3. A person who, being without the state, causes, procures, aids, er abets another to commit a crime within the state;

4. A person who, being out of this state, abducts or kidnaps by force or fraud, any person contrary to the laws of the place where such act is committed, and brings, sends or conveys such person within the limits of this state, and is afterwards found therein.

5. A person who, being out of the state and with intent to cause within it a result contrary to the laws of this state does an act which in its natural and usual course results in an act or effect contrary to its laws.

§ 17. Presumption of responsibility in general. A person is presumed to be responsible for his acts. The burden of proving that he is irresponsible is upon the accused person, except as otherwise prescribed in this Code.

§ 18. Same, as to child under seven years. A child under the age of seven years is not capable of committing crime.

19. Child under seven not capable of crime. A child of the age of seven years, and under the age of twelve years, is presumed to be incapable of crime; but the presumption may be removed by proof that he had sufficent capacity to understand the act or neglect charged against him, and to know its wrongfulness. Whenever in any legal proceeding it becomes necessary to determine the age of a child, the child may be produced for personal inspection, to enable the magistrate, court or jury to determine the age thereby; and the court or magistrate may direct an examination by one or more physicians, whose opinion shall also be competent evidence upon the question of age.

§ 20. Irresponsibility, etc., of idiot, lunatic, etc. An act done by a person who is an idiot, imbecile, lunatic or insane, is not a crime. A person cannot be tried, sentenced to any punishment, or punished for a crime, while he is in a state of idiocy, imbecility, lunacy or insanity, so as to be incapable of understanding the proceeding or making his defense.

21. Same. A person is not excused from criminal liability as an idiot, imbecile, lunatic, or insane person, except upon proof that, at the time of committing the alleged criminal act, he was laboring ander such a defect of reason as either

1. Not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or 2. Not to know that the act was wrong.

22. Intoxicated persons. No act com.ted by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication, shall be deemed less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition. But whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive or intent is a

necessary element to constitute a particular species or degree of crine, the jury may take into consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the time, in determining the purpose, motive or intent with which he committed the act.

§ 23. Morbid criminal propensity. A morbid propensity to commit prohibited acts, existing in the mind of a person who is not shown to have been incapable of knowing the wrongfulness of such acts, forms no defense to a prosecution therefor.

§ 24. Rule as to married women. It is not a defense, to a married woman charged with crime, that the alleged criminal act was committed by her in the presence of her husband.

25. Rule as to persons acting under threats, etc. Where a crime is committed or participated in by two or more persons, and is committed, aided, or participated in by any one of them, only because during the time of its commission, he is compelled to do, or to aid or participate in the act, by threats of another person engaged in the act or omission, and reasonable apprehension on his part of instant death or grievous bodily harm, in case he refuses, the threats and apprehension constitute duress, and excuse him.

§ 26. Rule when act done in defense of self or another. An act, otherwise criminal, is justifiable when it is done to protect the person committing it, or another whom he is bound to protect, from inevitable and irreparable personal injury, and the injury could only be prevented by the act, nothing more being done than is necessary to prevent the injury.

27. Exemption of public ministers. Ambassadors and other public ministers from foreign governments, accredited to the presi dent or government of the United States, and recognized according to the laws of the United States, with their secretaries, messengers, families and servants, are not liable to punishment in this state, but are to be returned to their own country for trial and punishment.

§ 28. Principal and accessory. A party to a crime is, either

1. A principal; or,

2. An accessory.

§ 29. Definition of principal. A person concerned in the commission of a crime, whether he directly commits the act constituting the offense, or aids and abets in its commission, and whether present or absent, and a person who directly or indirectly counsels, commands, induces or procures another to commit a crime, is a principal.

§ 30. Definition of accessory. A person who, after the commission of a felony, harbors, conceals, or aids the offender, with intent that he may avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction, or punishment, having knowledge or reasonable ground to believe that such offender is liable to arrest, has been arrested, is indicted or convicted, or has committed a felony, is an accessory to the felony.

3 R. S. 989, § 7.

§ 31. All principals in misdemeanors. A person who commits or participates in an act which would make him an accessory if the crime committed were a felony, is a principal and may be indicted and punished as such if the crime be a misdemeanor.

Sce § C82, post.

§ 32. Punishment of accessories. An accessory to a felony may be indicted, tried, and convicted, either in the county where he became an accessory, or in the county where the principal felony was committed, and whether the principal felon has or has not been previously convicted, or is or is not amenable to justice, and although the principal has been pardoned or otherwise discharged after conviction.

