LIBEL AND SLANDER. I. WORDS AND ACTS ACTIONABLE, 7 (Ark.) Defendant's statement that plaintiff was a whore, and that she poisoned his dog, was actionable under Kirby's Dig. §§ 1854, 1856. -Keck v. Shepard, 180 S. W. 501. II. PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS, 38 (Tex.Civ.App.) A report by a grand jury, questioning the moral character of the sheriff, but not finding any indictment against him for crime, is not privileged.-Rich v. Eason, 180 S. W. 303. VI. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. (A) Offenses. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. See Adverse Possession; Constitutional Law, 48, 171; Taxation, 805. I. STATUTES OF LIMITATION. (A) Nature, Validity, and Construction in General. 4 (Tenn.) Acts 1901, c. 15, abolishing the disability of nonresidence, removes the exception of Shannon's Code, § 4448, and is valid, since it allows all persons a proper time to sue without arbitrarily cutting off their rights.-Jones v. Coal Creek Mining & Mfg. Co., 180 S. W. 179. The statute of limitations, affecting the remedy only, may apply as well to contracts made before its passage, as to those thereafter made. -Id. 13 (Mo.App.) In action for rent, with counterclaim for a commission, plaintiff held not estopped to take advantage of the statute of claim.-Edwards v. Rich, 180 S. W. 415. limitations applicable to defendant's counter II. COMPUTATION OF PERIOD OF LIMITATION. (A) Accrual of Right of Action or Defense. 145 (Mo.App.) Publication, together with colloquium and innuendo, held libelous as charg-49 (Tex.) Where plaintiff gave his own pering loose morals, and also gambling, embezzle- sonal negotiable note in settlement of decedent's ment, and bribery of public officers, denounced as criminal offenses by Rev. St. 1909, 88 4764, 4552, and 4395, respectively.-State v. Pardo, 180 S. W. 578. The mere fact that a criminally libelous charge is formulated as an inquiry avails defendant nothing, for when the defamatory accusation is thus cast it is a libel as well as if it had been made directly.-Id. (B) Prosecution and Punishment. 152 (Mo.App.) Information for criminal libel, if setting out libelous misconduct with regard to funds of a parish, held to contain a colloquium sufficient to show with reasonable debt, there was an immediate payment of the debt, so that an action for reimbursement, which would be one on an implied contract and not on a written obligation, accrued when the note was given, and the two-year statute applied.Yndo v. Rivas, 180 S. W. 96. (B) Performance of Condition, Demand, and Notice. 65 (Mo.App.) Where no postponement of payment of a commission was mentioned until after sale at which time defendant charged plaintiff a commission, defendant's acquiescence in a postponement of its payment until the purchase price was paid lacked the mutuality nec For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER essary to an agreement, and did not toll the,197 (Tenn.) Evidence held insufficient to statute.-Edwards v. Rich, 180 S. W. 415. To suspend the running of the statute, an agreement to postpone the payment of a debt until certain money is collected must be sufficiently definite to suspend the right of action on the debt until the happening of the collection.-Id. negative concurrent presence of plaintiffs in United States, so as to remove the exception of the statute of limitations as to nonresidents.Jones v. Coal Creek Mining & Mfg. Co., 180 S. W. 179. LIQUOR SELLING. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. (C) Personal Disabilities and Privileges. See Carriers, 218; Telegraphs and Tele78 (Tenn.) Under Shannon's Code, § 4448, phones, 54. plaintiffs cannot maintain their action based upon a cumulative disability to avoid the operation of the statute of limitations, but can rely See Intoxicating Liquors. only upon their own disability, and not upon a disability of their ancestor in interest, upon whose death primary disability ceased.-Jones v. Coal Creek Mining & Mfg. Co., 180 S. W. 179. (E) Absence, Nonresidence, and Concealment of Person or Property. See Parties, LIS PENDENS. 26 (Tex.Civ.App.) The purchaser of a cause of action pending suit has a right to have the cause proceed in the name of his assignor; the judgment rendered inuring to the benefit of the purchaser.