The Law Relating to Railways and Railway Companies

This, added to the compensation above mentioned, forms the total produce of the whole land, which the company, if not a carrier, or a lessee of the railway carrying on no trade upon it, would receive as the aggregate of the line, and is that upon which alone, after due deductions, the company contend the rate ought to be imposed. We understand them, although it is not precisely so stated, to admit the principle of considering the whole line as entire, and to arrive at the exact sum at which they contend the rate in the respondent parish should be fixed by a mileage division of the whole line,—a principle very convenient in itself, and rightly adopted by consent. It is unnecessary, after this statement, to point out the difference, in fact, between the two cases; but we cannot see how this difference bears upon the principle on which the rate is to be imposed, or which governed the Court in the former decision, which proceeded entirely on the existing state of the facts. Each of the two companies must be rated in respect of the occupation of the land: one of them derives no benefit from that occupation, except by carrying goods and passengers, and the division of that profit into tolls and fares we think merely nominal; the other, in addition to this mode of profit by occupying, also derives a profit from allowing others to carry goods and passengers on the line also; and this latter profit is properly called tolls. Still, in both cases, the inquiry must be the same— What is the value of the occupation, from whatever source derived? In neither can the profits of trade, as such, be brought into the rate; but, if the ability to carry on a gainful trade on land adds to the value of the land, that value cannot be excluded on the ground that it is referrible to the trade. Suppose a house occupied by a private family to-day, which, having greater advantages of situation for the purpose of trade, should be turned into a shop to-morrow, and, in conSequence, let for double or treble the former rent: would not the rate be properly increased in proportion? Could it be objected, that to do so is to rate the profits of trade? Again, suppose the occupier were to let out different rooms to other persons carrying on the same trade as himself, and this mode of occupying was said to increase the value of the house to let: would this at all vary the principle on which he was rated, although it would increase the quantum? Lastly, suppose, instead of this species of under-letting being at the option of the occupier, all persons using the same trade had the right by some statute, under certain restrictions, to carry it on in the different rooms of the same house, paying a large compensation to the occu

Cases.

R. v. The

Grand Junction
Railway Co.

Cases.

R. v. The

Grand Junction
Railway Co.

pier would not the principle of the rate be still the same? Would it be material to inquire how the occupation became more valuable, except for the purpose of making greater or less deductions, which the nature of the occupation would make just? We may all remember when the large premises in Soho-square, now used as a bazaar, were occupied as a private residence. The present mode of occupation, no doubt, increases the rent; but whether one man, being the tenant alone, carried on the various trades now exercised there, or sold goods himself at some of the stands, and let out others, and so derived his profit in part directly from trade, in part from the rent paid him by the traders, or let out all the stands, and so earned no profit but from the rents paid him by the traders, the result would be, in either case, exactly the same; the overseers could only inquire what was the fair rateable value of the thing so occupied. Nor, as we have said before, could the inquiry be at all affected if the occupier of the bazaar held it under some statutable license, which compelled him to let his stands to all persons paying certain rents, and submitting to certain regulations. But it is said, that, in the case supposed, all is referrible to the occupation under the supposed lease that conveys the exclusive dominion, and thence flow naturally the means of making profits. We have, in truth, already given the answer to this; but it will be plainer if we observe, that there is a fallacy in confounding that which the lease conveys the legal title to, with that which it gives the lessee the means of doing or obtaining. No two things can be more distinguishable; and it is the latter which regulates the rent the tenant will give, and not the former. Suppose two estates of equal size, and in all respects of equal fertility, but one surrounded by excellent roads, a canal near to it, and a large market, and the other without these advantages; of course the rent and rateable value of the one would be larger than the other, yet a tenant would take no more by the lease of one than he would by the other; the lease would give him no legal title, which he had not before, to use the roads, canal, or market. Or, suppose a more peculiar case: A., the owner and occupier of Blackacre, and having the command of a stream of water which he can turn over Whiteacre, and on that account desires to rent it; to him it will be more valuable than to any other occupier, because he fertilises at very little expense; he will therefore give a larger rent than any other person; yet, by the lease, he would take no more than any other person, although he ought undoubtedly to pay a higher rent. Apply the principle of this. case

to the railway of the appellants, and it is quite true, that, if they were
to let it to a tenant, the lease would convey the land and railway
only, and give a title to the tolls only; but the lessee would undoubt-
edly consider the facilities and advantages which the occupation as
tenant would afford him for carrying on a lucrative trade as a carrier;
and in whatever proportion that consideration would increase his
rent, in the same, after due allowance, would his rate be raised also.
The two propositions are equally true, that the rate is not to be im-
posed in respect of the profits of trade, and that it is to be imposed in
respect of the value of the occupation; and two propositions that are
true, and applicable to the same subject-matter, cannot be incon-
sistent; and we think the respondents in the present case, by the
scheme they proposed, have shewn that they are not so.
The gross
yearly receipts of the company, as occupiers of and carriers on the
railway, must include the proper subject-matter of the rate: they
have therefore taken a sum agreed to represent them as the first point
to start from; they then assume an amount of capital employed in
the trade, and deduct from the former sum 51. per cent. on the latter
for the interest of this capital, and 207. per cent. for the profits which
ought to be made upon it; 3rdly, for the depreciation of stock beyond
the usual repairs and expenses; 4thly, they deduct from the gross
receipts the annual cost of conducting the trade; 5thly, they deduct the
annual value of all the lands occupied by stations, &c.; and, 6thly, a
sum per mile for the reproduction of rails, chairs, sleepers, &c. These
deductions, taken together, seem to us to include whatever is properly
referrible to the trade, as distinguished from the increased value which
that trade gives to the land. We do not now speak of the amounts
allowed under each item, and we are not competent to give any opinion
on this point, which is properly for the sessions; but if these are the
proper heads of deduction, then the residue must represent the value
of the occupation; and if so, this alone is brought into the rate, and
the profits of the trade are excluded. Accordingly, the sessions have
found, as an inference from the facts, that the residue is the sum
which a tenant from year to year might reasonably be expected to
give for the railway and corporeal hereditaments now occupied by the
company in connexion with the railway, exclusive of the stations and
other buildings, (which are rated separately), such tenant being assumed
to have the same and no other power of using the railway, the same and
no other advantages and privileges, than the company now possess. If
the deductions exhaust that portion of receipts referrible to trade, the

Cases.

R. v. The Grand Junction Railway Co.

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