rules, as where the whole equity of a complaint is denied by the answer (b.) The effect of the injunction granted under this part of the section, is not to restrain any removal or disposition whatever of the defendant's property, but only such a removal or disposition with an intent to defraud creditors (Brewster v. Hodges, 1 Duer, 609; and see Pomeroy v. Hindmarsh, 5 How. 35).

a. Continuance of injunction.—Ön an application to continue a temporary injunction, the court will inquire whether or not it has power to grant the relief demanded (Hartt v. Harvey, 10 Abb. 322; 32 Barb. 55.) Where an order absolutely enjoins defendant from doing certain acts, until the further order of the court; although it also requires him to show cause at a special term why such injunction should not be continued until the determination of the action, there is no necessity for any additional order to continue the injunction (Kelly v. Jeroloman, Rob. 158). Upon hearing such motion merely to continue the injunction, the court cannot relieve the defendant from the first order; that can only be done on his motion for the purpose (id.)

6. Trade-marks.-In what cases and upon what principles the court will grant an injunction, to protect the use of a trade-mark, see Brooklyn White Lead Co. v. Masury, 25 Barb. 417; Hobbs v. Francais, 19 How. 567; Comstock v. White, 10 Abb. 264 n.; Howe v. Searing, 10 Abb. 264; Partridge v. Menck, 2 Barb. Ch. R. 101, affirmed; see 4 How. 296; 1 How. App. Cas. 547; Peterson v. Humphrey, 4 Abb. 394; Fenn v. Bowles, 7 Abb. 202; Stokes v. Landgraff, 17 How. 608; Christy v. Murphy, 12 How. 77; Samuel v. Buger, 4 Abb. 88; 13 How. 342; 24 Barb. 163; Williams v. Spence, 25 How. 366; Jurgensen v. Alexander, 24 How. 269; Fetridge v. Wells, 4 Abb. 144; Fetridge v. Merchant, id. 156; explained, Corwin v. Daly, 7 Bosw. 222; and see Howard v. Henriquez, 3 Sand. 725; Stone v. Carlan, 3 Code Rep. 67; Merrimack Manuf. Co. v. Garner, 4 E. D. Smith, 387; 2 Abb. 318; Wolfe v. Goulard, 18 How. 64; Williams v Johnson, 2 Bosw. 1; Clark v. Clark, 25 Barb. 76 ; Merserole v. Tynberg, 36 How. 14; Curtis v. Bryan, 36 How. 33; McCardel v. Peck, 28 How. 120; Binninger v. Wattles, id. 206; Stevens v. De Couto, 7 Rob. 343; 4 Abb. N. S. 47; Burnett v. Phalen, 3 Keyes, 594; 3 Trans. App. 167; 5 Abb. N. S. 212; Merserole v. Tynberg, 4 Abb. N. S. 410; Caswell v. Davis, id. 6; 35 How. 76; Faber v. Faber, 3 Abb. N. S. 115; Matsell v. Flannagan, 2 Abb. N. S. 459; Amoskeag Manuf. Co. v. Garner, 6 Ább. N. S. 265; Town v. Stetson, 5 Abb. N. S. 218; Smith v. Woodruff, 48 Barb. 438; Howe v. Howe Machine Co. 50 Barb. 236; Gillott v. Esterbrook, 47 Barb. 455; Newman v. Alvord, 49 Barb. 588; 35 How. 108.

c. State officers.-See Laws of 1851, ch. 488. The courts cannot enjoin the acts of officers of the State who are proceeding under authority of a law of the State, although the law is alleged to be unconstitutional (Thompson v. Comm'rs of Canal Fund, 2 Abb. 248; The People v. Draper, 14 How. 233). Unless the acts are in manifest violation of the law, or in bad faith (Hartwell v. Armstrong, 19 Barb. 166; and see Leigh v. Westervelt, 2 Duer, 618; Phænix v. Comm'rs of Emigration, 1 Abb. 466; 12 How. 1; Gillespie v. Broas, 23 Barb. 370; Fitzpatrick v. Flagg, 4 Abb. 213; Bouton v. City of Brooklyn, 15 Barb. 375; Mace v. Trustees of Newburgh, 15 How. 161; Blake v. City of Brooklyn, 26 Barb. 30; Fuller v. Allen, 7 Abb. 12).