-Duke v. Trabue, 180 S. W. 910. LIVE STOCK. 84 (Tenn.) Under Shannon's Code, § 4448, no change of citizenship for removal of the disability of absence from the country is required, but if the persons excepted by the statute at any time come within the United States or its See Carriers, 216–230. territories, they are no longer protected by the statute.-Jones v. Coal Creek Mining & Mfg. Co., 180 S. W. 179. (F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and Concealment of Cause of Action. LOANS. See Executors and Administrators, 207. LOGS AND LOGGING. 104 (Mo.App.) Where defendant's right to See Constitutional Law, 65. sue for a commission was not dependent on his knowledge of plaintiff's collection of the purchase money, plaintiff's failure to inform defendant of its collection was not such wrongful conduct as to postpone the statute of limitations under Rev. St. 1909, § 1905.-Edwards v. Rich, 180 S. W. 415. Under agreement whereby defendant was to have commission when the purchase price of a mill sold by him was collected, plaintiff, while he could not take advantage of the statute of limitations if he used any artifice to conceal the collection of the price, was under no obligation to inform defendant thereof.-ld. (H) Commencement of Action or Other Proceeding. 130 (Tenn.) Where plaintiffs' exception to the statute of limitations by nonresidence was removed, and within two years they sued, their cause was saved so as to prevent subsequent acquisition of title by adverse possession against them, although it was subsequently dismissed, when a new action was brought within one year.-Jones v. Coal Creek Mining & Mfg. Co., 180 S. W. 179. suit III. ACKNOWLEDGMENT, NEW See Trespass. timber guarantees the purchaser a suitable road 3 (Ky.) Where a contract for the sale of is not entitled to an instruction entitling him to by which to remove the timber, the purchaser recover, unless a certain road could be used.Conder v. Ledford, 180 S. W. 77. 3 (Mo.App.) In an action for breach of an express warranty of title to timber sold, evidence held sufficient on the point that defendant sold the timber to support verdict for plaintitt. -Eminence Realty & Brokerage Co. v. Randolph, 180 S. W. 25. 8 (Mo.App.) Testimony of directions given plaintiff by defendant's timber inspector, who was not shown to have other authority whereby plaintiff was directed not to saw the amount of lumber specified, is inadmissible to show defendant's breach.-Phillips v. Todd, 180 S. W. 1039. Lumbering contract held not to require defendant to satisfy plaintiff's expense bills in excess of the amount due for lumber cut.-Id. Where defendant breached the contract providing for the cutting and sawing of timber by plaintiff, plaintiff's measure of damages is his profits must be made to warrant a recovery of more than nominal damages.-Id. tract, plaintiff cannot claim damages on the In an action for breach of a lumbering contheory that the deprivation of prospective profits caused him to lose his sawmill on replevin suit by a third person.-Id. 143 (Mo.App.) Where purchaser of mort-loss of net profits, if any, and proof of such gaged land obtained extension of time of payment by means of indorsement on the secured note, and after paying the debt pledged the note, to foreclose, brought within 10 years thereafter, held not barred by limitations. Devens v. Van Valkenburg, 180 S. W 996. 150 (Tex.) Promise of original debtor, whose 15 (Ky.) In an action to recover the agreed debt plaintiff had paid, to reimburse plaintiff price for driving logs, where the defense was at some indefinite time, not acceded to by plain- the right to terminate the contract on account tiff, held not a contract or new promise, suspending the operation of the statute of limitaof breach by the plaintiffs, as to which there was conflicting evidence, the question was for tions.-Yndo v. Rivas, 180 S. W. 96. the jury.-Beckette v. Kinner, 180 S. W. 530. V. PLEADING, EVIDENCE, TRIAL, 195 (Tenn.) While the burden of proof is on the one asserting the bar of the statute to show the bar, when the showing is made, the burden shifts to the other party to show that he has been always within an exception to the statute. -Jones v. Coal Creek Mining & Mfg. Co., 180 Verdict for plaintiffs in action to recover agreed price for driving logs held not excessive. -Id. Evidence held insufficient to show that there was payment in full of the contract price for driving logs.