who means well for Germany must wish that the contrary were the rule; that every one who finds no law in his home should go to the Diet, and that no one should return without being helped, or else convinced of the unreasonableness of his demand. This would be peculiarly the part for Prussia, and of incalculable importance for her moral position in relation to the German nations. Only now and then one dares to strive against the government; but if it were clear that only objective justice could prevail, no evil would be durable. There certainly has not often been a worse time than the present for the position of Prussia with relation to Germany. The Catholic Debate and the Hanover Question have wounded us deeply. By the first, Prussia has not only lost the affection of a great number of her own subjects, even of whole provinces, but has also suffered great prejudice to her reputation with the German cabinets for intelligence and circumspection. They see us in embarrassment, and fear to be drawn in with us; and it is not Bavaria alone which we have cut off from us, but our conduct is also blamed at other courts. By the Hanover Question no one has suffered more than ourselves. From Austria nothing else was expected; whether Germany thereby falls morally to the ground or not, is equally acceptable and welcome to that cabinet. From us, on the contrary, a different course was expected than that we should merely follow behind, and co-operate in bringing quite naked to light the emptiness of the defence of law which the confederation secures. Here also should have been done precisely the contrary of what was done. The confederation should have brought the whole affair before its forum, and there judged what had passed. The king of Hanover should, for his own safety, have been forced to bring the dispute to the decision of the Diet; if it were then really found that many points of the constitution of 1833 were incompatible with the respective articles of the confederation (Art. 37 of the Treaty of Vienna), a decree should have been passed by which the confederation abolished the objectionable articles of that constitution; but the king should still be allowed to adhere in all else to the ordinations of his predecessor. The gap which this would cause should be filled up by a free agreement between the king and his estates, and the result placed under the guaranty of the confederation. This is what Prussia should have done; even the Liberals would have applauded such a course, and a great advance would have been made on all sides." -pp. 97-102.

In another place Radowitz endeavors to show that, should Prussia obtain the pre-eminence he desires for her, no danger to Catholicity would ensue from her religion. We think otherwise, but we give his arguments.

"If it were possible," he says, "to ruin the position of Prussia for the great future of Germany, it would be brought about by those persons who, urged by narrow-minded particularism and Protestantism, are never tired of representing Prussia as the champion of Protestantism in Germany. Even reasonable and moderate men fall into this foolish declamation. No greater prejudice can be done to the great mission of Prussia, than to ascribe to her this aim. Her Austrian and Bavarian, Rhenish and Westphalian enemies, would then be perfectly right in doing all in their power to prevent at any price the union of Germany under a Prussian head. That such a thought has in past years been entertained by German Catholics is plainly the cause of the inexpressibly sad position of the so-called German Catholic party on the German Question; a fact for which Germany and the Catholic Church will yet suffer severely. This thought is altogether false, however loudly it may be proclaimed in either camp. The position and mission of Prussia is never Protestant, nor even ecclesiastical, but is exclusively directed to the political union of the nation. Whoever would wish to heal the wretched and dangerous condition of this great ruling people, to establish a true community in the centre of Europe, and to solve the problem of the future, will start with the actual and authorized juxtaposition of both confessions, and hold unchangeably to it. The most perfect independence on both sides is the only possible relation of the State to the Church in Germany, and more especially so in Prussia than elsewhere. Any attempt to use the state and its means for the external aggrandizement of either of the Christian confessions, must invariably end in the ruin of both parties. Would to God this truth could penetrate men's minds! It is confessed in the moment of danger, but immediately denied as soon as any chance appears of drawing advantage from that alliance." pp. 236-238.

This will at least justify the author in his desire to establish the supremacy of Prussia in Germany, although it may not convince his readers of the advantage of that measure. For ourselves, we are unwilling to see a Protestant power possessed of so great influence in Germany, and although we may agree with Radowitz, that the true relation of the Church and State is perfect independence of one another, we cannot but be suspicious that such might not be the case. That it should be so, we concede; but that it would be so, we hesitate to affirm. Abstracting all considerations of religion, we cannot deny that, viewing the sole political and temporal welfare of Germany, the prevailing influence in German affairs would be better placed in the hands of Prussia than

in those of Austria. Prussia is, as he says, more closely connected and identified in all its interests with those of the rest of Germany, whilst Austria has comparatively little in common with its German neighbors. Still, believing as we do that Catholicity is immeasurably superior to all other forms of religion or rather the only one that is of any avail― for the political welfare and prosperity of any country, we raise our voice against the too great influence of Prussia; and whether the influence of the Catholic powers may be extended or not, we are unwilling to see that of the Protestant powers increased.

We next turn to some remarks intended to serve for the History of the State.

