agreement of the colonies as at any rate the causa sine qua non; such recognition in no way impairs the unity of the Act of Constitution or suggests dangerous rights of secession. In complete accordance with the doctrine of colonial selfgovernment laid down for Australia in 1850, the union and its conditions (subject to some alteration of the provisions concerning appeals to the King in Council) were framed in Australia itself, and the Imperial Parliament in passing the Statute which gave them legal form acted as the supreme constituent authority in the Empire.

An extensive literature exists on the subject of the several unions of States, and no definition of a federal union could be offered which would not challenge criticism. For purposes of description, however, it may be said that a federal government exists in any political community where the powers of government are divided between two authorities -a central authority extending to the whole territory and population, and a number of particular authorities limited to particular areas and persons and things therein each of which is equipped for its own purposes without recourse to the other, and which are so far independent of each other that neither can destroy the other or impair its powers or encroach upon its sphere.

If it is asked why the Australian colonies preferred a federal to an incorporate union, the division to the concentration of power, the most obvious answer lies in the fact that where several States, independent of each other, come together to form a new political community, there is, in the absence of any imperative force, a strong bias against complete self-surrender and absorption. The same cause influences the form which federalism is likely to assume-in its most natural shape, the constituent States will not only preserve their own identity, but will reserve the general powers of government and will commit to the new federal authority specific powers only.

This tendency will be the greater if the union is formed under the auspices of the existing Governments and of State politicians. It may be overcome if the union is achieved either by or in the presence of force, as in Germany, where the Empire of 1870 was founded on the military supremacy of Prussia, whose hegemony was stamped upon the Constitution. In South Africa, the deliberate preference for an incorporate union was due to a variety of conditions, chief amongst which were that the fundamental divisions of South African politics transcended colonial boundaries altogether, and (it may be surmised) that the pathway to union was beaten out by men whose position in the country enabled them to view the conditions with detachment from local prepossessions and connections.

That the Canadian Constitution gives the residuary power to the Dominion Parliament and only specific powers to the Provinces is no exception to the rule. In addition to the fact that in the years 1864-1867, when the "confederation was forming, the United States was a neighbour flushed with the spirit of American unity, is the fact that the Dominion Constitution was not merely nor mainly a union of the British North American colonies; it was, so far as concerned its principal members— Ontario and Quebec-a dissolution of the incorporate union of Upper and Lower Canada and the substitution of a federal bond.

In Australia, all these exceptional conditions were absent. There was no imperative external pressure-the questions of the Pacific and of a White Australia had not then assumed the importance which later events and a wider outlook have given them. Union was a governmental convenience rather than a necessity, designed for the attainment of certain obvious and practical purposes, more apparent to men of political experience than to the multitude. In such circumstances, it was natural to build on existing foundations, to leave things unchanged except so far as change should be

necessary to secure the practical ends in view.

It

is not necessary to lay stress upon mutual jealousies, and the impossibility of obtaining union upon other terms. To do so is to suggest that the Constitution was to its framers a pis-aller, an acceptance of the second best; and there is no reason for doubting their belief that the great interests which they had in view would be served by a government with powers definitely limited and pointing specifically towards those ends better than by one which was burdened with the miscellaneous functions of a Parliament with plenary powers. An ardent national spirit and widespread national consciousness have been the growth of the years since federation was accomplished: the product of a sense of common external interests and possible dangers on the one hand, and, on the other, of more clearly defined differences in political thought and aims.

The position, as it presented itself to federalists, cannot be described better than in the resolutions of the National Australasian Convention of 1891:

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That, in order to establish and secure an enduring foundation for the structure of a Federal Government, the principles embodied in the resolutions following be agreed to:

"1. That the powers and privileges and territorial rights of the several existing colonies shall remain intact except as to such surrenders as may be agreed upon as necessary and incidental to the power and authority of the National Federal Government.

"2. No new State shall be formed by separation from another State, nor shall any State be formed by the junction of two or more States or parts of States, without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of the Federal Parliament.

"3. That the trade and intercourse between

the federated Colonies, whether by land carriage or by coastal navigation, shall be absolutely free.

"4. That the power and authority to impose Customs duties and duties of Excise upon goods the subject of Customs duties, and to offer bounties, shall be exclusively lodged in the Federal Government and Parliament, subject to such disposal of the revenues thence derived as shall be agreed upon.

"5. That the naval and military defence of Australia shall be entrusted to federal forces, under one command.

"6. That provision shall be made in the Federal Constitution which will enable each State to make such amendments in its Constitution as may be necessary for the purposes of the federation."

These principles were emphasised in the Federal Convention of 1897-9.

A clause in the draft of 1891, making the Governor-General of the Commonwealth the channel of communication between the Imperial Government and the States, was omitted in the final scheme; and the Canadian plan, which gives to the Dominion Government the appointment of the Lieutenant-Governors of the Provinces and a veto on provincial legislation was carefully avoided. The object of the Constitution was to mark out the sphere of the Federal Government, to ensure the completeness of the power of that Government in its sphere, and to leave the rest-the States' Constitutions, their frame of government, and their powers of government-unchanged.

§ 2. Commonwealth and State Functions.

In the sphere of Federal authority, precedence must be accorded to the matters of defence and fiscal relations. Here the State services of Defence and Customs were wholly transferred to the exclusive authority of the Commonwealth Parlia

ment. Subject to the constitutional provision of inter-state free-trade, power was given to make laws with respect to external and inter-state commerce. Two other State services, closely connected with external commerce-lighting and buoying, and quarantine-were also transferred, as was the post-office, with the telegraphs and telephones. Of the 39 subjects granted to the Commonwealth Parliament, some, like "external affairs," "immigration," "naturalisation and aliens," point to the established need of a single voice to speak for Australia in her external relations. Others, such as trade-marks and patents, banking and bills of exchange, go some way towards bringing commercial law into federal hands. Currency and coinage are always regarded as fittest for a central authority, and in Australia the power of the Commonwealth Parliament is fortified by prohibitions to the States. Weights and measures are federal for like reasons. Marriage and divorce are suggested by warnings from the United States. Alone amongst the miscellaneous powers, "invalid and old-age pensions" and an arbitration power to deal with industrial disputes passing the boundaries of any one State, were calculated to make any wide appeal to political feeling.

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From the nature of the case, it is not possible to define the States' powers by enumeration. But the residuary power includes such important matters of administration as the lands, public health, mining, railways, education, police, and local government; the whole law of property and most civil rights; all trade and commerce, except foreign and inter-state commerce; and all industry and industrial relations except so far as they may be brought into the Commonwealth sphere of conciliation and arbitration by the existence of some form of dispute extending beyond the limits of any one State. The State power thus embraces those social matters which in all modern countries are arousing the deepest concern, as well as those matters of public economy which in a new country engross the