-Id. Contract for driving logs held not terminable at will.-Id. A petition to recover the contract price for by the defendants, plaintiffs used due diligence to get other employment, but failed to do so. -Id. LUMBER. See Logs and Logging. LUNATICS. See Insane Persons. MACHINERY. See Master and Servant, 209. MAINTENANCE. See Champerty and Maintenance. MALICE. See Homicide, 11, 286. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. V. ACTIONS. I. THE RELATION. (B) Statutory Regulation. 13 (Tex.Cr.App.) Under Acts 33d Leg. c. 68, not merely a contractor for public works, but an agent of the contractor, requiring persons to work more than eight hours a day, is guilty of misdemeanor.-Bradford v. State, 180 S. W. 702. (C) Termination and Discharge. 21 (Mo.App.) A contract of employment by week by notice then given.-Hutton v. Lamthe week might be terminated at the end of any bardi, 180 S. W. 566. 59 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for malicious prosecution based on alleged theft of bale of cotton, issue as to whether plaintiff had land-43 (Mo.App.) Evidence in an action for the lord's lien, to satisfy which he sold the bale, was collateral, and could be considered by the jury only on question of defendant's probable cause in making criminal complaint.-Rainey v. Old, 180 S. W. 923. 72 (Tex.Civ.App.) Instruction, that burden was on plaintiff to show defendant instituted prosecution without probable cause and with malice and intent to injure, was not bad as depriving plaintiff of benefit of presumption of malice and intent arising from want of probable cause.-Rainey v. Old, 180 S. W. 923. Such instruction held not misleading, as asserting that defendant could be actuated with malice while without intent to injure.-Id. In action for malicious prosecution for theft of bale of cotton, instruction that relation of landlord and tenant, under which plaintiff claimed to have sold cotton to satisfy his landlord's lien, did not exist, held not objectionable under the evidence.-Id. Instruction that jury should consider only facts known to defendant when instituting criminal proceedings, in determining question of defendant's probable cause, held not objectionable as improperly limiting jury on question of malice.-Id. MANSLAUGHTER. See Homicide. MANUFACTURING COMPANIES. See Taxation, 236. MAPS. See Deeds, 112. MARK. See Animals. MARKET VALUE. See Evidence, 113. MARRIAGE. See Breach of Marriage Promise; III. MASTER'S LIABILITY FOR IN- (A) Nature and Extent in General. 101, 102 (Ky.) An employer owes to his employé the duty of exercising ordinary care in furnishing tools and appliances which are reasonably free from defects.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Patrick, 180 S. W. 55. 101, 102 (Tex.Civ.App.) At common law a master owes to the servant the duty of exercising ordinary care to furnish a reasonably safe place to work, and safe tools and appliances with which to work.-Thurber Brick Co. v. Matthews, 180 S. W. 1189. The master's absolute obligation to see that due care is used to provide safe appliances for his servants is not extended to all the passing risks arising from short-lived causes.-Id. 114 (Mo.App.) Where a master provided a passway between tracks in which car repairers moved and deposited their new materials, the master, though bound to remove débris, is not bound to remove new materials, placed in the passway by the car repairers.-Hall v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 180 S. W. 426. 124 (Tex.Civ.App.) Railroad company, before turning hand car over to employé for use, held bound to inspect same, though bought from reputable manufacturer.-St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Ewing, 180 S. W. 300. Aside from simple tools, the master must Divorce; servant as would satisfy a prudent person of make such inspection of appliances furnished their safety.