session thereof, the person establishing a legal title to the premises shall be presumed to have been possessed thereof within the time required by law; and the occupation of such premises by any other person, shall be deemed to have been under, and in subordination to, the legal title, unless it appear that such premises have been held and possessed adversely to such legal title, for twenty years before the commencement of such action.

Tyler v. Heidon, 46 Barb. 463.

$82. Occupation under written instrument.

Whenever it shall appear that the occupant, or those under whom he claims, entered into the possession of premises under claim of title, exclusive of any other right, founding such claim upon a written instrument, as being a conveyance of the premises in question, or upon the decree or judgment of a competent court, and that there has been a continued occupation and possession of the premises included, in such instrument, decree, or judgment, or of some part of such premises, under such claim, for twenty years, the premises so included shall be deemed to have been held adversely; except that where the premises so included consist of a tract divided into lots, the possession of one lot shall not be deemed a possession of any other lot of the same tract.

$83. Adverse possession.

For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession, by any person claiming a title founded upon a written instrument, or a judgment or decree, land shall be deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases :

1. Where it has been usually cultivated or improved;

2. Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure; 3. Where, although not inclosed, it has been used for the supply of fuel or of fencing timber, for the purposes of husbandry, or the ordinary use of the occupant;

4. Where a known farm or a single lot has been partly improved, the portion of such farm or lot that may have been left not cleared or not inclosed, according to the usual course and custom of the adjoining country, shall be deemed to have been occupied for the same length of time as the part improved and cultivated.

a. A corporation may claim title by adverse possession, the same as individuals (Robie v. Sedgwick, 35 Barb. 319), and twenty years' exclusive possession by a corporation under a claim of title will raise the presumption of a valid title (id.) Possession for purposes of railroad (Watson v. N. Y. Cent. R.

R. 6 Abb. N. S. 91.)

b. An alien may defend his possession as against one showing title, by showing an adverse possession of twenty years (Overing v. Russell, 32 Barb. 263).

c. An adverse possession, not founded on any written instrument, extends only to the land fenced, cultivated, or improved (Becker v ̧. Van Valkenburgh, 29 Barb. 319.)

d. An adverse possession commenced in the lifetime of the ancestor, continues to run against his heir, although the heir may be under disability (Becker v. Van Valkenburgh, 29 Barb. 319).

e. A general assertion of ownership, irrespective of any particular title, will constitute an adverse possession (Crary v. Goodman, 22 N. Y. 170; and see Miller v. Garlock, 8 Barb. 153; Becker v. Van Valkenburgh, 29 Barb. 319; Fish v. Fish, 39 Barb. 513; Finlay v. Cook, 54 Barb. 10).

884. Premises actually occupied, held adversely.

Where it shall appear that there has been an actual continued occupation of premises, under a claim of title, exclusive of any other right, but not founded upon a written instrument, or a judgment or decree, the premises so actually occupied, and no other, shall be deemed to have been held adversely.

§ 85. Adverse possession under claim not written.

For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession, by a person claiming title not founded upon a written instrument, or a judgment or decree, land shall be deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases only:

1. Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure; 2. Where it has been usually cultivated or improved.

See Miller v. Garlock, 8 Barb. 153; Munro v. Merchant, 28 N. Y. 10; Doolittle v. Tice, 41 Barb. 181.

§ 86. Relation of landlord and tenant.

Whenever the relation of landlord and tenant shall have existed between any persons, the possession of the tenant shall be deemed the possession of the landlord, until the expiration of twenty years from the termination of the tenancy; or, where there has been no written lease, until the expiration of twenty years from the time of the last payment of rent; notwithstanding that such tenant may have acquired another title, or may have claimed to hold adversely to his landlord. But such presumptions shall not be made after the periods herein limited.

$87. Descent cast.

The right of a person to the possession of any real property shall not be impaired or affected by a descent being cast in consequence of the death of a person in possession of such property.

§ 88. (Am'd 1870.) Persons under disabilities.

If a person entitled to commence any action for the recovery of real property, or to make an entry or defense founded on the title to real property, or to rents or services out of the same be, at the time such title shall first descend or accrue, either

1. Within the age of twenty-one years; or,

2. Insane; or,

3. Imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution upon conviction of a criminal offense for a term less than for life;

The time during which such disability shall continue, shall not be deemed any portion of the time in this chapter limited for the commencement of such, action, or the making of such entry or defense; but such action may be commenced, or entry or defense made, after the period of twenty years, and within ten years after the disability shall cease, or after the death of the person entitled who shall die under such disability; but such action shall not be commenced, or entry or defense made, after that period.

Fogal v. Pirro, 10 Bosw. 100; Tyler v. Heidon, 46 Barb. 441.

CHAPTER III.

Time of commencing actions other than for the recovery of real property.

$89. (Am'd 1849.) Periods of limitation prescribed.