d. Municipal corporation.-As to injunctions against, see Whitney V. Mayor of N. Y. 28 Barb. 233; People v. Mayor of N. Y. 9 Abb. 253; The People v. The Mayor, 32 Barb. 102; and see 19 How. 155; Milhau v. Sharp, 15 Barb. 193; 17 id. 435; 28 id. 228; Stuyvesant v. Pearsall, 15 Barb. 245; Morgan v. Quackenboss, 22 Barb. 72; Baldwin v. City of Buffalo, 29 Barb. 396; to prevent improper expenditures of city funds (De Baum v. Mayor of N. Y. 16 Barb. 392; Reynolds v. Mayor of Albany, 8 Barb. 597; Roberts v. Mayor of N. Y. 5 Abb. 41; Dolan v. Mayor of N. Y. 4 Abb. N. S. 397; Greaton v. Griffin, 4 Abb. N. S. 310; Pullman v. Mayor of N. Y. 2 Abb. N. S. 29.)

e. To stay proceedings in another action.—An injunction will not be granted by any court of this State to stay proceedings in an action in

the same court or in any other court of this State of co-ordinate jurisdiction, or court of the United States, where the relief sought can be obtained by motion, answer or otherwise, in the action sought to be restrained (Bowers v. Talmadge, 16 How. 325; Dederick v. Hoysradt, 4 How. 350; Arndt v. Williams, 16 How. 244; Bennett v. Le Roy, 14 How. 178; 5 Abb. 55, 156; Conover v. Mayor of N. Y., 25 Barb. 514; 5 Abb. 293; Winfield v. Bacon, 24 Barb. 155; Wood v. Draper, id. 265; Chappell v. Potter, 11 How. 365; Van Wagenen v. La Farge, 13 How. 16; Mott v. U. S. Trust Co. 19 Barb. 568; Tarrant v. Quackenboss, 10 How. 244; Hunt v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. 8 How. 416; Grant v. Quick, 5 Sand. 612; Harman v. Remsen, 23 How. 174; Phelan v. Smith, 8 Cal. R. 520; Rickett v. Johnson, id. 34; Revalk v. Kraemer, id. 66; Chapman v. Hibbard, id. 268; Schell v. Erie R. R. Co., 35 How. 438; 51 Barb. 368; Moser v. Polhamus, 4 Abb. N. 8. 442; Sippile v. Albites, 5 Abb. N. S. 76). But an injunction will sometimes be allowed to prevent a multiplicity of suits (Woodruff v. Fisher, 17 Barb. 224; 8 Abb. 241; 7 id. 69; 5 id. 410; 17 N. Y. 608; and see Minor v. Webb, 10 Abb. 284; Grinnon v. Platt, 31 Barb. 328).

a. A court of this State, having general equitable jurisdiction, has power to enjoin a party to a suit pending before it from suing the adverse party upon the same subject-matter in a foreign tribunal (Field v. Holbrook, 3 Abb. 377; and see 3 Abb. 20, note; Williams v. Ayrault, 31 Barb. 364).

b. Where it is shown that a justice's judgment, regular on its face, was ob tained in an action in which he had no jurisdiction, the court will enjoin proceedings on such judgment (Cooper v. Ball, 14 How. 295; see Munn v. Worrall, 16 Barb. 221).

c. A State court has no jurisdiction to enjoin a judgment of the circuit court of the United States (McKee v. Voorhies, 7 Cranch, 279; and see Phelan v. Smith, 8 Cal. R. 520; Mariposa Co. v. Garrison, 26 How. 448). A court of the United States has no jurisdiction to enjoin proceedings in à State court (Diggs v. Wolcott, 4 Cranch, 179).

d. Where an injunction is granted to restrain proceedings pending in another court, it is improper to enjoin the counsel employed in those proceedings, unless something more is alleged against him than the prosecution of his client's rights (Mayor of N. Y. v. Conover, 5 Abb. 252).

