bordering on a navigable stream are to be determined by the State
in which it is situated subject to the limitation that its rules do not
impair the efficacy of the grant or its use by the grantee. Joy v.
St. Louis, 332.

2. Title to accretions; nature of question as one of local or Federal law.
Whether land contained in an original patent reached to a river under
the distances called for is a question of fact, and whether the patentee
is entitled to accretion is a question of local and not Federal law, and
ejectment for the land made by accretion cannot, where diversity of
citizenship does not exist, be maintained in the Circuit Court as a case
arising under the law of the United States. Ib.

3. Indian reservations; effect of Wisconsin enabling act as grant of sections
within, for school purposes.

The provisions in the enabling act of August 6, 1846, authorizing the people
of the then Territory of Wisconsin to form a state government, and by
which section 16 in every township of the public lands, in that Terri-
tory, not sold or otherwise disposed of was granted to the State for the
use of schools, did not operate to vest in the State section 16 of town-
ships within the La Pointe or Bad River and the Flambeau Indian
Reservations from which the Indians have never been required to
remove; and this notwithstanding by the provisions in treaties exe-
cuted prior to 1846 the Indians occupying them ceded those lands to
the United States only retaining the privileges of occupancy thereof
until required to remove therefrom by the President of the United
States, and that after 1846 the same lands were included in the reserva-
tions as they now exist. United States v. Thomas, 151 U. S. 557,
followed, as determinative of this case (although it did not have refer-
ence to the particular Reservation involved in this case). It was held
that the court will not, at this time and at the instance of the State,
interfere with the administration by the Interior Department of the
lands in question for the benefit of the Indians for whom the Reserva-
tion was established. Wisconsin v. Hitchcock, 202.

4. Parties in adverse proceedings-Restoration of land to public domain-
Collateral attack of rulings of Land Department-Final certificate as
equivalent of patent.

The Land Department refused to issue a patent on a mining lode location
for which the local office had issued final certificate on the ground that
the entry embraced two tracts separated by a placer claim; but gave
the applicant the privilege for a definite period of electing which tract
he would take, the entry to be cancelled on one of the tracts specified
unless he meanwhile appealed or made his election. Within the period
he waived his appeal and elected to take the other tract. Subsequently
the Land Department entered a formal order cancelling the entry as to
the tract abandoned. Meanwhile three entries were made of the aban-
doned tract. The first immediately after the Land Department had
refused the patent; the second immediately after the election and
relinquishment was made; and the third immediately after the final

order of cancellation was entered. In consolidated adverse proceed-
ings between these three entrymen, held, that:

(a) In adverse proceedings each party is practically a plaintiff and must
show his title.

(b) The order refusing to grant the patent did not of itself restore the land
to the public domain during the period of election, but the relinquish-
ment of the original entryman to the abandoned tract operated to do
so eo instanti, and the formal order of cancellation merely recorded a
preëxisting fact, and the rights of the party entering the land im-
mediately after the relinquishment were superior to those of the other
entryman.

(c) Rulings of the Land Department as to land covered by a location can-
not be challenged collaterally in separate proceedings and the principle
of freedom from collateral attack is equally applicable in cases of final
entry as in those where patent has issued.

(d) A final certificate issued after submission of final proof and payment
of purchase price is for many purposes equivalent to a patent. Brown
v. Gurney, 184.

1. Jurisdiction of subordinate judicial tribunals dependent upon act of Con-
gress.

Subordinate judicial tribunals of the United States can exercise only such
jurisdiction as may be authorized by acts of Congress and whatever
the nature of a civil suit or criminal proceeding in a state court it
cannot be removed to the Federal court unless warrant therefor be
found in some act of Congress. Kentucky v. Powers, 1.

2. Right of removal where discrimination against accused due to illegal or
corrupt acts of administrative officers unauthorized by constitution or
laws of State.

Under §§ 641, 642, Rev. Stat., there is no right of removal into the Circuit

Court of the trial of a person indicted under the state law where the

alleged discrimination against the accused in respect to his equal rights,
is due merely to illegal or corrupt acts of administrative officers un-
authorized by the constitution or laws of the State as interpreted by
its highest court. The remedy for wrongs of that character is in the
state court, and ultimately in this court by writ of error to protect
any right secured or granted to the accused by the Constitution or
laws of the United States which has been denied to him in the highest
court of the State in which the decision in respect to that right can be
had. Ib.

3. Refusal of state courts on previous trials to recognize alleged pardon by
acting governor as ground for removal.

The fact that the courts of the State have on previous trials refused to

recognize the validity of an alleged pardon given to the accused by the
acting Governor of the State does not make a case under § 641, Rev.
Stat., for the removal of the prosecution from the state court into the
Circuit Court. Ib.

4. Application of section 641, Rev. Stat.
While the prior decisions of this court determining the scope of § 641,
Rev. Stat., had reference to discrimination against negroes because of
their race, the rules announced equally apply where it exists as to the
white race; § 641 as well as the Fourteenth Amendment is for the
benefit of all of either race whose cases are embraced by its provisions
and not alone for the benefit of the African race. Ib.

REMOVAL FROM OFFICE.

See CIVIL SERVICE.

REPEAL.

See STATUTES, A 3.

RIPARIAN RIGHTS.

See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 1;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 7.

SCHOOL LANDS.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 3.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 14, 15.

SELF-INCRIMINATION.
See WITNESSES, 3, 7.

SERVICE OF PROCESS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 11.

1. Title; effect of generality of title on validity of statute under constitutional
restriction as to subjects.

The generality of the title of a state statute does not invalidate it under a
provision of the constitution of the State that private and local laws
shall only embrace one subject which shall be expressed in the title,
so long as the title is comprehensive enough to reasonably include
within the general subject or the subordinate branches thereof, the
several objects which the statute seeks to effect, and does not cover
legislation incongruous in itself and which by no fair intendment can
be included as having any necessary and proper connection.
clair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147.) Blair v. Chicago, 400.

(Mont-

2. Title; expression of object in; effect of declaration as to character of rail-
ways concerned, on exercise of power of city in such manner as to au-
thorize use of other motive power.

A declaration in the title of state statutes that they concern horse railways,
where it is apparent that these terms were intended to indicate street
railways as distinguished from steam railways, will not, because of a
constitutional provision that the object of the statute must be ex-
pressed in the title, prevent the city from exercising its powers under
the statute in such manner as to authorize the use of other power such
as cable or electricity. Ib.

3. Repeal; effect as to ratification of contracts existing when statutes passed.
The repeal of a state statute authorizing every street railway to be operated

by such animal, electric or other power as the municipal authorities
may have granted would not destroy its effect to ratify contracts in
existence when it was passed. Ib.

4. Reading of statute amended.

As a rule of construction a statute amended is to be understood in the same
sense exactly as if it had read from the beginning as it does amended. Ib.

5. Effect of abolition of office, the consent of whose incumbent is necessary
under a statute to authorize extension of street railway-Effect of subse-
quent act limiting life of franchises.

Where a state statute requires the consent of a municipal officer to au-
thorize the extension of a street railway the abolition of that office
does not authorize the extension without any official consent; and

where the consent of municipal authorities is required for franchises
relating to special localities by a statute, and subsequently a general
act limits the time for which any such franchise can be granted in any
city or village, the consent given will be presumed, in the absence of
any period specified not to be in perpetuity, but for the period as so
limited. Ib.

1. Effect of reorganization of railroad company on exemption from taxation.
Where a railroad company is reorganized under a special act of the legis-
lature but no new corporation is chartered a statutory exemption from
taxation is not destroyed. Powers v. Detroit & Grand Haven Ry., 543.