-Id. 62 (Ark.) Attorney's fees cost money and alimony pendente lite cannot be allowed on a wife's cross-bill as against the guardian of a minor husband suing to annul the marriage contract.-Erwin v. Erwin, 180 S. W. 186. 129 (Ky.) Railroad, whose freight train conductor, after notice that car's brake beam was defective, failed to stop the train, the beam derailing it, killing a track walker standing 15 feet away to let the train go by, was liable for the death.-Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. | 209 (Ky.) Risk from violent, unusual, and v. Strunk's Adm'x, 180 S. W. 528. (D) Warning and Instructing Servant. 155 (Ark.) There is no negligence of the master in not warning a man of ordinary intelligence and of experience of the obvious projection of a set screw on machinery which he was operating.-National Drainage Co. v. Bell, 180 S. W. 984. (E) Fellow Servants. 177 (Ky.) The master is not liable for injury to a servant from negligence of a fellow servant.-Nebo Coal Co. v. Barnett, 180 S. W. 79. 185 (Tex.Civ.App.) A master, furnishing a reasonably safe place to work and reasonably safe appliances, cannot be held liable to a servant whose fellow servant has negligently rendered the place or the appliances unsafe, without the master's fault or knowledge. Thurber Brick Co. v. Matthews, 180 S. W. 1189. Where an appliance is reasonably safe and its operation necessarily rests upon the care and intelligence of the fellow servants of the person injured, the master will not be held liable for an injury from the manner in which the appliance is operated by a fellow servant. -Id. unnecessary contact of a motor with a flat car propelled thereby is not one assumed by employés on the car.-Nebo Coal Co. v. Barnett, 180 S. W. 79. 216 (Tex.Civ.App.) At common law a servant assumes the risk of injury resulting from the negligence of a fellow servant, and cannot recover of the master therefor.-Thurber Brick Co. v. Matthews, 180 S. W. 1189. 217 (Ky.) Risks not naturally incident to failure to exercise due care to provide a reaan occupation and arising from the master's sonably safe place and appliances for work, are not assumed, until the servant knows of the defect and the risk arising therefrom.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Henry, 180 S. W. 74. 217 (Ky.) An employé who knows or should know the risks to which he is exposed, and appreciates their danger, assumes them if they are not latent, and not created by the master's negligence.-Concannon v. J. L. Strassel Paint & Roofing Co., 180 S. W. 86. danger does not constitute an assumption of Knowledge of defect without appreciation of risk, but a general knowledge of defects giving notice of danger defeats a recovery, although the employé was ignorant of the particular defect causing the injury.-Id. 217 (Ky.) A servant, injured by the fall of car, slipped and struck him, held to have asa heavy timber which, being unloaded from a sumed the risk. Isaacs v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 180 S. W. 345. 187 (Tex.Civ.App.) A master who delegates the performance of his duty to provide a servant with a safe place to work, so that another servant is injured as a result of negligence in the performance of that duty, cannot at com-217 (Tex.Civ.App.) A car repairer held not mon law invoke the fellow-servant rule to es- to have assumed the risk of cars being unincape liability.-Thurber Brick Co. V. Mat- tentionally kicked onto repair track on which thews, 180 S. W. 1189. he was working, by the mere act of working on a car outside a derail switch, without knowledge of any danger.-San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Littleton, 180 S. W. 1194. At common law a master cannot invoke the fellow-servant rule to escape liability for negligence of his servant, who occupies the relation of a vice principal toward an injured servant. -Id. 188 (Tex.Civ.App.) A servant may serve in the dual capacity of vice principal and fellow servant.-Thurber Brick Co. v. Matthews, 180 S. W. 1189. 219 (Ark.) The projection above the surface of a set screw being obvious the risk thereof was assumed by an employé who had for weeks worked within two feet of it.-National Drainage Co. v. Bell, 180 S. W. 984. 