See New Haven R. R. Co. v. Schuyler, 8 Abb. 239; McCarthy v. Peake, 9 Abb. 164).

An injunction has been allowed,—

e. To restrain transfer of stock in a mining corporation (The People v. Parker Vein Co. 10 How. 187; 544; Rogers v. Michigan, &c. R. R. Co. 28 Barb. 540).

f. To aid an action for recovery of specific personal property (Erpstein v. Berg, 13 How. 92; Furniss v. Brown, 8 How. 59; Hunt v. Mootry, 10 How. 478).

g. To restrain the obstruction of water courses (Corning v. Troy Iron & Nail Factory, 6 How. 89; 39 Barb 312; Schafer v. Herb, 7 Rob. 222).

h. To restrict the use of demised premises to the terms of the lease (Howard v. Ellis, 4 Sand. 369; Dodge v. Lambert, 2 Bosw. 570; Ogden v. Jones, id. 685; Ambler v. Skinner, 7 Rob. 561).

i. To restrain publication of private letters (Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. 49). j. To prevent misappropriation of the funds of a moneyed corporation (Carpenter v. New Haven R. R. 5 Abb. 277).

k. To restrain a nuisance interfering with private rights (Smith v. Lockwood, 13 Barb. 209; Phanix v. Commissioners of Emigration, 1 Abb. 466; The Mayor v. Baumberger, 7 Rob. 219; Wetmore v. Story, 22 Barb. 414; Dubois v. Budlong, 15 Abb. 445; Penniman v. N. Y. Balance Co. 13 How. 40; Knox v. Mayor of N. Y. 38 How. 67; and see Harrison v. Newton, 1 Code Rep. N. S. 207; Peck v. Elder, 3 Sand. 126; Hudson v. Madison, 35 Eng. Ch. R. 352; Milhau v. Sharp, 7 Abb. 220; 28 Barb. 228; Niagara Falls Bridge Co. v. Great Western R. R. Co. 39 Barb. 212; McKeon v. See, 4 Rob. 450; Masterson

v. Short, 7 Rob. 299; 3 Abb. N. S. 154; Manhattan Gas Co. v. Barker, 7 Rob. 523; 36 How. 233; Milhau v. Sharp, 27 N. Y. 612; Dællner v. Tynan, 38 How. 176).

a. To restore running water (Corning v. Troy Nail Factory, 40 N. Y. 191). b. To restrain a blacksmith from carrying on his trade (Dallner v. Tynan, 38 How. 176)

c. To restrain prosecution of a claim before an American consul abroad (Dainese v. Allen, 3 Abb. N. S. 212).

d. To restrain proceedings under act to abolish imprisonment for debt (Frost v. Myrick, 1 Barb. 362).

e. To restrain a divorced husband from interfering with property of the wife (Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Barb. 295).

f. To prevent waste or injury to land (Spear v. Cutter, 5 Barb. 486; Rodgers v. Rodgers, 11 Barb. 596; Johnson v. White, 11 Barb. 194; Relyea v. Beaver, 34 Barb. 547; see, however, Van Wyck v. Álliger, 6 Barb. 507).

g. To restrain a municipal corporation from improper use of the public moneys (Christopher v. Mayor of N. Y. 13 Barb. 567; Pullman v. Mayor of N. Y. 2 Abb. N. S. 291).

h. To prevent fraudulent disposition of property (Mitchell v. Bettman, 25 Barb. 408; Dillon v. Horn, 5 How. 35; see, however, Reubens v. Joel, 13 N.Y. 488).

i. By a stockholder against a company (Hamilton v. Acces'y Transit Co. 26 Barb. 46).

j. By a tax-payer to restrain a contractor with the city from violating his contract (McCafferty v. McCabe, 4 Abb. 57; Kelsey v. King, 32 Barb. 410).

k. To prevent the removal of the remains of the dead (Richards v. N'west Dutch Church, 11 Abb. 30).

