M.S. Congres HEARINGS BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE Senate COMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION. UNITED STATES SENATE SEVENTY-SECOND CONGRESS FIRST SESSION ON S. 3275 A BILL TO PERMIT NATURALIZATION OF ALIEN MARCH 22 AND 26, 1932 Printed for the use of the Committee on Immigration UNITED STATES WASHINGTON: 1932 NATURALIZATION OF ALIEN CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS TUESDAY, MARCH 22, 1932 UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, Washington, D. C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10.30 o'clock a. m., in room 212 Senate Office Building, Senator David A. Reed presiding. Present: Senators Reed (chairman), Patterson and Coolidge. The subcommittee had under consideration the following bill: [S. 3275, Seventy-second Congress, first session] A BILL To permit naturalization of alien conscientious objectors Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the first sentence of the fourth subdivision of section 4 of the naturalization act of June 29, 1906, as amended, is amended by striking out the period at the end thereof and inserting in lieu thereof a semicolon and the following: "but an alien otherwise qualified shall not be denied citizenship under any provisions of this act solely by reason of his refusal on conscientious grounds to promise to bear arms or otherwise participate in war: Provided, That nothing in the foregoing provisions shali be construed to affect the obligations of aliens after their admission to citizenship." Senator REED. We will hear the proponents of the bill this morning, and we hope to cover that side of the case between now and 12 o'clock. Then the committee will arrange another session at which to hear the opponents of the bill. Mr. Davis, are you ready to go ahead? Mr. DAVIS. At any time, Senator. STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN W. DAVIS Mr. DAVIS. I was asked just now by one of our newspaper friends in what capacity I appeared this morning. I am not commissioned to appear in any capacity other than a person interested in the bill. I represent no organized society. I have on this particular occasion no client; and I am here presumably because of my interest in this particular topic. My interest in this subject, gentlemen, draws from the case of Professor Macintosh. I was counsel in that case in the Supreme Court of the United States; and, unfortunately, from my point of view the Supreme Court did not agree with the argument I presented. I am not filing a petition for a rehearing before this committee. Unfortunately no such petitions lie from that particular tribunal. 1 My attention to this subject draws, as I say, from that particular incident, and perhaps I can do no better than make that case the pivot on which I wish to hang what I have to say in favor of this particular bill. Let me say at the outset I am not interested in the language of this bill; I am only interested in the principal object which the bill undertakes to make a part of the law and which I think is necessary for purposes of clarification. What about that Macintosh case? It came to my office after the district court in Connecticut had refused his petition for naturalization. I went into the facts and discovered that here was a man 53 years of age, 8 years past the period which every statute has fixed as the dead line of military validity, who was born in Canada under a system of laws and jurisdiction similar to our own, accustomed to the doctrines of Government that we believe in, who had been educated in this country at the University of Chicago, had taken a degree there in 1904, who had been ordained in this country to the Baptist ministry in 1907, who had been a professor of Yale ever since 1909, occupying one of the most responsible chairs in the institution, and who had been continuously engaged in the education of the young men of the United States, for some 20 years before his petition for naturalization came forward. I discovered that prior to the breaking out of the Great War he had declared his intention to become an American citizen, and that when the war broke out and his native country, Canada, became involved, he abandoned that present intention on the theory that while his native country was at war his first allegiance must be to it. He had studiously sought service under the military forces of Canada, and in 1916 with the indorsement and active aid of exPresident Taft he had secured enlistment in the forces of Canada as chaplain in the Canadian Army; served at the Battle of Vimy Ridge and along the Somme. After his term of enlistment had expired, the Canadian forces declared that they had no further use for additional chaplains, and released him from service, against his protest. He returned to this country and toured the country from coast to coast, speaking and writing in favor of the Allied cause. When we entered the war the man sought service with the American forces, and at the close of the war was serving at the front at St. Mihiel, in charge of a Y. M. C. A. hut. He came forward to be naturalized as an American citizen after that service, and along with others appeared before the examiner of the Bureau of Immigration, then before the district court of Connecticut, and his petition was denied. I said to myself when those facts were presented: "On what theory can a man so eminently qualified for American citizenship as this be denied the right of naturalization? Is not this exactly the type of man who will contribute most to the citizenship of the United States, and is he not a desirable addition from every point of view?" I turned to the naturalization law and read that the requirements which Congress had specified were that it should be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court that he had resided continuously within the United States five years at least, and in the State or Territory one year at least; that during that time he had behaved as a man of good moral character attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same. I said to myself: "If any man has ever presented himself to a court to fulfill those requirements, surely this man has." Then I saw that he was required further to take an oath that abjured any allegiance to the sovereign to whom he had theretofore owed his allegiance; that he was required further to swear that he would support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and I was advised that he had offered to take that oath; that he had asked no qualification of that oath; that he was prepared to do everything which, as far as I could read the act, he was required to do to attain the privilege of American citizenship. It appeared, however, that in the questionnaire presented to him by the Bureau of Naturalization there was question 22, which in my humble judgment, did not draw at all from the statute, but drew entirely from the conception of some officer in the Bureau of Naturalization. Question 22 was in this categorical form: Are you willing, if necessary, to take up arms in defense of the United States? In answering that question he had said-and I shall not go into the details of his statement-that he was so prepared, but that he reserved the right to determine whether such service would or would not violate his conscientious conception of his duties toward his God. He had proved the fact during the Great War that he was no pacifist; his writings and utterances during the Great War showed his firm belief that right must be supported by might, and that when right was endangered that it was the duty of every man to spring to its defense; but he could not waive what he conceived to be the duty to consult his conscientious objections if the occasion demanded it. I was not aware that the oath of allegiance required any such waiver. I suppose all of us who have held any public office have taken that oath. Senators and Representatives have taken that oath; those who serve in any other governmental capacity have taken the same oath. I had never supposed that a judge upon the bench, when he took the oath of allegiance, would, when a war broke out, cast off his judicial gown and enroll in the armed forces of the country; I did not suppose that a Representative, when he took that oath, agreed that if war broke out he would desert his duties in the legislative hall and take up arms in the defense of his country. Therefore, I assumed with some assurance that this requirement was a pure bureaucratic innovation and that it emanated from the Bureau of Naturalization as an adornment and embroidery of the act which Congress itself had passed specifying what was necessary for admission. That contention was presented to the circuit court of appeals, presented to the Supreme Court of the United States; in all, presented to 13 judges. Seven of those judges agreed with the contention which I made bold to present; six of them disagreed with that contention. Those who disagreed were the district judge who tried the case and the five, constituting the majority, of the Supreme Court; and I bow to the fact that the majority in the Supreme Court |