§ 33. Same. Except in a case where a different punishment is specially prescribed by law, a person convicted as an accessory to a felony is punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years, or by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars, or by both.

TITLE III.

DEGREES IN THE COMMISSION OF CRIMES AND ATTEMPTS TO COMMIT CRIMES.

SECTION 34. What is an attempt to commit a crime.

35. Prisoner indicted may be convicted of lesser crime, or attempt.
36. Acquittal or conviction bars indictment for another degree, or

attempt.

34. What is an attempt to commit a crime. An act, done with intent to commit a crime, and tending but failing to effect its commission, is an attempt to commit that crime.

35. Prisoner indicted may be convicted of lesser crime, or attempt. Upon the trial of an indictment, the prisoner may be convicted of the crime charged therein, or of a lesser degree of the same

crime, or of an attempt to commit the crime so charged, or of an attempt to commit a lesser degree of the sarae crime.

§ 36. Acquittal or conviction bars indictment for another degree, attempt. Where a prisoner is acquitted or convicted, upon an indictment for a crime consisting of different degrees, he cannot thereafter be indicted or tried for the same crime, in any other degree, nor for an attempt to commit the crime so charged, or any degree thereof.

TITLE IV.

TREASON.

SECTION 87. Treason against the state defined,

38. Id., how punished.

39. Levying war defined.

40. Resistance to a statute when levying war.

37. Treason against the state defined.

people of the state consists in

or

Treason against the

1. Levying war against the people of the state, within this state;

2. A combination of two or more persons by force to usurp the government of the state, or to overturn the same, shown by a forcible attempt, made within the state, to accomplish that purpose; or

3. Adhering to the enemies of the state, while separately engaged in war with a foreign enemy, in a case prescribed in the constitution of the United States, or giving to such enemies aid and comfort within the state or elsewhere.

2 R. S. 928, § 2.

§ 38. Id., how punished. Treason is punishable by death.

3 R. S. 928, § 1.

§ 39. Levying war defined. To constitute levying war against the people of this state, an actual act of war must be committed. To conspire to levy war is not enough.

Where per

40. Resistance to a statute when levying war. sons rise in insurrection with intent to prevent in general by force and intimidation, the execution of a statute of this state, or to force its repeal, they are guilty of levying war. But an endeavor, although by numbers and force of arms, to resist the execution of a law in a single instance, and for a private purpose, is not levying war.

TITLE V.

OF CRIMES AGAINST THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE.

§ 41 Crimes against the elective franchise are defined, and the punishment therefor prescribed by special statutes.

TITLE VI.

OF CRIMES BY AND AGAINST THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE STATE.

SECTION 42. Acting in a public office without having qualified.

43. Acts of officer de facto, not affected.

44. Giving or offering bribes.

45. Asking or receiving bribes.

46. Attempting to prevent officers from performing duty.
47. Resisting officers.

48. Taking unlawful fees.

49. Taking reward for omitting or delaying official acts.

50. Taking fees for services not rendered.

51. Taking unlawful reward for services in extradition of fugitives.

52. Corrupt bargain for appointments, etc.

§ 42. Acting in a public office without having qualified. A person who executes any of the functions of a public office without having taken and duly filed the required oath of office, or without having executed and duly filed the required security, is guilty of a misdemeanor; and in addition to the punishment prescribed therefor, he forfeits his right to the office.

§ 43. Acts of officer de facto. The last section must not be construed to affect the validity of acts done by a person exercising the functions of the public office in fact, where other persons than himself are interested in maintaining the validity of such acts.

44. Giving or offering bribes. A person who gives or offers a bribe to any executive officer of this state with intent to influence him in respect to any act, decision, vote, opinion, or other proceeding as such officer, is punishable by imprisonment in a state prison not exceeding ten years, or by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by both.

3 R. S. 957, § 9.

§ 45. Asking or receiving bribes. An executive officer, or person elected or appointed to an executive office, who asks, receives or agrees to receive any bribe, upon an agreement or understanding that his vote, opinion or action upon any matter then pending or which may by law be brought before him in his official capacity shall be influenced thereby, is punishable by imprisonment in a state prison not exceeding ten years, or by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by both; and in addition thereto forfeits his office and is forever disqualified from holding any public office under this state. Id., $10.