1. To restrain proceedings of a magistrate out of court (Mayor, &c. of N. Y. v. Conover, 5 Abb. 253; and see id. 171).

m. To restrain a creditor from proceeding at law against an insolvent corporation to obtain a preference (Galway v. Ū. S. Sugar Refining Co. 21 How. 313).

n. To stay proceedings on an execution (Shaw v. Dwight, 16 Barb. 536), or on a judgment (Watt v. Rogers, 2 Abb. 261; Clute v. Potter, 37 Barb. 199). o. To restrain a railroad from removing its rails (The People v. Albany R. R. Co. 19 How. 523; 11 Abb. 136).

p. To restrain a bishop from prosecuting a sentence of an ecclesiastical tribunal (Walker v. Wainwright, 16 Barb. 486).

q. To restrain an individual from opening a road to the prejudice of a road corporation (Auburn Plank Road v. Douglass, 12 Barb. 553).

An injunction has been refused,—

r. Merely to restrain an act "dangerous to the peace, morals or welfare of the community" (Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. 49; Smith v. Lockwood, 13 Barb. 209).

8. To restrain proceedings on a judgment (Watt v. Rogers, 2 Abb. 261; Chappel v. Potter, 11 How. 365; see, however, Dobson v. Pearce, 1 Abb. 97; 12 N. Y. 166).

t. To restrain the publication of proceedings in another action (Wood v. Marvine, 3 Duer. 674).

u. To restrain the disclosure of an art or invention taught by plaintiff to defendant under an oath not to divulge it (Deming v. Chapman, 11 How. 382; Nessle v. Reese, 19 Abb. 240; 29 How. 382; Hammer v. Barne's, 26 How. 174).

. To restrain infringment of copyright (Palmer v. Dewit, 7 Rob. 530). w. To restrain a foreign corporation from issuing bonds (Rogers v. Michigan South R. R. Co. 28 Barb. 539; see Fisk v. Chicago & Rock Island R. R. 36 How. 20; Brien v. Rock Island R. R. 36 How. 24); or paying a dividend (Howell v. Chi. & N. W. R. R. Co. 51 Barb. 378).

2. Restraining arbitrators from making an award under the circumstances (Heath v. Pres. of Gold Board, 7 Abb. N. S. 251).

a. To restrain overseers of highways opening a road (Snyder v. Trumpbour, 7 Trans, App. 63).

b. To restrain sale by sheriff on execution against partnership assets (Turner v. Smith, 1 Abb. N. S. 304).

c. To restrain State officers proceeding under a State law (Thompson v. Commissioners of Canal Fund, 2 Abb. 248).

d. To restrain a railroad company from cutting its road (Baucus v. Albany N'ern R. R. Co. 8 How. 70; see, also, Hentz v. Long Island R. R. 13 Barb. 646). e. To restrain a receiver (Winfield v. Bacon, 24 Barb. 155).

f. To prevent the construction of a sewer in a public street by a municipal corporation (Kelsey v. King, 32 Barb. 410).

g. To restrain the exercise of a trade contrary to a covenant with a specific penalty for a breach (Vincent v. King, 13 How. 234). It would be otherwise if no penalty was specified (id.; see Howe v. Searing, 6 Bosw. 354; see Redfield v. Middleton, 7 Bosw. 649).

h. To prevent a consequential injury from a lawful exercise of a right (Williams v. Ñ. Y. Cent. R. R. Co. 18 Barb. 222).

