Obrázky stránek
PDF
ePub

rence his Maker, and love his neighbour, have no sufficiently strong hold of the soul to carry him through life with satisfaction to himself, or with advantage to others."

I wish there were reasonable grounds for hope that the people of Manchester would lay such remarks as these to their hearts.

MATRIMONY AND DIVORCE.

A WRITER who describes himself as a barrister of Gray's Inn, has put forth a tractate upon the subject of divorce, herein imitating the somewhat renowned John Milton, but not quite coming up to the force and picturesqueness of that poetical republican's style. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the Gray's Inn gentleman possesses those qualities as a writer which are likely enough to make him popular in the present age, and in the present state of the public taste. He is very confident, very impetuous, and very liberally disdainful of all the "prejudices" which ecclesiastics and people of that sort have gathered out of an ancient book, called the Bible.

Our Gray's Inn philosopher divides all the married couples in England into three classesnot that he does this formally, for any such methodical statement of his case would be ineonsistent with the impetuous flow of his de

clámatory style-but persons of lower genius may be permitted to use the formality in humbly pursuing the business of analysis.

The first class he describes are those who are perfectly content in their wedded condition; the second are those who are dissatisfied with their matrimonial lot, and thereupon-at least so far as the husbands are concerned-act with the same license as if they were bound by no matrimonial engagements; the third are the conscientious, who have made "mistaken matches," cases in which, as our philosopher has it, "the society of his legal wife affords the husband no gratification, and conscience keeps him from violating the law in search of it" (the gratification, it is to be supposed)" elsewhere."

Our moral philosopher being a barrister, it is to be understood, doubtless, that he uses the term "legal" wife for the greater caution; but it would have gratified natural curiosity had he explained what sort of distinction he had in his mind when he used this epithet. What sort of a wife is it that is not legal, especially where bigamy is certainly not intended to be alluded to?

But now to apply our philosopher's notion concerning what he calls "the law against divorce" to these three several classes. With respect to the first, the law, he modestly assures us, is a superfluous impertinence; with respect to the second, a mere nullity; and with respect

to the third, an edict for the oppression of the unfortunate.

This conclusion he arrives at per saltum in the third page, and feels so sure about the matter, that he repeats it more emphatically thus:

"Viewed with reference to those who do not wish to separate, it is a command where none is wanting; viewed with reference to those whom neither human nor divine laws can bind, it is ludicrously impotent; and viewed with reference to the conscientious and ill-matched, it is a piece of absurd tyranny, inasmuch as it denies redress where redress would really prove a blessing."

This is a triumphant and most logical settlement of the question, and arrived at within three pages; for if the whole of the people to whom the Divorce Law can apply be divided into three parts, and if it be superfluous as regards the first part, impotent as regards the second, and absurdly tyrannical as regards the third, then it is most clear that, as regards the whole, it is a law worthy of condemnation.

But to us, much meditating upon all subjects of domestic interest, it may appear that our philosopher is considerably too hasty in his assumptions, and that he knows less of the genuine state and condition of mankind than even prejudiced ecclesiastics, who deduce their opinion of that state and condition from their

own observation and from those maxims of holy writ which apply, not to anything visionary, but to man as he really is.

The law of England which makes marriage indissoluble is not by any one held up as a thing so perfect but that inconvenience will occasionally arise from it. This is an accident of all law, and of every human device upon every subject. But it is very rash to conclude that it is superfluous to those who are content with their married condition. Who shall presume to affirm that this very contentment is, as to its steadiness and permanency, not very much dependent upon the inevitableness of the marriage tie when once entered into? It is true that the arbitrary imposition of a restraint often causes a wish for license which would not, perhaps, otherwise have existed; but-(such is the mingled texture of man's moral nature)—it is equally true that a voluntary adoption of a restraint, especially when believed to be on the side of virtue, keeps the desires from straying, and ensures, as far as may be, the constancy even of the will. Great as the blessing of regulated freedom undoubtedly is, and dreadful as have been the sufferings from its privation in certain great and notable cases, yet it may be taken as a truth which observation and experience will confirm, that in the general proceedings of mankind, small and great, domestic and public, the sum of fretfulness, discontent,

indecision, and remorse, arising from "the weight of too much liberty," is far greater in amount than that which restraint has ever inflicted.

"Nuns fret not at their convent's narrow room;
And hermits are contented with their cells;
And students with their pensive citadels :
Maids at the wheel, the weaver at his loom,
Sit blithe and happy; bees that soar for bloom,
High as the highest peak of Furness Fells,
Will murmur by the hour in fox-glove bells:
In truth, the prison, unto which we doom
Ourselves, no prison is."

In the ordinary practice of life there are thousands upon thousands who go on satisfied with their matrimonial condition because it is settled so, and cannot be unsettled; whereas, if there were a facility in the law for effecting a change, that change would be present to their thoughts, and they would long for it, and their contentment would be broken.

man.

66

Next, with regard to those who violate their vows in disregard of laws both divine and huIt is rash, if not untrue, to affirm that the law of indissolubility of marriage is to them "a nullity." Are there no such things as repentance and amendment? Is human character so uniform that it must be altogether rebellious or altogether obedient? Certainly not. In the practice of society it is notorious there are many who, in respect of marriage vows, amongst other things, are partly faithful and partly unfaithful.

« PředchozíPokračovat »