190 (Tex.Civ.App.) Negligence in not put- applicable where the plaintiff is injured by a 219 (Ky.) The simple tool doctrine is not ting back part of the floor of tram car, so that defect in a sledge handled by another employé. plaintiff stepping thereon was injured, held-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Patrick, 180 S. W. not the act of a vice principal, but of a fellow 55. servant in the performance of an incidental 219 (Mo.App.) The master held not liable duty, so that plaintiff could not recover.-Thur- for injury to a servant from the slipping, when ber Brick Co. v. Matthews, 180 S. W. 1189. tightening a nut, of a wrench, a simple tool, 202 (Ky.) The negligence must be gross, any defect in which was plain.-Neil v. Pryor, for the master to be liable, where negligence of 180 S. W. 407. a superior servant causes injury, not resulting 219 (Mo.App.) Servant injured when holdin death, to a servant immediately under the control and supervision of such superior servant.-Nebo Coal Co. v. Barnett, 180 S. W. 79. (F) Risks Assumed by Servant. 203 (Mo.App.) Assumption of risk is a defense to a servant's action for personal injuries. -Collins v. Rankin Farms, 180 S. W. 1053. 204 (Ky.) In a railroad employé's action for injuries by a splinter flying from a maul, it was error to sustain a demurrer to a plea of assumption of risk, the federal Employers' Liability Act as to assumption of risk not applying.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Patrick, 180 S. W. 55. 206 (Ky.) The dangers ordinarily and necessarily incident to an occupation are presumably taken into account in fixing the rate of wages, and an employé of mature years is taken to assume the risk therefrom.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Henry, 180 S. W. 74. 209 (Ky.) Risk of injury to employé in a planing mill, caused by a plank flying back when released by a defective spring in a saw, is not assumed by the servant.-Southern Planing Mill v. Hebel, 180 S. W. 63. ing a slipping valve hook with his hand so that water in a high-pressure cylinder might be removed, a matter not obviously dangerous, held not barred of recovery by assumption of risk. -Stamper v. Hammond Packing Co., 180 S. W. 1074. 220 (Ky.) Where an employé was killed by falling from a scaffold of the safety of which he had complained, recovery was not defeated on the ground of assumption of risk, where the employer's foreman had assured decedent of the safety of the scaffold.-Concannon v. J. L Strassel Paint & Roofing Co., 180 S. W. 86. 220 (Tex.Civ.App.) Employé held to assume risk of injury from defective tool by continuing work without protest, or after protest if nothing is said or done to induce belief that repairs will be made.-Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Brown, 180 S. W. 1117. 221 (Tex.Civ.App.) Employé, continuing to work for a reasonable time in reliance on promise that defect in appliance will be remedied, held not to assume the risk.-Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Brown, 180 S. W. 1117. Section hand held entitled to rely on fore fective one, though not made to him individual | 264 (Mo.App.) Where a car repairer, in- (G) Contributory Negligence of Servant. 228 (Mo.App.) A coal miner's request for the defendant master was negligent in employ- 265 (Mo.App.) Where a car repairer, in- 426. 265 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the eyes of a nacky, 180 S. W. 141. 229 (Ky.) That a servant may recover of 270 (Ky.) Violent, unusual, and unneces 234 (Ky.) Where a servant continues work276 (Ky.) Evidence held insufficient to show that a defect in a brake on a lever car, by which sey, 180 S. W. 38. Evidence held to show an accident to an em- 234 (Mo.App.) A servant injured by slip; S. W. 407. 241 (Ky.) Where an experienced railroad 243 (Ky.) Defendant railroad, whose train (H) Actions. 250 (Mo.App.) The petition for injury to 256 (Tex. Civ.App.) Petition, in action for In an action for the death of a car repairer, pany's injured servant, evidence held sufficient to 278 (Mo.App.) In an action for injuries to 278 (Mo.App.) Where a car repairer turned 278 (Mo.App.) In suit against a lumber 278 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action by a rail- 279 (Ky.) Evidence held insufficient to 279 (Tex.Civ.App.) In a servant's action, |