis and constitute a striking instance of the adaptability of equitable remedies to new conditions. Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Waterworks Co., 172 U. S. 1, 12; Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Water Co., 177 U. S. 558, 581; Detroit v. Detroit Citizens' Street Railway Co., 184 U. S. 368, 379; Vicksburg Water Co. v. Vicksburg, 185 U. S. 65; Cleveland v. Cleveland City R. Co., 194 U, S, 517, 531, VOL, CCI-28

Argument for the Railway Corporations.

201 U.S.

The existence of a cloud upon title is one of the irreparable injuries of which the complainants complain and against which it is the duty of a court of equity to give relief. Where the cloud complained of is serious and substantial and occasions irreparable injury, relief is not limited to cases where there is an apparently valid lien or title outstanding. Vicksburg Water Co. v. Vicksburg, 185 U. S. 65; American Waterworks &c. Co. v. Horn Water Co., 115 Fed. Rep. 171; Detroit v. Detroit Citizens' Ry. Co., 184 U. S. 368. This is not only a principle of general equitable jurisprudence, but a part of the local law of Illinois. Cicero Lumber Co. v. Town of Cicero, 176 Illinois, 9; Glucose Refining Co. v. Chicago, 138 Fed. Rep. 209; Monson v. Kill, 144 Illinois, 248.

It is a maxim of equity that the court having once obtained jurisdiction over a subject matter, will proceed to a complete determination of the entire controversy between the parties relating to such subject matter. United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 160 U. S. 1, 52; Ober v. Gallagher, 93 U. S. 199; Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Pet. 264.

The removal of a cloud from the title was within the ancillary jurisdiction of the court because it was essential to an intelligent administration of the property and to the full development of its public usefulness during the time that it should remain under the control of the court; and also to protect its value from unlawful impairment in case a sale should become necessary. Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203; Connor v. Alligator Lumber Co., 98 Fed. Rep. 155; Lanning v. Osborne, 79 Fed. Rep. 657; In re Tyler, 149 U. S. 164, 181; Rouse v. Letcher, 156 U. S. 47, 49.

It was no objection that complainants' title is an estate for years and not in fee. Goldsmith v. Gilliland, 22 Fed. Rep. 865; McKee v. Howe, 17 Colorado, 538; 31 Pac. Rep. 115; Pennie v. Hildreth, 81 California, 127, 130; City of Newport v. Taylor's Ex'rs, 55 Kentucky, 669.

The city's claim of a right to purchase was a cloud on title. The claim of an outstanding option of purchase, unaccom

201 U. S.

Argument for the Railway Corporations.

panied by any present attempt to exercise such option, was a cloud upon title from which the Circuit Court as a court of equity was bound to grant relief. Sea v. Morehouse, 79 Illinois, 216; Altschul v. Hogg, 62 Fed. Rep. 539; Lane v. Lesser, 135 Illinois, 567; Monson v. Kill, 144 Illinois, 248. This is generally recognized as a ground of relief in equity, even when no present possibility of trespass and no multiplicity of suits are to be apprehended. Hodgen v. Guttery, 58 Illinois, 431; Key City Gas Light Co. v. Munsell, 19 Iowa, 305; Tucker v. Kenniston, 47 N. H. 267. It is no objection to complainants' right to maintain the suit, that the city's claim is to a right in futuro. An unfounded claim to an estate in remainder or reversion is a cloud on title against which equity will give relief. Rhea v. Dick, 34 Ohio St. 420; Niles v. Gray, 12 Ohio St. 320; Onderdonk v. Mott, 34 Barb. 106; Clark v. Darlington, 7 S. Dak. 148. It is no objection to complainants' right to maintain the suit that they sue in a representative capacity. Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203; Laverty v. Sexton, 41 Iowa, 435; City of Newport v. Taylor's Ex'rs, 55 Kentucky, 699. While it has been repeatedly held in Illinois that a suit to quiet title cannot be maintained by an administrator, the reason given is that the administrator has no estate or interest in the land, but only a power of sale. Ryan v. Duncan, 88 Illinois, 144. It is no objection that there is no statute of Illinois specifically authorizing it. Courts of equity have inherent jurisdiction to grant such relief in a proper case. Whitney v. Stevens, 97 Illinois, 482; Lamb v. Farrell, 21 Fed. Rep. 5; Allen v. Halliday, 25 Fed. Rep. 688; Sharon v. Tucker, 144 U. S. 533; Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15. Nor that the defendant is a municipal corporation claiming certain powers under a statute of the State. Watson v. City of Elizabeth, 35 N. J. Eq. 345; City of Newport v. Taylor's Ex'rs, 55 Kentucky, 699; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203.

The complainants were under no obligation to set out specifically in their bills the nature of the adverse claims made by the city. It was sufficient to allege generally that such adverse

Argument for the Railway Corporations.

201 U. S.

claims existed. Ely v. New Mexico &c. R. Co., 129 U. S. 291; Tolleston Club of Chicago v. Clough, 146 Indiana, 93; Holbrook v. Winsor, 23 Michigan, 394. When issues have been joined and fully tried between the proper parties, the courts will not draw fine distinctions to defeat a remedy which it is in the public interest to have administered. Detroit v. Detroit Citizens' Street R. Co., 184 U. S. 368; Gridley v. Watson, 53 Illinois, 186; Mollie v. Peters, 28 Nebraska, 670; Goodrum v. Ayers, 56 Arkansas, 93.

The franchises possessed respectively by the North Chicago City Railway Company and the Chicago West Division Railway Company to construct, maintain and operate street railways in the streets and other public places of the city of Chicago in and over highways in the county of Cook, were derived by direct grant from the State of Illinois. It was the duty of the legislature to provide increased transportation facilities in the streets. Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Chicago, 140 Illinois, 309; Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Attorney General, Fed. Cas. No. 2666; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 341. The ownership of the fee of the streets by the city made no difference. Palatine v. Kreuger, 121 Illinois, 72.

It is equally clear, under the decisions in Illinois, that the public right of passage in 1859 was under the direct and immediate control of the General Assembly. Its powers in this respect had been delegated only to a limited extent, and for purposes clearly defined. In the exercise of these powers, in 1859, it was practically free from all constitutional restrictions. Except as modified by subsequent constitutional provisions, this continues to be the doctrine in Illinois to the present day. People ex rel Jackson v. Suburban Railroad Co., 178 Illinois, 594; West Chicago Park Commissioners v. McMullen, 134 Illinois, 170. The act of 1865 was a legislative construction of the act of 1859 to this effect.

In every grant by a sovereign authority the courts will endeavor to see an intelligible and beneficial purpose, and will so construe the grant as to favor that purpose and not go be

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