i. To restrain the collection of a tax illegally imposed (Wilson v. Mayor of N. Y. 1 Abb. 4; Chemical Bank v. Mayor of N. Y. id. 79; N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. N. Y. Supervisors, id. 250; Livingston v. Hollenbeck, 4 Barb. 10; Van Rensselaer v. Kidd, id. 17; Hasbrook v. Kingston B'd of Education, 5 Abb. N. S. 399; 3 Keyes, 480; 3 Trans. App. 106; Mut. Ben. Ins. Co. 2 Abb. N. S. 233; Messeck v. Superv. of Columbia, 50 Barb. 190; see, however, Wood v. Draper, 4 Abb. 322).

j. To restrain a foreclosure suit (Tarrant v. Quackenboss, 10 How. 244; see Grinnon v. Platt, 31 Barb. 328; Susquehanna Bank v. Supervisors of Broom, 25 N. Y. 312; Broderick v. Smith, 26 Barb. 539).

k. To protect a mere nominal interest (Wetmore v. Story, 3 Abb. 262; 281). 7. To protect a claim on an illegal contract (Bennett v. Amer. Art Union, 5 Sand. 614).

m. To restrain the continuance of the use of the signs of a dissolved firm by the firm continuing the business (Peterson v. Humphrey, 4 Abb. 394).

n. To restrain a municipal corporation from paying money under a resolution claimed to be illegal (Roberts v. Mayor of N. Y. 5 Abb. 41; see Ely v. Connolly, 7 Abb. N. S. 8; Cleveland Fire Alarm Co. v. Metrop. Fire Commr's, 7 Abb. N. S. 50).

o. To restrain a municipal corporation from selling its real estate (Roosevelt v. Draper, 7 Abb. 108; The People v. Louber, id. 158).

p. To restrain at the instance of an individual tax-payer, an act injurious to all the tax-payers of the city (Korft v. School Trustees, 16 How. 140).

q. To restrain the imposition or collection of a tax or of an assessment (see Betts v. City of W'msburgh, 15 Barb. 255; Wood v. Draper, 24 Barb. 187; 4 Abb. 322; 14 How. 233; Mace v. Trustees of Newburgh, 15 How. 161; Blake v. City of Brooklyn, 26 Barb. 301; Beck v. Village of Rondout, 15 Abb. 48; Murray v. Jayne, 8 Barb. 612; Chemical Bank v. Mayor of N. Y. 1 Abb. 79; and see Laws 1853, p. 97, ch. 69; Mut. Ben. Ins. Co. v. Super. of N. Y. 20 How. 416; 33 Barb. 322; Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. B'd of Super. 8 Bosw. 683; Magee v. Cutler, 43 Barb. 439).

r. To restrain a judgment-debtor from compromising suits brought to cancel securities as usurious (Boughton v. Smith, 26 Barb. 635).

8. When the real object of the action is to obtain a review of a previous decision (Livingston v. Hudson R. R. Co. 3 Code R. 143).

t. To restrain a defendant from obtaining payment of debts due him (Gallatin v. Oriental Bank, 16 How. 253).

u. To restrain the lessee of an inn from discontinuing to keep the inn open, as he had covenanted to do (Hooper v. Brodrick, 11 Simons, 47).

v. To prevent the publication of a libel (Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige, 24; 2 Swans, 413).

a. Generally, where the injury is such as may be amply recompensed by an action for damages (Marshall v. Peters, 12 How. 218; Townsend v. Tanner, 27 id. 384: 2 Code R. 6; Spear v. Cutter, 2 Code R. 100; 4 How. 575).

b. To restrain an apprehended trespass (Mayor of N. Y. v. Conover, 5 Abb. 171, 253; Sixth Av. R. R. Co. v. Kerr, 28 How. 382; Taylor v. Brockman, 1 Abb. N. S. 169; Gentil v. Arnaud, 38 How. 94).

c. To restrain construction of a railroad (Barnes v. So. Side R. R. Co. 2 Abb. N. S. 415).