The periods prescribed in section 74 for the commencement of actions other than for the recovery of real property, shall be as follows:

§ 90. (Am'd 1849.) Twenty years.

Within twenty years:

1. An action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of any State or Territory within the United States.

2. An action upon a sealed instrument.

a. This section applies to judgments of the marine and justices' courts (Delavan v. Florence, 9 Abb. 277, note; see Conger v. Vandewater, 1 Abb. N. S. 126), and surrogate decrees (1 Brad. Sur. R. 4).

b. The presumption of payment of a judgment obtained before the revised statutes took effect, is rebutted by a sheriff's return of an execution partly unsatisfied (Henderson v. Cairs, 14 Barb 15); and as to rebutting the presumption of payment of a judgment obtained prior to the revised statutes taking effect, see Waddell v. Elmendorf, 10 N. Y. 170.

91. (Am'd 1849.) Six years.

Within six years:

1. An action upon a contract, obligation, or liability, express or implied, excepting those mentioned in section 90.

2. An action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture.

3. An action for trespass upon real property.

4. An action for taking, detaining, or injuring any goods or chattels, including actions for the specific recovery of personal property.

5. An action for criminal conversation, for or any other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract, and not hereinafter enumerated.

6. An action for relief on the ground of fraud in cases which heretofore were solely cognizable by the court of chancery, the cause of action in such case not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.

c. The statute is a bar to an action on a promissory note brought by the payee against the maker; although the former, after the expiration of six years from the time the note became payable, paid the amount of it to his indorsee, and thus became repossessed of the note (Woodruff v. Moore, 8 Barb. 171).

d. Where services are performed for a series of years, without any express agreement as to the time or measure of compensation, no payments being made, the law will not imply an agreement that the payment shall be postponed until the termination of the employment, but will regard the hiring as from year to year, and the wages as payable at the same time (Davis v. Gorton, 16 N. Y. 255).

e. In an action for converting personal property, the statute commences to run from the time of the conversion (Kelsy v. Griswold, 6 Barb. 436). After

the statute has commenced running, the case cannot be taken out of the statute by a demand and refusal of the property, made after the defendant had parted with the property (id., and see Bruce v. Tilson, 25 N. Y. 194).

a. An action to enforce an equitable lien for the purchase-money of land, must be brought within six years. The debt is the cause of action (Borst v. Corey, 15 N. Y. 505).

b. One entrusted with a note for collection, and who receives the money, is not a trustee; and an action for the money must be within six years (Hickok v. Hickok, 15 Barb. 632).

c. A debt of an administrator for which a judgment has been recovered, is regarded as a simple contract debt, and must be prosecuted within six years (Ball v. Miller, 17 How. 300).

d. Under a general retainer to an attorney to prosecute an action, his right to costs against his client accrues on his perfecting judgment, and the statute limitation commences to run against his claim for costs from the time such judgment is perfected (Adams v. Fort Plain B'k, 23 How. 45; 2 Trans. App. 234).

e. The statute of limitations is a bar to a recovery for the use of goods for any period antecedent to six years before action brought (Rider v. Union Rubber Co. 5 Bosw. 86).

ƒ. An action in the nature of a creditor's bill is limited to six years after the return of the execution unsatisfied (Eyre v. Beebe, 28 How. 333). .

g. In an action for fraud the statute does not commence to run until knowledge of the fraud is brought to plaintiff (Gates v. Andrews, 5 Trans. App. 176; 37 N. Y. 657.

h. See In the matter of the Estate of Delacroix, deceased, 1 Brad. Sur. Rep. 1; Mayne v. Griswold, 3 Sand. 463; Coleman v. Second Av. R. R. 6 Trans. App. 148, and ante, page 74 a.

$92. (Am'd 1849.) Three years.

Within three years:

1. An action against a sheriff, coroner, or constable, upon a liability incurred by the doing of an act in his official capacity, and in virtue of his office, or by the omission of an official duty, including the nonpayment of money collected upon an execution. But this section shall not apply to an action for an

escape.

2. An action upon a statute, for a penalty or forfeiture, where action is given to the party aggrieved, or to such party and the people of this State, except where the statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation.

i. An action to charge defendants, as trustees of a manufacturing corporation, with personal liability for debts of the company, on the ground of omission to file report as required by law, and declaring improper dividends, must be commenced within three days after the cause of action accrued (Merchants B'k of N. Haven v. Bliss, 35 N. Y. 412).

j. An action to recover goods wrongfully taken by a sheriff under an execution, must be brought within three years from the day the levy was made (Coddington v. Carnley, 2 Hilton, 528; Dennison v. Plumb, 18 Barb. 89).

k. As to time of limitation in an action against a stockholder of the Rossie Galena Co. individually, under the act incorporating that company, see Corning v. McCullough, 1 How. App. Cas. 126.