201 U.S. Argument for the Railway Corporations. yond it. In a country constituted as this is, where sovereign powers are exercised by representative legislative bodies, the courts recognize but one mode of "favoring the State," and that is by sustaining and making effective the legislative purpose. Romer v. St. Paul City R. Co., 75 Minnesota, 217; Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Hall, 91 U. S. 343; Pearsall v. Great Northern R. R., 161 U. S. 646; State v. Newport St. Ry. Co., 16 R. I. 533; State ex rel. &c. v. Hancock, 35 N. J. L. 537; Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's Car Co., 139 U. S. 24; Telephone Co. v. Manning, 186 U. S. 238; Wilmington City Ry. v. Railroad, 46 Atl. Rep. 12; Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497; Smith v. McDowell, 148 Illinois, 51. It is only in matters not essential to the main object of the grant that the rule of strict interpretation will be applied. Chicago Theological Seminary v. Illinois, 188 U. S. 662, 676; Brooklyn Heights R. Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 152 N. Y. 244; People ex rel. v. Deehan, 153 N. Y. 528, 532. Neither the city nor its common council ever possessed power, prior to May 3, 1875, to limit the time for the enjoyment of the grant made directly to these specially chartered companies by the General Assembly. Until the passage and acceptance of the Cities and Villages Act the whole power was retained by the assembly. The regulation of highways was purely a state function and the corporations created and affected by the acts prior to that time did not derive their powers from the municipality. See acts of 1859, 1861, 1865. This view as to the powers of the common council under the acts of 1859, 1861 and 1865 finds support in the judicial decisions in many other States. Westport v. Mulholland, 159 Missouri, 86; Atlantic City Water Works v. Consumers' Water Company, 44 N. J. Eq. 427; State v. Dayton Traction Co., 18 Ohio C. C. 490; Galveston &c. R. Co. v. Galveston, 90 Texas, 398; Appeal of City of Pittsburgh, 115 Pa. St. 4; Citizens' Street R. Co. v. City R. Co., 64 Fed. Rep. 647; Citizens' Street R. Co. v. City of Memphis, 53 Fed. Rep. 715, 732; National Foundry and Pipe Works v. Oconto, 52 Fed. Rep. 29, 34; Beek Argument for the Railway Corporations. 201 U.S. man v. Third Ave. R. R. Co., 153 N. Y. 144, 158; The People ex rel. v. Deehan, 153 N. Y. 528, 532. There are limits on the rule of contemporaneous construction of legislative acts especially in the case of a public corporation. The municipality, through the exercise of its strictly municipal powers, can so far embarrass the work of any public service corporation, that the inducement to avoid controversy is almost irresistible. A "course of conduct" on the company's part under such circumstances may be more naturally referred to a desire to preserve the peace than to an intention to place a construction on a statute. City of Chicago v. Evans, 24 Illinois, 52; City of Wichita v. Old Colony Trust Co., 132 Fed. Rep. 641; Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Water Co., 177 U. S. 558. Specific legislative authority was needed in order to enable the council to contract for a definite period of occupancy. Peoples' Railroad v. Memphis Railroad, 10 Wall. 38, 52; Potter v. Collis, 156 N. Y. 16; Stillwater v. Lowry, 83 Minnesota, 277. Or for a fixed rate of fare. Detroit v. Detroit Citizens' Street Railway Co., 184 U. S. 368, 382. Or for incidental rights and privileges. City of Chicago v. Sheldon, 9 Wall. 50. The act of February 14, 1859, embraced but one subject and the entire contents of said act were within the scope of its title. There may be included in an act any means which are reasonably adapted to secure the object indicated by the title. Larned v. Tiernan, 110 Illinois, 173; People ex rel. &c. v. Ottawa Hydraulic Co., 115 Illinois, 281. The constitutional provision was not intended to require that every subject of the enactment, subordinate and incidental to the main subject thereof, should be specifically referred to in the title of the act. Mahomet v. Quackenbush, 117 U. S. 508; Sutherland Statutory Construction, p. 86. See also People v. People's Gas Co., 205 Illinois, 482; S. C., 194 U. S. 1; Hoboken v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 124 U. S. 656; Jonesboro City v. Cairo &c. R. R. Co., 110 U. S. 192; Carter County v. Sinton, 120 U. S. 517; Van Brunt v. Flatbush, 128 N. Y. 50; Morris & Cummings Dredging Co. v. The Mayor, 64 N. J. L. 587; Sweet v. City of Syracuse et al., 201 U.S. Argument for the Railway Corporations. 129 N. Y. 316; Diana Shooting Club v. Lamoreaux, 114 Wisconsin, 44. The act of 1865 was within the power of the assembly. The contract under which the right to occupy the streets of Chicago is derived, is a contract between the State and the specially chartered companies whose railways are held under lease. The common council had authority to act in the matter only as an agent of the State, not of the city. Its function did not extend to the making of the contract, but only to supplying certain administrative details, necessary to carry the contract into execution. Hence it appears to be impossible that any constitutional question should arise as to the power of the State to modify the State's own contract, without asking the consent of the city of Chicago. But if the question were squarely presented as to the power of the General Assembly of Illinois in 1865 to modify a contract made by a municipality of that State, the conclusion must be in favor of the existence of the power. Chicago had no special constitutional status, such as is possessed by Denver or St. Louis. In that regard she stood on a level with the most obscure village in the State. People v. Hill, 163 Illinois, 186; Hawthorne v. People, 109 Illinois, 302; Wilson v. Trustees, 133 Illinois, 443. See also Covington v. Kentucky, 173 U. S. 231; East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. 511; Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207. The act of 1865 was not meaningless. Governor Ogelsby vetoed it in 1865 on the ground that it granted an extension of franchises as we now contend. See also opinion of corporation counsel, 1871; Message of Mayor Harrison, 1883; Report Street R. R. Commission, 1900. Though this particular act is abundantly justified as a wise exercise of legislative judgment, with the wisdom or unwisdom of the legislation the court can have no judicial concern. Priestman v. United States, 4 Dall. 28; Everett v. Knells, 2 Scott N. R. 531; McCrusky v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 601; Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207. Argument for the Railway Corporations. 201 U. S. In giving effect to the act of 1865, the only principles of interpretation are those applicable to any statute in which there is a plain declaration of the legislative purpose about a matter clearly within the competency of the legislature to decide. City of Springfield v. Edwards, 84 Illinois, 626; Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U. S. 1; Fry v. C., B. & Q. R. Co., 73 Illinois, 399; Beardstown v. Virginia, 76 Illinois, 34; Ottawa Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Downey, 127 Illinois, 201; Steere v. Bromwell, 124 Illinois, 27; McGann v. The People, 97 Ill. App. 591. It is a cardinal principle of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to all the words of the statute. Ogden v. Strong, 2 Paine, 584; Decker v. Hughes, 68 Illinois, 33, 41; Attorney General v. Plank Road, 2 Michigan, 139; Opinion of Justices, 22 Pick. 571; Nichols v. Wells, 2 Kentucky, 255; Leversee v. Reynolds, 13 Iowa, 310. The words "during the life hereof" mean "during the continuance or existence of this statute as an amendatory act." Benham v. Minor, 33 Connecticut, 252. A section of a statute has or can have no life except as a part of the whole statute. It has no force or meaning or significance apart from the enacting clause. Wheeler v. Chubbock, 16 Illinois, 361; Burritt v. State Contracts Comm'rs, 120 Illinois, 322; In re Seat of Government, 1 Wash. T. 115; State v. Patterson, 98 N. Car. 660. No "life" can be predicated of any part of a statute, but only of the statute as a whole. The words "hereof," "herein," or "hereby," in an original statute, refer to the act itself; in an amendatory statute they refer to the original act as amended. Lane v. Kolb, 92 Alabama, 636; Holbrook v. Nichol, 36 Illinois, 161; McKibbin v. Lester, 9 Ohio St. 628; Ely v. Holton, 15 N. Y. 595. The suggested difficulty as to the words "as made or amended" is equally devoid of substance. The word "as" may express either similarity, identity or simultaneity. It may relate to form, manner or time. Its use in the latter significance is well established and frequently recognized. Seibert's Appeal, 13 Pa. St. 500. 201 U. S. Argument for the Railway Corporations. The rule is always applicable that the legislature is presumed to legislate for the future, not for the past. For this reason courts are reluctant to give statutes a retrospective operation. White v. United States, 191 U. S. 545. This rule has been frequently recognized by the Supreme Court of Illinois. Cleary v. Hoobler, 207 Illinois, 97. Particularly is this principle applicable to a statute which expresses a general principle, as is here done by the words "all contracts," etc. To lay down a general rule and then to exclude from its operation all future cases, would be verging upon absurdity. City Railway Co. v. Citizens' Railroad Co., 166 U. S. 565. So firmly established is this rule of construction that the courts in many cases have construed statutes prospectively, even where the legislature had apparently confined its language with intention to the past or present tense. Amsbry v. Hinds, 48 N. Y. 57; Harvey v. Tyler, 2 Wall. 328; Railroad Co. v. Blackman, 63 Illinois, 117; People v. Hinrichsen, 161.Illinois, 223; Harris v. White, 81 N. Y. 532. The term "horse railway" is not used in the acts in the zoological sense, but in the popular sense as distinguishing such railways from steam roads. Words in a statute which are not technical are to be taken in their common or popular acceptation, unless some special reason exists for giving them a strict interpretation. City of Chicago v. Evans, 24 Illinois, 52; State v. Bridgewater Township, 49 N. J. L. 614; Gross v. Fowler, 21 California, 393; Schriefer v. Wood, 5 Blatchf. 215; File Sharpening Co. v. Parsons, 54 Connecticut, 310; Maillard v. Lawrence, 16 How. 251. This principle has been held to apply with peculiar force to the titles of legislative acts. Enterprise v. Smith, 62 Kansas, 815; West Plains Township v. Sage, 69 Fed. Rep. 943, 950; Little v. State, 60 Nebraska, 749. The motive power to be used by a street railway is peculiarly a subject for regulation, from time to time, by the police power of the State. The courts will not attribute to the legislature an intention to abridge or limit the police power by a |