"In every form of government, in whatever manner it is constituted, there are always two parties; the governing and the governed. The appointment of the governor may be deduced and established in different ways; from the patrimonial relations,the family and its head; from the theocratic, the nation and the divinely appointed ruler; from the warlike, the chieftain and the army; and from the delegated, the citizens and those called by them to preside over their affairs. These principles have been more or less brought into combination in the historical manifestation, and have decided the form of the state. In the earliest times the patrimonial principle prevails as the patriarchal government. In the ancient kingdoms of the East is found a combination of the patrimonial and theocratic elements. In Rome, after Cæsar, the empire was a combination of the warlike and the delegated. In the Middle Ages in Germany the warlike was at first predominant; afterwards the patrimonial element entered, by the consolidation of the state, and formed the feudal system. In the seventeenth century the territorial lordship was constituted from the patrimonial and theocratic elements, but not without great distortion. In the government of Louis the Fourteenth and its imitations, the doctrine of a presumed delegation of the people is added. In the eighteenth century the state was in theory established on this principle of a supposed indorsement on the part of the citizens, and a corresponding theory of contract. The Napoleonic state is an intermediate anomaly, in which the warlike element is again introduced. The latest attempts, as the natural reaction against the doctrine of the eighteenth century, are to establish the state upon a combination of the theocratic and patrimonial principles (Haller, Maistre, and their followers).

relations of the govThe ancient republic

"A second consideration arises from the erned under different forms of the state. rests upon the actual community of all the citizens governing itself,

THIRD SERIES. VOL. III. NO. I.

8

The basis of the Oriental kingdom is the unrestrained sovereign and his absolute subjects, who may thus sink to the condition of mere slaves. Religion and morals form the only bounds and security, and this only so long as the ruler observes them. In the state of the Middle Ages, the warriors stand as free people by the side of the chieftain; by more fixed confirmation they become territorial lords within the patrimonial state, first as free possessors, afterwards as feudal tenants. The towns join them with their own rights. The clergy also retain their rights. From this grows the system of estates, in which the sovereign must obtain the consent of his estates, if he wishes to impose anything on them, or to demand anything from them. From the old estate system proceeds the representative state in various gradations. Its peculiar nature is that the estates represent not only themselves and their rights, but the collective nation, and that their consent is necessary not only in whatever immediately touches their rights, but also in all the acts of government. In the first form, which is found chiefly in England, these last developments are only partially discovered. Only in later times, as in the further imitation on the continent of Europe, is the abstract representative system fully carried out. The government here becomes only the executor of what the representatives of the people either decree on their own motion, or to which they give their consent on the motion of the government. Whether this government is to be vested in an hereditary race of princes or not, is merely a question of prudence. With intelligent persons the decision will always be in favor of the hereditary line. The extent and manner of the exercise of the power of the government form also a question of expediency. The government has never any right of its own in this matter, but fulfils a charge confided to it by the members of the state. In substance the abstract representative state is a republic with an hereditary supreme magistrate at the head of the government. I know that the term representative system is not always understood in this sense, and that by many these last developments are not admitted. The adoption of an absolute veto, which is a distinct anomaly in this system, shows it. But the fundamental principle of the system leads to these last points. If I wish to place my own opinion, already indicated above, in opposition to this, I must certainly go further back. If I weigh all accessible sources of knowledge, I can stop neither with the mere natural process, nor with any relations of conformity and utility, but the synthesis must demand this inseparable element in the state. The end of the state is the realization of right. Right appears under two forms; as freedom and as order. The state must preserve both; it is the office of authority to guarantee and maintain these two conditions. It fulfils this office by its own right, or, more properly, by its own duty in this consists

the true nature of authority. Whether this authority is hereditary in a line of princes, or is elective in any form, is in itself of no importance. Even those who are elected to this office are the authority in the full sense, and not merely officers who execute the will of another. That the authority in the administration of its office does not lose other rights, or usurp other privileges, is a further condition. The sum of the regulations how the authority is to be invested, and where and how in the administration of the government it is bound to the co-operation or consent of the governed, is the constitution of the state. What this should be in a particular instance depends wholly on particular circumstances, or on the nature of the contract. No universal direction for this can be taken from reason nor from the immediate precepts of God, but is determined by the facts in the particular case.

"This is no contradiction of the divine government of the world, which is manifested in the history of nations. I see clearly enough the general form of the state, though not the particular details, for Prussia, and for the middle of the nineteenth century. The Prussian monarchy has been established by intelligence and war; it is less the result of a natural growth than of a creation. Therefore on one side it is further removed from the conditions of the patrimonial state, and on the other it partakes more of the nature of a centralized government. What the Prussian monarchy loses in material strength in comparison with the other members of the Pentarchy, it must repair by the constant readiness of all its force. The finances and the army must be greatly attended to, and be always at its disposal. Hence the necessity of a strong government on the one hand, and on the other that it proceed in constant unison with the governed. And because the strength of all its subjects is more to be exerted in the field, than is the case with any other state, a necessary condition of its life is the representation of the country. The constitution of Prussia flows from the position of a free people under a free king. The question is next raised as to the manner of the representation. I do not hesitate to maintain, that the true aristocracy are the proper representatives of the nation. But can this be the old representation of the estates ? With my hand on my heart, I answer, No. The old estates are blotted out, and the new provinces of Prussia consist of quite different elements. The aristocracy of the present day is based on three things,-office, intelligence, and possessions. The first can clearly be only a secondary element of the representation against the government. Here it has influence, not as a consequence, but as a thing compatible with it; and it is a dangerous misconception to confound these points. To find the proper position of the second requires a closer analysis, which I shall consider elsewhere. The most important force is in the third, the posses