d. To restrain expulsion of member from Board of Brokers (White v. Brownell, 3 Abb. N. S. 318).

e. To restrain interference with partnership funds, the partnership being denied (Goulding v. Bain, 4 Sand. 716; see Dunham v. Jarvis, 8 Barb. 88; Mowbray v. Lawrence, 22 How. 107; 13 Abb. 317).

f. To restrain summary proceedings by landlord to recover possession of demised premises (Aaron v. Baum, 7 Rob. 340; 37 How. 237; McIntyre v. Hernandez, 7 Abb. N. S. 214; Brown v. Metro. Gas Co. 38 How. 133; Marry v. James, 37 How. 52; Roberts v. Matthews, 18 Abb. 199; Bean v. Pettingill, 2 Abb. N. S. 58; 7 Rob. 7; Smith v. Moffat, 1 Barb. 65; Wordsworth v. Lyon, 1 Code Rep. N. S. 63; 4 How. 463; Hyatt v. Burr, 8 How. 168; Bokee v. Hammersley, 16 How. 461; Duigan v. Hogan, 1 Bosw. 645, Marks v. Wilson, 11. Abb. 87; Seeback v. McDonald, 11 Abb. 95; 21 How. 224; McGune v. Palmer, 5 Rob. 607; Supp v. Keusing, id. 609; Springsteen v. Powers, 3 id. 483). Injunctions were allowed under the circumstances of the cases in Cure v. Crawford, 1 Code Rep. N. S. 63; 4 How. 463; Forrester v. Wilson, 1 Duer, 624; Capet v. Parker, 1 Code Rep. N. S. 90; Vallotin v. Seignett, 2 Abb. 121; Griffith v. Brown, 3 Rob. 627; 28 How. 4; Graham v. James, 7 Rob. 468.

g. To restrain corporate election (Hartt v. Harvey, 32 Barb. 55; 10 Abb. 822).

h. Where plaintiff had commenced an action and issued an attachment in another action (Mills v. Block, 30 Barb. 549).

i. To restrain police officers from exercising supervision of citizens within the sphere of their duty as peace officers (Sterman v. Kennedy, 15 Abb. 201). j. To try the right to office in a religious corporation (Hartt v. Harvey, 10 Abb. 322; 32 Barb. 55).

k. To test the title to a public office (The People v. Draper, 4 Abb. 333; 14 How. 233; McCafferty v. Glazier, 10 How. 475; Lewis v. Oliver, 4 Abb. 121; Mayor of N. Y. v. Conover, 5 Abb. 171; Mayor of N. Y. v. Flagg, 6 Abb. 296). 7. To restrain proceedings of commissioners of highways (Thatcher v. Dusenbury, 9 How. 32; Hyatt v. Bates, 40 N. Y. 164).

m. Where the rights of the parties were undetermined, and an injury might be occasioned to one party (Gurnee v. Odell, 13 Abb. 264).

n. To set aside a fraudulent lien on property attached by the plaintiff (Brooks v. Stone, 11 Abb. 220; 19 How. 395; Mills v. Block, 30 Barb. 549).

o. To restrain a party from giving his services to another (Fredericks v. Meyer, 13 How. 566; 1 Bosw. 227; see Sanquirico v. Benedetti, 1 Barb. 315; Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De Gex M. & G. 604; 13 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 252; Butler v. Galetti, 21 How. 465; Hamblin v. Dinneford, 2 Edw. Ch. R. 529; Kemble v. Kean, 6 Simons, 333; De Pol v. Sohlke, 7 Rob. 280).

§ 220. At what time it may be granted. Copy of affidavit to be served.

The injunction may be granted at the time of commencing the action, or at any time afterward, before judgment, upon its appearing satisfactorily to the court or judge, by the affidavit of the plaintiff, or of any other person, that sufficient grounds exist therefor. A copy of the affidavit must be served with the injunction.